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2ABSTRACT
The first Chapter investigates the question: 
whether nullity existed in the dharmasastra♦
Chapter Two is concerned with bigamy as ground for 
nullity. The essential requirements to obtain relief where 
either party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage 
have been discussed. *
In Chapter Three degrees of prohibited relationship, 
degrees of Sapip.<jLa relationship, and essential requirements 
of a custom permitting such a marriage have been dealt with.
Chapter Pour defines impotence, considers instances 
amounting and not amounting to impotence. The media and 
standard of proof of impotence; factors limiting the Court1s 
jurisdiction has also been considered.
Chapter Five considers mental incapacity sufficient 
to annul a marriage and the test to be applied in such a 
case.
Chapter Six defines force, that will suffice to 
entitle the petitioner to petition for a decree of nullity. 
Similarly, it defines the fraud and investigates the sort 
of concealment or misrepresentation that will suffice to 
entitle deceived party to petition for a decree of nullity.
Chapter Seven deals with concealed pregnancy as a 
ground for nullity* An attempt has heen made to define such 
terms as "ignorant", "discovered" and "intercourse with 
the consent of the petitioner". Similarly the nature and 
standard of proof has also heen considered.
Chapter Eight deals with venereal disease as a 
ground for nullity under the Kenya Ordinance and considers 
to what extent this ground may he adopted under the HKA 
or Uganda Ordinance.
4CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT.......................................  2
ABBREVIATIONS..................................  16
LIST OB CASES..................................  20
PREFACE..........., .,..........................  48
CHAPTER I : CONCEPT OB NULLITY...............  52
(A) "Nullity" and Allied Reliefs according
to the Lharmasastra ........... ......  52
I Introduction.....................  52
II "Nullity" and Vedic Aryans   53
III "Nullity" in Sutra Literature..,.. 54
IV "Nullity" in the Arthasastra  57
V "Nullity" in the Smiritis. 59
(1) "Nullity" from "betrothal to
consummation................ 61
(A) "Nullity" of betrothal. 61
(i) The effect of re­
traction of a promise. 62
(a) By the father.. 62
(b) By the suitor.. 63
(ii) The effect; of a girl 
being promised to 
several suitors.... 63
(iii) The suitor goes
abroad... 63
(iv) The effect of
suitor!s death..... 66
(B) Nullity of unconsummated 
marriage  .....   67
5
^ge
(2) "Nullity" arising from infrac­
tion of a secular and spiritual 
grounds for prohibition...... 69
(3) Traces of "Nullity" arising 
from dissatisfaction between
the spouses................ . 70
(i) Supersession.  ....   71
(ii) "Abandon"   • • • 73
(iii) "Give Up"............. 75
(iv) Deserting* ........   76
(v) "Expelling" and "Banishing 
from the town"......... 76
(4) Provisional conclusion...... 77
VI "Nullity" in Buddhist Texts....... 76
VII "Nullity" in Jaina Law  ....  79
VIII "Nullity" in the Brahminical Legal
Commentaries ..............   81
(1) Concept of Nullity........ . 81
(2) Test of Nullity......  81
(3) Nullity of betrothal.. 82
(4) Distinction between nullity
of consummated and unconsummated 
marriage.......     82
(5) Traces of "nullity" arising from 
dissatisfaction between spouses. 83
(i) "Give Up"............. 84
(ii) "Abandoned".....    85
(6) Effect of non-disclosure of
defects..................... 86
(7) Faults of a Kanya for which
nullity is possible ...... 87
6Page
(8) Meaning of anusaya......... .. 88
(9) Meaning of "abandon".. .. 89
IX Conclusion.... 0.................. 92
(B) Legislative history of nullity of marriage
in Hindu law*................... ..... 97
(1) "Nullity” c^l marriage before 1955• 97
(2) Nullity of marriage under HMA, 1955• 101
CHAPTER II: BIGAMY......... ................  105
I Introduction....  ..............  105
II Essential Requirements .....  107
(1) There must be a spouse living... 107
(i) Marriage in contravention of
S«15 HMA.................... 108
(ii) When the marriage may not be
void..............    113
(iii) "Presumption of death"  114-
(2) ... form of marriage recognised
by Hindu Law. .......     117
III Approbation of a bigamous marriage... 122
IV Bigamy in Kenya and Uganda..........  126
CHAPTER III : DEGREES OP PROHIBITED RELATIONSHIP
AND §APINDASHIP................... 127
I Introduction.  .....................  127
II Degrees of prohibited relationship... 130
7
Page
(1) Meaning.......................  • 130
(i) Lineal ascendant.......  131
(ii) If one was the wife or
husband of a lineal ascen­
dant or descendant of the 
other* ................   132
(iii) If one was the wife of the 
brother or of the father's 
or mother's brother or of 
the grandfather's or grand­
mother's brother of the 
other..........    133
(iv) If the two are brother and 
sister, uncle and niece, 
aunt and nephew or children 
of brother and sister or of
two brothers and two sisters. 134-
III Sapinda  ............   134-
(1) Meaning of Sapinda and how it
can be determined.......   134-
(a) Meaning of Sapinda.........  134-
(b) Determination of "sapinda" 
according to Mitakshara*... 137
(c) Determination cf "sapinda1 
according to Dayabhaga..... 14-0
(2) Sapinda relationship under HMA.. y
(i) Lineal ascendant within the 
limits of sapindaship...*..
(ii) Persons having common lineal 
ascendant within the sapinda
relationship............. 14-5
IV Custom. ......        14-6
(1) ..."for a long time" ... "obtained
force of law" ............. 14-8
(a) "for a long time"...........  14-8
(b) "obtained the force of law". 151
8Page
(2) must be "certain"* not "unreason­
able" , "not opposed to public 
policy"......    154*
(a) must be "certain1.1......... 15^
(b) "not unreasonable" 155
(c) "opposed to public policy".. 155
(i) immoral custom   156
(ii) Custom opposed to a statute. 157
(iii)Abhorant to decency or 
morality............   158
(5) "Discontinued".................  160
(4) Proof of Custom......    160
V Degrees of prohibited relationship
and Sapindaship in Kenya and Uganda.. 161
CHAPTER IV : IMPOTENCE.........................  165
I Introduction.........  163
II Meaning of "impotence"..............  165
(1) Meaning of intercourse.,*...... 171
(2) Use of contraceptives.  ....   172
(3) Coitus interruptus    ......... 175
(4) Conception or birth of a child*. 179
(a) Pecundatio ab extra.......  179
(b) Artificial insemination.... 180
III What constitutes impotence..........  181
(1) Structural malformation........ 182
Curability..................... 183
U
9
Page
(2) Venereal disease..............  187
(3) Sterility ,..............  190
(4-) Nervous and/or psychic disorder. 194-
(a) Universal.......     195
(b) Impotence quoad hanc or hunc, 198
(i) The origin of the doctrine 197
(ii) Illustration of impotence 
quoad hanc or hunc in
Indian Cases ..... 201
(5) Failure to consummate the marriage. 204-
(6) Refusal to undergo medical examina­
tion and/or treatment...   207
IV Proof of i m p o t e n c e 208
(1) Media of proof................  209
(i) Medical examination........ 209
(ii) Examination of the parties as 
witnesses................. 209
(a) Effect of admissions.... 210
(b) Corroboration   210
(2) Standard of proof.............. 212
V Factors limiting jurisdiction.......  213
(1) Sincerity or approbation........ 213
(a) Sincerity. ........ • 213
(b) Approbation. ........... 215
(c) Test...................... 216
(i) By conduct............  216
(a) R V. R (unreported case). 216
s
10
Page
(b) Acceptance of
material benefits.. 217
(ii) By overt acts......... ., 218
(a) Artificial insemina­
tion ........ ...... 219
(b) Adoption of children* 221
(2) Delay................. . 224
(3) Collusion.........  225
(4) Taking advantage of his or
her condition*    * 226
VI Impotence in Kenya and Uganda*. 228
CHAPTER V : MENTAL INCAPACITY..... 230
I Introduction. ...........*.......       230
II Meaning of "idiot", "lunatic", "of
unsound Mind" etc.*...........  233
(1) "Idiot"..................  233
(2) "Lunatic"  ............   236
(3) "Of unsound mind or subject to re­
current fits of insanity or epilepsy" 239
III Test of mental incapacity....... 241
(1) Weakness of intellect..... 241
(a) Where mental capacity found... 242
(b) Where want of mental capacity
found......................
(2) Capacity to enter into a financial 
agreement..................... . 247
(3) Test of mental incapacity..... .. 250
11
Page
IV Presumption of sanity and burden of proof. 253
(a) Adjudication................... * 254
(b) Can a guardian form an intention to
marry. ........    255
V Mental Incapacity in Kenya and Uganda.. 256
CHAPTER VI : EORCE AND FRAUD................ 257
I Introduction....................  257
(1) Necessity of Consent........  25B
(a) Mistake as the identity of the 
person......................  260
(b) Mistake as to the nature and
purpose of the ceremony...... 2^0
(c) Marriage during intoxication.. 262
(3) The Concept of Consent......  264
(4) "Two stage theory" ...........  265
(5) Scope of the Chapter........  266
II Force...........................  267
(1) Different meaning and their appli- 
cation............   267
"Force" in Penal Code............ 269
(2) "Force" in nullity proceedings.... 271
(3) Essentials of force.............. 272
What constitutes force.. 272
(a) Force exercised by the 
parties themselves.. 273
(b) Force exercised by third 
parties. ........    275
(a) Force of a less serious 
nature.............. 276
(b) Threats of death or grievous 
bodily harm. ..... 277
12
Page
(ii) Threats of imprisonment or
arrest.................. . 277
(iii) Threats involving mental 
suffering or reverential
fear  ............... 279
(4) Degree of force *..........  283
(3) 1 the inducing cause.........  285
III Fraud..............................  286
(1) Definitions of fraud and their 
applicability...,.  .............. 286
(i) Dictionary meaning   287
(ii) "Fraud" in criminal law...... 287
(iii) "Fraud" in contract......... 287
(2) "Fraud" in nullity..............  288
(3) Definition of fraud.............  292
(4) Test of fraud  ..........  292
(5) Cases, where acts were held to be or
not to be fraudulent.......   293
(i) Concealment of an intention not 
to cohabit and not to have
children.......     294
(a) Not to cohabit.........   294
(b) Not to have children  296
(ii) Concealment of sterility and 
physical incapacity......... 299
(iii)Concealment of disease...... 300
(iv) Misrepresentation as to pre­
marital unchastity. ..... 304
(v) Misrepresentation as to
pregnancy.  ..........    307
13
Page
(a) Where the husband had pre­
marital relations....... 308
(b) ... where she is not pregnant
at all. *................ 309
(vi) Misrepresentation as to pre­
marital status...........   310
(viiMisrepresentation as to caste
and religion. ....    313
(a) Caste.......    314*
(b) As to religion.......... 315
(viii) Misrepresentation as to
personal qualities ....... 317
(6) Conclusion. ........    318
(7) Factors limiting jurisdiction..... 319
IV Force and Fraud in Kenya and Uganda... 319
CHAPTER VII : CONCEALED PREGNANCY AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE.......................... 321
I Introduction.................  321
II Preliminary requirements.............  321
(1) u... 1 ignorant1 tT of the facts alleged. 322
(2) That proceedings have been instituted
•.. within one year of such commence- *26  
ment ... from the date of the marriage...
(3) That marital intercourse with his con­
sent has not taken place......... 331
(i) Meaning of "discovered”  332
(ii) Intercourse with the consent... 335
III The standard of proof.......   337
(1) Nature of standard of proof......  338
14
Page
(2) Statutory requirements..........  339
(i) Meaning of "satisfied"....... 34-0
(ii) How can "satisfaction" be
arrived at?................. 34-1
(iii) Value of admissions........ 34-2
(3) Standard of proof to be followed..
(i) View relies on an unconvincing 
authority........   344
(ii) "Concealed-pregnancy" not to be 
regarded as a criminal or quasi­
criminal offence......   34-8
IV Proof of non-paternity of petitioner.. 351
(1) Evidence of non-access.......   351
(2) Presumption of certain facts  351
(3) Blood test....................... 353
V "Concealed-pregnancy" in Kenya and Uganda* 358
CHAPTER VIII : VENEREAL DISEASE ...............  359
I Introduction.......    359
II Venereal disease in a communicable
form. ............     360
III Preliminary requirements  ....... 361
(1) "Ignorant" of the facts alleged... 361
(2) That the proceedings were initiated 
within one year.  ....   362
(3) That marital intercourse with the 
consent of the petitioner has not
taken place .............   362
(i) Meaning of "discovered"...... 362
(ii) Intercourse with the consent. 364-
IV The standard of proof*.. ............  365
15
Page
CHAPTER IX : CONCLUSIONS........    366
APPENDIX I : THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT..........  375
APPENDIX II : THE [KENYA] HINDU MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ORDINANCE.. 4-960......... 391
APPENDIX III : EXTRACTS PROM Cap.112: AN ORDINANCE
RELATING TO DIVORCE. 11951]....... 403
APPENDIX IV : [THE UGANDA] HINDU MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ORDINANCE, 1961.......... 405
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY........................... 413
16
ABBREVIATIONS
A, .....*..... ...... .Atlantic Reporter*
A*2d.  ............... * .Atlantic Reporter 2nd Series.
A.C..............      .Appeal Cases.
Add.............   *..Addams 1 Ecclesiastical Reports»
A.I.R.................  All India Reporter*
-All...... Allahabad*
fAn.P..... .Andhra Pradesh.
-Bom. .....Bombay.
-Cal. .....Calcutta.
-P.O. .....Federal Court.
-Ker. .....Kerala.
-Lah.  Lahore.
-Mad..... Madras.
-M.P. .....Madhya Pradesh.
-Nag. .....Nagpur*
-N.U.C. ...Notes of Unreported Cases.
-Or. .....Orissa*
-Pat..... Patna •
-P.O. .....Privy Council.
-Pu. .....Punjab.
-Sau..... Baurastra.
-S.C..... Supreme Court.
-Tra.C. ...Travancore-Cochin.
17
A . Xj © R * ...... • • • • • American Law Reports.
A.L.R.2d« ...... • » * » • American Law Reports 2nd Series.
AlltE»E. ...... • • • • • All England Reports.
ApUS . ««.«». • •tit Apastamba - dharmasutra#
Asv.gr. ...... • • • • « ASvalayana-gphya-sutra,
A • V ♦ ...... • • • • * Atharva-Veda•
Baud. ...... * • « * • Baudhayana-dbarma-sutra.
Bhar. ..... • • • • t Bharucin.
B.H.C.R. *•«».. # • * * • Bombay High Court Reports.
Bom. L.R. •••••» • • t • • Bombay Law Reporter.
0•A • ...... • f • • • Court of Appeal.
Gan. B.R....... • •iii Canadian Bar Review.
C.L.R. ...... ■ # • * • Commonwealth Law Reports. (Aus.)
Go#Rep. ...... • • • • • Coke 1s Reports.
Gro.Car........ • i • i « Croke1s Reports.
Curt• ..... • i i i • Curteis* Ecclesiastical Reports.
D♦B.R. ...... i i i • i Dominion Law Reports# (Canada)#
Dow* ...... • « i • • Dowfs Reports, House of Lords.
B.R. ...... • III! English Reports.
Gau. ...... f I « 1 1 Dharmasutra of Gautama.
Gobhila gr# .... 1 1 • f 1 Gobhila-grhya-sutra.
Hagg. Con. .... • # • * # Harrardfs Consistorial Reports.
Hagg. ECO. .... • I 1 I • Haggard1s Ecclesiastical Reports
Hir# Gr........ • • « * I Hir apyake § i-gr ahya-sutr a •
H.L. ...... 1 I I I I House of Lords.
H.L.C. House of Lords Cases.
18
I. A. ........... Indian Appeals,
I.C.L.Q. ...........  International and Comparative Law
Quarterly.
I.L.R. .......... . Indian Law Reports.
-All. ...... Allahabad.
-Cal. ...... Calcutta.
-Had. ...... Madras.
I.R....... ...... . Irish Reports.
Kat. ...........  Katy anana.
Kaut.  .... Kaufilya Artha§astra*
Kay and J............ Kay and Johnsons Chancery Reports.
Ker, L.T............. Kerala Law Times,
K.K.T.  ....... Kpt^rakalpataru of Bhafpa Lakghmldhara.
Lee. ........... Sir G. Lee's Ecclesiastical Judge­
ments.
L.Q.R. ............ Law Quarterly Review.
L.R. ............ Law Reports.
L.T*...... ...........  Law Times Reports.
Manava.gr,  ...... Manava-gphya-sutra.
MoH.C.R, ..........  Madras High Court Reports.
M.L.J.  ......... Madras Law Journal.
Medh. ...........  Medhatithi.
Mitak.  .... The ^ Commentary Mitaksara on
Yajnavalkya Smriti by Vijnanesvara.
Mod.L.R.............. Modern Law Review.
HE..................  North Eastern Reporter.
HE 2d..... . .........  North Eastern Reporter 2nd Series.
19
NYS. *..........  New York Supplement.
NYS*2d*..............  New York Supplement 2nd Series.
NW. ............ North Western Reporter*
NW 2d..... .......... North Western Reporter 2nd Series.
P. ............ Pacific Reporter*
P.2d*..... ...... Pacific Reporter 2nd Series.
P*........ .....
P*D.  ) Probate and Divorce Division*
P. and D............
Phillim*ECC..........  J. Phillimore!s Ecclesiastical
Reports.
Rob. ECC.  ........ . Robertson1s Ecclesiastical Reports*
S.B.E. ...........  Sacred Books of the East*
S .0.R. ............ Supreme Court Reports *
Sm.C*..... ........ . Smritichandrika.
S.P.ECC* and Ad. ..... Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Reports
by Thomas Spinks.
StoTr. ...........  State Trials.
SW.  *..... South West Reporter.
SW 2d..... ......... . South West Reporter 2nd Series.
SW and Tr.  .... . Swabey and Triastram!s Reports*
T.L.R.(N.S.)* ....... Times Law Reports New Series.
Vasis* ...........  Vasistha-dharmasutra.
W.L.R. ........ Weekly Law Reports.
W.N....... .......... . Weekly Notes.
Yajn*..... ............ Yajnavalkyasmpiti.
Z*V.R. ........ Zeitschrift fur vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaft.
20
LIST OF GASES
Pages
A V. B. (1952) 54 Bom. L.R. 725....*........... 98,
182
Ackerman V. Ackerman 231 RYS 2d. cited in
A.L.R. 2d Supplement Service (1961-63)
(1964— issue; at pg. 56. 298
Ajai V. Met. Vijai Kumari. A.I.R. 1939 P.C.22. 151,
152
Ajodbya Prasad V. Bhawani Shankar - AIR 1957 All.l. 34-2
Akrep V. Akrep - [ ] 63 A 2d. 253............  291
Amrithammal V. Vhllimayil Ammal - AIR 194-2 Mad.£07(PB). 97,
232
Anakamma V. Bamanappa - AIR 1937 Mad.332. ....... 276, 2771
284-, 289
Ananth Rath V. Lajabati - AIR 1959 Cal.778...... 265,
302
Anders V. Anders [1916] 113 RE.203 cited in
Zerk V. Zerk...................................  296
Antoni V. Antoni - [1954-] (Misc.) 128 NYS 2d.510.. 298
Arndt V. Arndt. - (194-8) 82 RE 2d 908. 309
21
Pages
Arnold V. Arnold (1911) II® 38 Cal................   343
Arun Y. Sudhansa -AIR 1962 Or.65 SB...............   201
Aufort V. Aufort -(1935) 4-a P 2d. 620.............. 299
Aunjona Dasi V. Prahlad Chandra -(1870) 6 Bengal
Law Reports, 24-3..........................  98
Attiahari Tea Co. V. State of Assam. A.I.R.1961
S.C. 231...............................   50
Aykut V. Aykut - AIR 194-0 Cal. 75 .................  316
B V. B. (1901) P.39............................  205,
208
B V. B-(1958) 2 All. E.R. ?6....................... 183,
207
Beau Fielding1 s Case .....................    260
B-N V. B-N (P.O.) (1854-) 1 S.P. ECC and AD. 24-8 =
164- E.R. 144.............................. 191
Balusami V. Balakrishna -AIR 1957 Mad.97........... 159
Bartlett V. Rice - (1895) -72 L.T.122.............. 273,
274, 
2 75
Bater V. Bater -(1950) 2 All.E.R. 458.............. 339,
349,
350
22
Pages
Battle V. Brown -AIR 1916 (Mad. 84-7............. Ill,
113
Baxter V. Baxter - (194-7) 1 All. E.R. 387)(C.A.) 173
" -(1947) 2 All. E.R. 886 (H.L.).. 173,
175,
192,
297
B'entz V. Bentz (194-7) 73 NYS 2d................. 298
Berger V. Berger -(194-7) 73 NYS 2d 384.............  298
Bernice Leventha V. Fennie Liberman -( )
88 A.L.R. 782............................. 303
Bhagwati V. Parmeshwari -AIR (1942) All.518.....  97,
232
Bh.au Rao Shankar Lokhande V. The State of
Maharastra -(1965) Bom. L.R. 423 (S.C.). 119, 120,
121, 264
Bhok V. Bhok (1946) 63 NYS 2d. 401.................  298
Bimlabai V. Shahkerlal -AIR 1959 M.P.8.............  314
Binoy V. Satish -AIR 1927. Cal.480.............. 108
23
Pages
Birendra Kumar Biswas V. Hemlata Biswas (before 
remand) - AIR 1921
Cal. 459..............................  187,
300,
301
-(after remand) -AIR 1921.
Cal. 464.........    187, 188,
189, 301
Boisclair V. Boisclair (1943) 47 HE 2d 291......  308
Boughtoon V. Knight -(1873) 3 P.65............   249
Bravery V. Bravery -(1954) 1 W.L.R. 1169 (C.A.), 193
Briggs V. Morgan -(1820) 2 Hagg.Con. 324=161 E.R.758. 214 
Brodie V. Brodie -(1917) P.2771................. 282
Browning V. Reane -(1812) 2 Phillim. ECC.69 = 161
E.R. 1080 ............................  244,
250
Bull V. Bull - AIR 1938 Cal. 684 ................ 203,
204
Bullock V. Bullock -(I960) 2 All.E.R, 307.......  122,
123,
125
Bury's Case - 5 Co.Rep, 96b. = 77 E.R. 207....... 198,
199
24
Pages
C V. C (1911) 27 T.L.R. 421.................... 205,
206,
208
C V. C (1912) P.399............................  196
C V. C -(1914) 5 A.L.R. 1013...................  303
C V. C - (1921) P.399........................... 200,
203
C V. C -(1962) 106 (Yol.ii) The Solicitor's
Journal pg. 959.......    363,
365
Cackett V. Cackett - (1950) 1 All.E.R. 677....... 177,
178
Camion V. Smalley (1885) L.R. 10................. 243
Capossa V. Callona (1923) 122 A.378.............. 285
Cassin V. Cassin (1928) 58 A.L.R. 319............ 312
Catherine Elizabeths V. Welde [1771] 2 LCC 580=
161 E.R. 44-7............................. 166
Chaplin V. Chaplin - (1948) 2 A11.E.R.408(C.A.).. 328,
362
Chidamberam V. Subramaniam -AIR 1933 Mad«492. 153
Chinna Y. Tegarai -(1876) ILR 1 Mad.168......... 156
Chister V Mure -(1865) SW.Tr.223 = 164 E.R.1259... 110
Churchman Y. Churchman -(1947) 2 All.E.R.190. 338,
344,
345, 
346
25
Pases
Clarke V. Clarke - (1945) 2 All.E.H. 540........  180
Clifford V. Clifford -(1948) 1 All.E.H. 594(C.A.) 224
Cooper V. Crane (1891) P.D.569 .................. 274,
275
Coral Indira V. Iswanriah -AIR 1953 Mad. 858..... 206,
209
Countess of Essex Case - Cobbett's Complete
Collection of State Trials (1613) Vol.II,
786-862................................ 197,
198
Cowen V. Cowen (1945) 2 A11.E.R.197.............. 173,
192
Cumynes V. Cumynes (1812) 2 Phillim. ECC.10=
E.R. 1062................................. 198
Cuneo V. Cuneo (1950) (Misc.) NYS 2d. 899.......  309
D V. D -(1954) 2 All.E.R. 598............   182
D-E V. A-G. -(1845) 1 Rob. ECC 280 = 163 E.R.1039. 168,171,
172,173,
179,182,
184,191
26
Pages
Davis V. Davis -(1919) 106 A.644................ 303
Davis V. Davis -(1950) 1 All.E.R. 40(C.A.) ..... 347,
348
Dawson Edward Charles V. Dawson Matty -AIR 1916
Mad. 675......................*.....  168,
182
De Renville V. De Renville -(1948) 1 A11.E.R.56. 102
Di Lorenzo V. Di Lorenzo - 75 NYS. 878 cited in
Nocenti’s Case.......................... 290
Dodworth V. Dale -(1936) 2 All.E.R. 440............  103
Duchess of Kingston*s Case [1778] St* .Tr.355«** 198,
199
Durham V. Durham (1885) L.R.10 at pg.80.........  243*
250
Eaves V. Eaves -(1939) 4 All.E.R.260............ 103
Emanuel V. Emanuel -(1946) P.115...... *........  226
Emmanuel Singh V. Kamal Saraswati -AIR 1934 Pat.670. 205
27
Pages
Emperor 7. Manju -AIR 194-8 Bom, 374,•«••••••••••• 121
Emperor 7. Son! -AIR 1936 Nag, 13*.............  H 7
Ertel 7. Ertel - (194-2) 40 NE 2d 85.............  250
E V. P - (1896) 75 L.T. 192.................   205
P V. P - (1911) 27 T.L.R. 429...................  205,
206,
208
Fairman 7. Pairman -[1949] 1 All.E.R.’ 938..... 338
Fatah Gugan 7. Sardara -AIR 1958 Pu. 333........  352
Field1s Case -(1848) 2 H.L,C. 48 = 9 E.R.1 0 1 0 , 2 7 4 ,
275
Fish 7. Fish (1947) 67 NYS 2d ?68.............   298
Plorio V. Plorio -(1955) 143 NYS 2d.105........  295
' e r  \c\3Lil u (L. Csis -  ' - ' *
Foss 7. Foss (1866) reported in Problems of the
Family by Fowler 7. Harper, pg.195..........  308
Ford 7. Stier [1896]................. ............  260
Fowke 7. Fowke [1938] 2 All.E.R. 638 ........... 103
Fo3t V. Fox (1943) 154- F 2d. 29..........
Fulwood's (Lady) Case -(1638) Cro.Car.4-83 
79 E.R. 1017...................
G V. G -(1871) L.R. P. and D. Vol. 11. pg.287.... 166,168,
169,204
G V. G -(1924) A.C. 34-9.(H.L.)................. 167,171
205
G V. G. -(I960) 3 All.E.R.56...................  224,
225
G V. M - (1885) 10 A.C. 171 (P.C.)............  214
G.E.G.R. V. E.M.R. -AIR (1925) Sind. 25......... 246
Gaboli V. Gaboli (I960) The Times May 19.......   183
Gallar V. Gallar (1954-) 1 All.E.R. 536 (C.A.).... 338,345
Gambacorta V. Gambacorta (1954) 136 HYS 2d.258. .. 307
Gard V. Gard. -(1918) 11 A.L.R. 923............ 309
Gardner V. Gardner (1954-) 130 NTS 2d. 859...... . 298
28
307
272
29
Pages
Gatto V. Gatto (1919) 106 A.493................. 305,
307
Gerwitz V. Gerwitz -(194-5) 66 NYS 2d. 627 .......  297,
298
Ginesi V. Ginesi -(194-8) 1 All.E.R. 373 .........  338,344:,
345,346
Gipps V. Gipps -(1864) XL H.L.C.l * 11 E.R,1230. 344
Gokul Chand V, Parvin Kumar -AIR 1952 S.0.231.... 149
Gould V Gould -61A. 604 - cited in American
Jurisprudence, 2d., Vol.4 at pg.862..... 295
Gower V. Gower (1950) 1 All.E.R. 804...........  346,
347
Graves V. Graves -(1842) 3 Curt. 236 = 163 E.R.714. 306
Griffith V. Griffith (1944) I.R.35.............. 278,
284
Grimes V. Grimes (1948) 2 All.E.R. 147.......... 176,177,
178
Gudivada V. V.Smt. Gudivada llagamani -AIR 1962
An. P. 151.............................  190
30
Pages
H V. H -[1861] SW.Tr, 24......................  182
H V. H -AIR. 1928 Bom.279.....................  202»
203
H V. H -(1953) 2 All.E.R. 1229................. o ^ ’oo*’
dod} dHy
H V. H March 31 , 1954-s (unreported cited in
S V. S (1954) 3 All.E.R. 736 at 741.*••• 16?
H V. H and C- (1962) The Times March 23......... 354
Hafner V. Hafner (1946) 66 NYS 2d. 442 .......... 297*
298
Hall V. Hall (1908) 24 T.L.R. 756............... 260
Hancock V. Peaty (1867) 1 L.R.P.D. 335 .............  245
Hannibal V. Hannibal ( ) A.2d. 838........... 297
Harbhajan Singh V. Mst. Brijbala Kaur - AIR 1964
Pu. 359 ...............................  260,265,
289,304
Hanumaiah G. V. G. Mallayya -AIR 1959 An.P.177*.. 158,
159
Harrod V. Harrod -(1854) 1 Kay & J,4 = 69 E.R.344. 243
Harthan V. Harthan -(1948) 2 All.E.R. 639 (C.A.) 226,
228
31
Pages
Henderson V. Henderson (1944) 1 All,E.R.44.. • *... 336*337*
364-
Hind V. Macdonald (1932) 1 D.L.R.96............. 278
Hisnam V* Ougbi -AIR 1959 Manipur 20............  107
Hodgkins V. Hodgkins (1950) 1 All.E.R.619(C,A.).. 211
Hunter V. Edney (1881) L.R.10 P.D.93............  24-6,
251
Hussein V. Hussein -(1938) P*159................ 273,274,
275
Inverclyde V. Inverclyde -(1913) All.E.R.39*••••*
Irena V. Thomas (1922) 23 A.L.R. 178....... . 312
J V. J (194-7) 2 All.E.R. 4-3(0.A.)............... 192,
227
Jackson V, Jackson (1908) P.308. ......... 24-6,
251
Jackson V. Jackson (1911) I.L.R. 34 All.203.....  110,
111
32
Pages
Jackson V. Jackson (1939) 1 All.E.R. 471........ 323,
362
Jackson V. Rubay (1921) 19 A.L.R. 77............ 309
Jagdish Kumar V. Sita Devi -AIR 1963 P u » 1 1 4 . 169
Jainarain V. Mahabir Prasad -AIR 1926 0udh,470. •. 247
Jambapuram Subbamma V. J. Venkata Reddi -AIR 1950
Mad. 394..............................  352
Janki V. Parmeswaram -AIR 1955 NUC(Tra.-C) 4132. 108
Jayasukhlal V. Lalita -AIR 1955 N.U.C.1945......  305
Jitendra V. Bbagwat -AIR 1956. Patna 457........ 161
Johnson V. Johnson 176 Ala,449 cited in American
Jurisprudence 2d. Vol.4, pg,462. ....... 295
Johnson V. Johnson (I960) 82 A.I.R. 2d.1029* • • • • • 252
Jude, Claudia V. Jude, Lancelot -AIR 1949 Cal.503* 315,
316
33
Pages
Kalan V. Emperor -AIR 1938 Sind. 127............ 117
Kalawati V. Sevi Ram A.I.R. 1961 Himachal Pradesh. 258
Kanhaiyalal V. Harsingh -AIR 1944 Hag. 232....... 246
Kanthi Balavendram V. Harry -AIR 1954 Mad.516.... 168,
182
Kantilal V. Vimla -AIR 1952 Sau.44.............. 182,
207
Kaura Devi V. Indra Kumari -AIR 1943 All.310..... 247
Kansi Ram V. Jai Ram -AIR 1956 M.P.4............ 351
Kelly V. Kelly (1932) 49 T.L.R. 99............. 260,
261
Kishore Sahu V. Snehprabha Sahu -AIR 1943 Hag.185* 195*
212
Kshitesh V. Emperor -AIR 1937 Cal.214...........  289,314,
315
Kunta Devi V. Sri Ram Kaluram - A.I.R. 1963 Pu.235* 258
L V. L (1922) 38 0?.L.R. (H.S.) 1697 192
34
IT, I -(1949) 1 All.E.R. 14-1..................  180,219,
220
Latchamma V. Appalaswamy -AIR 1955 An.P.55...... 157
Lawrence V. Lawrence - June 2, 1954 (unreported} 
cited in Rayden - Divorce (9th. edition)
at pp.119-120.........................  355, 560,
364
Liff V* Liff (1948) W.N. 128.................... 354
Lock V. Lock -(1958) 3 All.E.R. 472............. 239
Lovedon V. Lovedon -(1810) 2 Hagg. Con.l =
161 E.R. 648.............    340,348,
549
Lowndes V. Lowndes -(1950) 1 All.E.R.999........ 225
M V. M -(1956) 3 All.E.R........................ 183
M V. S -(1963) Ker. L.T.315..................... 169,184,
186
M 1Adam V. Walker (1813) 1 Dow. P.O.148 = 3 E.R.654. 242
Madan Setti V. Thimmi A w a  -AIR 1940 Mad.135*.... 505,
306
35
Pages
Madhvarao V. Raghvendrarao -AIR 1946 Bom.380* • * • • 150,
161
Mahadev Rao V. Raghvendrarao -AIR 1940 Bom,377* 152
Mahendra V. Sushila -AIR I960 Bom. 117-.......... 340
Mahendra V. Sushila -(1964) Bom.L.R*681 (S.C.) =
AIR 1965 S.C......................   210,338,
341, 342,343,
352,353.
Malan V, State of Bombay -AIR I960 Bom.393*....   H7»
119
Marckley V. Marckley (1945) 189 SW 2d.8.  .... 308
Martens V. Martens -(1952) 35 A.L.R. 771........  282
Mehta V. Mehta C19553 2 All.E.R. 692......... 261
Miller V. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All.E.R.372. 338,
348
Mordaunt V. Moncreiffe (1874) 30 L.T.649........  346
Morris V. Morris (1940) 13 A 2d. 603............  309
Motiram V. Sukma -AIR I960 M.P.46. ....152
36
Pages
Moujilal V. Chandrabatti (1911) 38 I.A. 122(P.O.) 246
Mulchand V, Budhia [ ] I.L.R. Bom. 812........ 98
Mamnishwar Butt V. Indra Kumari -AIR 1963 Pu.449. 235,237,
238,253
Muthammal R. V. Sri. Subramaniaswami -AIR I960
S.C. 601..............................  236
N-R V. M-E -(1853) 2 Rob. ECC. 625 = 163 E.R,1435. 199,
202
Nagabbusanam V. Nagendramma -AIR 1955 An .P. 181. 112
Nash V. Nash -(1940) 1 All.E.R.206.............. 214,
215
Naumi V. Narotam. A.I.R. 1963 Himachal Pradesh 15* 258
Nocenti V. Ruberti (1933) 3 A 2d. 129.••••••••••• 290,
291
Noble V. Noble - (1869) L.R.I. P. and D. 691...... H O
37
Pages
O'Reilly V. O'Reilly (1913) 234 N.W. 216........ 286
Over V. Over -(1924) 27 Bom. L.R. 251..............  343
OwingsV. Owings-( 1922) 118 A.858. ................. 278
Park V. Park -(1953) 2 All .E.R.408.............  248
Park V. Park -(1953) 2 All.E.R. 1411 (O.A.).... 248, 249,
252
Parojcio V. Parojcic -(1959) 1 All.E.R.1........ 279,
280
Perrin V. Perrin (1822) 1 Add.l = 162 E.R.l  306
Pettit V. Pettit -(1962) 2 All.E.R.57 (C.A.).... 227
Pisciotta V. Pisciotta -(1952) 91 A.2d, 629.....  298
Pollard V. Wybourn -(1828) 1 Hagg. ECO. 725 =
162 E.R. 732..............................  205
Portsmouth V. Portsmouth (1828) 1 Hagg. 352 =
162 E.R.611...............................  245
Premi V. Dayaram A.I.R. 1965 Himachal Pradesh.... 258
38
Pases
Premnath V. Jasoda -AIR 1955 Ajmer 7*........... 155
Preston-Jones V. Preston-Jones (1951) 1 All.E.R. 340,
124 (C.A.) ............................ 341,
345
Primmer V, Primmer 234 NYS 2d. 795 cited in 
A.L.R. 2d.
Supplement Service (1961-63) (1964 issue) 
at pg.56............................. . 298
Puyum V, Motiram -AIR 1956 Manipur 18. 157
R. V. Algar (1953) 2 All.E.R. 1381.............. 102
R V.R -November 14, 1934 (unreported) cited in
Latey on Divorce - pg.202............ . 216
- Feb. 25, 1935 (C.A.) -(unreported)
cited in Latey on Divorce - pg.202...... 217
R V. R -(1952) 1 All.E.R. 1194.....................  172
R V. Millis (1843-44) 8 E.R. 844............... 260
R.E.L. V. E.L. - (1948) P.211................... 219
39
Pages
Ram Bijai Bahadur 7. Jagat Pal Singh -(1890) 17
I.A, 173 = I.L.R, 18 Cal. lll(PfC.)  246
Rakeyabibi 7. Anil Kumar -(1948) ILR 2 Cal.119*.* 98
Ramangauda 7. Shivaji - cited in Maynefs 10th ed.,
at pg.169. *................ * .  158
Rambhabai 7* Kanji -AIR 1953 Sau. 88  159 ,
160
Ram Harakh 7, Jagarnath -AIR 1932 -All*5*....... 289
Ram Prasad V. State of U.P. -AIR 1957 All.911.... 107
Rameshwar Dayal 7, State -AIR 1957 M.P.21. 343
Randall V. Randall -(1939) P. 131................ 239
Rangaswami T« V. Arvindammal T-AIR 1957 Mad.243. 102, 104,
169, 182, 190, 
194, 211, 212
Ratanmoni Debi V. Nagendra -AIR 1949 Cal,404..... 98
Ratneshwari Nandan V. Bhagwati Saran -AIR 1950 P.O. 142. 255 
Rice 7. Reynold^Spring-Rice -(1948) 1 All.E.R.188. 177
40
Pages
Richardson V. Richardson -(1951) 105 NYS 2d. 219. 298
Roberts V. Roberts (1917) 117 L.T. 157.........  364
Rogers V. Halmshaw (1865) 3 SW. and dr.509 ■=
164- E.R. 1573.......................... 110
Ross Smith V. Ross Smith (1962) 1 All.E.R.544(H,L.) 102,
105,104-
Rukmani V. T.S.R.Chari -AIR 1955 Nad. 616....... 511
Russell V. Russell -(1924-) A.C. 687 (H.L.)...... 179
S V. S (1865) 5 SW and Tr. 24-0 = 164- E.R. 1266. 206
S V. B (1892) L.R. 16 Bom. 659.................  201
S V. B (1905) 21 T.L.R. 219....................  205,
208
S V. S -(1908) 24 I.L.R. 255...................  205,
208
S V. S -(1954) 5 All. E.R. 736.................  167,168,
169,185,
184,185,
186
41
Pages
S V. S (No.2) -(1962) 3 All.E.R. 55 (C.A.) ..... 184, 185,
186
Saladur V. Oajaddxn -(1936) ILR 63 Cal.851......  155
Sant Ram V. Emperor -AIR 1929 Lah. 713........   H 7
Savalram V. Yeshodabai -AIR 1962 Bom. 190........ 327,
362
Schulman V. Schulman (194-3) 4-6 NYS 2d. 327 ......  297,
298
Scott V. Scott (1959) 1 All .E.R. 531.............  224,
225
Scott V. Selbright -(1881) 12 P.D.21............  273,274,
275,280,
284
Security First National Bank Case -(1945) 162 
P.2d. 966............................
Seithammarak V. Koyommath Mammod -AIR
1957 Ker. 63........................... 351
Senat V. Senat -(1965) 2 All.E.R. 505........... 339,
345
Shepherd V. Shepherd -(1917) 192 SW 658.........  278
Shibnarain V, Bhutnath - (1917) ILR 45 Cal.475• 154-,
155
42
Pages
Shireen V. Taylor -AIR 1952 Pu.277.............. . 294
Sivaguru V . Saroja -AIR I960 Mad, 216........... 523, 327,
333, 362, 
363
Slater V. Slater (1953) 1 All.E.R.246 •••••.. 221,
222,
223
Smith V. Smith (1940) P.179....... *............  239,
240
Smith V, Smith (1947) 2 All.E.R.741 (C.A.) ...... 333,334,
335,363
Snowman V. Snowman (1943) P.186......... . 179,
180
Sobal V. Sobal -(1914) 50 NTS 248..................  303
Spurgeon V. Spurgeon -(1930) 46 T.L.R. 396.........  115
Sreenivasan V. Kirubai -AIR 1957 Mad.160......... 351
State of Bombay V. Narasu Appa - AIR 1952 Bom.84. 107
Statford V. Statford -(1949) 217 SW 2d. 917....  309
Subhani (Mst.) V Nawab -AIR 1941 P.O.21..... . 149
Sullivan V. Sullivan (1818) 2 Hagg. Con.238=161
E.R.728.. 262,
263
Surti V. Harain Das -(1890) 1 L.R. 12 All.531.... 246
43
Pages
Sutton V. Sutton -(1936) 55 P*2d. 261#  .....• ••• 307
Svenson V. Svenson - 178 FT 54. cited in Nocentifs
Case.... 290
Swapna V. Basanta -AIR 1955 Cal *533..... ..... .. 117 ,
118
Szapira V* Ssapira cited in [1902] 25 I.L.R, 756,
at 757.... 260
I V. M -(1865) L.R. 1 P. and D.31............... 185
Thanker V. Jennison [1921] 61 D.L.R. 161, 162... 265
Thandi Ram V. Jagan Nath - AIR 1937 Lah. 784.... 352
Tindall V. Tindall (1953) 1 All.E.R. 139......... 218
Tirumamagal V. Ramaswami -(1861-63) 1 M.H.C.R.214. 234,
235
Titli (Mst) V. Alfred Robert Jones -AIR 1934 All.273. 235,
246,
289
Turner V. Meyers -(1808) 1 Hagg. Con. 414 =
161 E.R. 600........................... 244,
245
Turner V* Turner - AIR 1921 Cal.517............. 112
Turney V. Avery -(1912) 113 A.710............... 299,
300
44
Pages
Tweney V. Tweney (1946) 1 All. E.R.564.   .... 115,
116
U V. J - (1868) L.R.I. P.D. 460................. 210
Ujai V. Hathi -(1870) 7 B.H.C.R. A.CJ. 133......  156
Valier V. Valier [19253 133 L.T. 830.......   261,
262
Varadarajula V, V. Baby Anmal -AIR 1965 Mad29*... 347,
348
Venkadu V. Subbaramiah -(1954) 2 M.L.J.
(Andhra Section) 24...............      155
Venkata N. V. Bhujangayya -AIR I960 An.P.412....  149,
150
Venkata V. Subhadra -(1884) ILR 7* Mad. 548.....  158
Venkatacharyulu V. Rangacharyulu -(1890) IRR 14 Mad.316.97,
98,
232
Venkatalinga V. Vioiatbamma -(1883) ILR Mad.43.*»* 158
Vileta V. Vileta -(1942) 128 P.2d. 261...........  307
45
W V. W (1912) P.78 .............................. 205,
208
W V. W (1952) 1 All.E.R. 858 (C.A.)............. 216,
221,
222
W V, W (No.4) -(1963) 2 All.E.R. 386...........  354-
W V. W (No.4) -(1963) 2 All.E.R.841 (C.A.).....  354-
W-H V. H -(1861) 2 SW.Tr. 24-1 =» 165 E.R.987....  184
W-Y V. A-Y (1946) S.C.27 (Scottish Case).......  185
Wakefield V. MacKay (1807) 1 Fhillim. ECC. 134 -
161 E.R. 937...................  517
Warter V. Warter (1890) L.R. 15 P and D. 152.....  Ill,
112
Watkins V. Watkins -(1953) 2 All.E.R. 1113......  124,
126,
290
Weinberg V. Weinberg (1938) 8 NYS 2d. 341. ...... 237,
238
Wells V. Cottam -(1863) 3 SW.Tr. 364 = 164 E.R.1316. 102
Wells V. Pisher -(1831) 174 E.R. 34............. 102
Wells V. Talham (1923) 33 A.L.R. 827..... 289,
312
46
Pages
Westfall V. Westfall [1921] 13 A.L.R. 1428...... 308
White V. White -(1948) 2 All.E.R. 151...........  177,
178
White V. White -(1958) 1 S.C.R. 1410............  340,
341
Whysall V. Whysall (1959) 3 W.L.R. 592..........  240
Wickham V. Wickham -(1880) 6 P and D.ll......... 113
Wiley V. Wiley -(1943) 139 P.2d. 950......... . 295
Wilkins V. Wilkins -(1896) P.108................  124,
125
Wilson V. Wilson -AIR 1931 Lah.245..............  195
Winner V. Winner (1920) 11 A.L.R. 1919..........  309
Woodland V. Woodland -(1928) All.E.R.690........  124,
125
Wright V. Wright (1948) 77 C.L.R. 191...........  338,
347
Wylie V. Wylie -AIR 1930 Oudh. 83...............  188,
189
Yaquer V. Yaquer (1946) 21 N.W. 2d. 138.........  309
Ysern V. Horter - 110 A.31 cited in Nocenti's Case 
Yaquer V. Yaquer (194-6) 21 N.W. 2d. 138.........
Yucabezky V. Yucabezky (1952) 111 NYS 2d. 441....
Zerk V. Zerk -(1950) 28 A.L.R. 2d. 495..........
Zogolio V. Zogolio -157 A.2d cited in (1965)
A.L.R. 2d later case service at pg.332.
48
PREFACE
There appears to be no work devoted to a comprehen­
sive study of the "nullity of marriage in modern Hindu Law". 
The purpose of the present work is modest: primarily, it is 
cronfined to an examination of the grounds recognised by 
the modern Hindu law for declaration of nullity.
A good piece of legislation should be unambiguous, 
certain and precise. The provisions of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955? (hereinafter cited as HMA) and the parallel 
provisions of the Kenya and Uganda law in general and 
relating to "nullity" in particular seem far too often to 
be deficient in one or more of these elements. The main 
grounds of "nullity" are the creation of statute; however, 
such important terms as "impotence", "idiot", "lunatic", 
"force", "fraud", "ignorant" and "discovered" are not 
defined.
Nullity is not a term of art. It is predicated as 
an ostensibly legal marital relationship, which may be 
utterly void or merely voidable, is stripped of its colour 
of legality, and the relationship destroyed ab initio, 
for some reason existing at the time of the marriage although 
the marriage may terminate as of the date of the decree.1
1. Corpus juris secundum* Vol.27A, p*16.
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The view has been taken that "the * category1 "of
’voidable1 marriages as well as the retroactivity of the
decree of nullity have obviously been borrowed from the
English law, and, if they are to be retained in the Indian
law, justification, therefore, must be founded in the
potential harm to society if the marriage were merely
dissolved instead of annulled* Similarly, it has been
argued that, "the greatest care should, therefore, be taken
2in importing the law of nullity in Indian statutes*" Thus 
two questions arose: what is the need of "nullity"? and 
what is the role of foreign precedents in the new institu­
tion?
(1) Need of "nullity":
The importance of nullity lies in the fact that,
(a) it enables to terminate a marriage where no grounds 
for divorce are available;
(b) a marriage can be brought speedily to an end;
(c) the wife's alimony is likely to commence at a low 
rate, and must cease altogether on her remarriage.
1. S.S. Nigan, "A Plea for a uniform Law of Divorce";
Paper Read in Hindu Law Seminar, University of Rajastham 
(1964) p.23.
2. ibid•
3. J.D.M.Derrett "Aspects of Matrimonial Causes in Modern 
Hindu Law" [1964J Revue du sud-est asiatique, pp.215,235*
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(2) Hole of foreign precedents in the new institution:
The question is: is it necessary for the Courts to 
follow, in nullity proceedings, the principles and rules 
on which English and foreign courts act and give relief?
The law of "nullity of marriage in modern Hindu law" 
is in process of development, and because of infinite 
variety of circumstances, principles are difficult to state. 
What then is a judge to do? The judge, in arriving at his 
decision, has to be guided by some principles. In deciding 
whether to follow foreign precedents, in order to formulate 
right principles, we may take help from Gajendragadkar,J!s 
(as he then was) observations in Attiabari Tea Co. V, State 
of Assam,^ "... when we are dealing with the problems of 
construing a constitutional provision which is not too 
clear or lucid you feel inclined to inquire how other 
judicial minds have responded to the challenge presented 
by similar provisions in other sister constitutions." In 
accordance with this dictum it is suggested that foreign 
precedents may be followed in nullity proceedings, under 
the HMA, or Kenya Ordinance, or Uganda Ordinance, in the 
light of social conditions prevailing in Hindu families.
1. A.I.E. 1961 S.C, 231 at 257.
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Foreign precedents constitute tentative principles which 
may have to be modified in tThe light of further information.
An attempt has been made to set out the principles 
relating to "nullity of marriage in modern Hindu law" as 
lucidly as possible* to point; out contradictions where 
they occur, to harmonise conflicting decisions where this 
can be done* Accordingly, the author has set out what he 
understands to be the law.
I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor J*D.M. 
Derrett, for his help and paibience during the preparation 
of this thesis*
The Law as stated in this thesis corresponds to 
that reported up to 1 July 1965#
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CHAPTER I 
CONCEPT OE NULLITY
(A) "NULLITY" AND ALLIED RELIEFS ACCORDING TO THE DHARMAE&STRA 
Section I Introduction;
Sagiskara generally means a purificatory act or rite
1
which being effected imparts fitness for a certain purpose. 
The Vivaha-sagiskar a is a composite rite, comprising several 
subordinate elements which have to be done in a certain
2
order, which brings about the status of wifehood in a woman* 
It is more of a psychic than a merely physical bond, but it 
can nonetheless be annulled on the discovery of lack of one 
or more of the essential qualifications for marriage.
It is almost impossible to define marriage in legal 
terms but the shastric definition of marriage would seem to 
have been as follows: a union between a man and a woman 
which arises at the time when the ceremony of marriage has 
been completed, the bridegroom having the qualification for 
accepting a girl in marriage and the bride the qualifications
1. Sabra on3&iminA VI, 135? Kumarilabha£$a, Tantravartika 
p.1115 on J III, 8,9? quoted in P.V.J£ane. Sist. of 
Dh.S. vol.II(i) pp*190-191* As to Saffiskaras generally 
see R.B. Pande; History of Hindu Sansk§Lras. Bee also; 
Encyclopaedia of‘"Eelxgion: Sacraments, Ed* G.James 
Sailings,~vol*l0,~p. £9?? K . V . Rangaswami Aiyangar:
Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life according to 
Dharmasastras, pp*129-156.
2. fledhatlthi on Manu III, 20.
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for Toeing given in marriage, and the couple having formally 
or nominally accepted each other in front of the marriage 
fire 9 in which thee-er oblations as a married pair will 
thenceforth he given
(The exact significance of sagiskaras was left rather 
vague in our authorities and their treatment of the purpose 
of sajpskaras is not exhaustive* If we look at the list of 
sa^iskaras we shall find that their purposes were many. They 
served, on the one hand, spiritual (sic) and cultural pur­
poses and were more or less of a popular nature having a 
mystical or symbolic element* On the other they also have 
psychological values impressing on the mind of the person
p
that he has assumed a new role. Thus the Vivaha consists 
essentially in an acceptance, which produced the mental 
impression that this girl is the man*s wife, and wifeness
arises from her having undergone the sajjLSkara, which
-  3sajLskara itself could not occur but for the marriage.
Section II, “Nullity" and Vedic Aryans
The earlier Vedic texts (which may be said to cover 
the period down to the end of B.C.500) present with practical
1* J.D.M* Derrett: Hindu Law Past and Present, p*86.
2. P.V. Kane: His t „ of Ss vol• 11(1) pp.192-193*
5* J*D.M. Derrett: The Discussion of Marriage by Gadadhara,
p*180.
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uniformity the condition of marriage among Hindus* It is
uncertain how far the modern rule of "nullity” was in vogue
in the Vedic period. We find passages to the effect that
these can he no repudiation of the sacred hond of marriage.'*'
However, we do find a hymn in the Rigveda where the marriage
2
of a brother and sister is expressly treated as improper.
Ill* "Nullity” in Sutra literature:
The age of sutras is uncertain. For our purposes it
is safe to assume that they were compiled between B.C.500 
and the beginning of the Christian era.
Sutra literature does not specifically mention 
"nullity” but both a betrothal and marriage could nonethe­
less be "repudiated” under circumstances which we shall 
examine. We find that a betrothal could be repudiated if a
Zl
blemish is discovered either in the suitor or the girl.
We also find that if a suitor abandons a faultless girl 
after betrothal the punishment of a thief is ordained for
5
him. Similarly if the father of the girl repudiates his 
daughterfs betrothal and the suitor is faultless, the 
punishment is the same.
1. R.V. X, 82,2.
277. XIV, 1,18,49.
2. E77. X, 10.
3« F7V. Kane: Hist, of D.S. vol.I, p.8.
4. Vishnu V, ISO,16T, 162.
5. Vishnu V, 162.
6. Vishnu V, 160-161.
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The law provides information on what could he con­
sidered a hlemish and not all these rules are relevant to 
our problem* But certain qualifications for marriage are 
insisted upon.
A man is not allowed to marry a girl who either
belongs to the same Gotra’*' (i.e. a relative bearing the same
o
family name, laukika gotra) or has the same pravara (one 
descended from the same Rishi, Vaidika Gotra) and who is 
related to him within the prohibited degrees of relationship, 
i * e *, sapinda ship * ^
What would happen if these restrictions are violated? 
Is the state of wifeness itself produced? What would be the 
girlls position? The answer appears to be that the marriage 
performed between two sapindas is no marriage and if a man 
marries a Sagotra and/or Sapravara girl he, (a) should
renounce her, (b) must support her treating her like his
/■ \ Amother and (c) must perform a penance; i.e., it is not the
case that the girl is free to marry another*
However, a marriage may be repudiated where a girl
has been abducted by force and married to another without
performing sacred rites^  This suggests that, (a) such
!♦ ApaSoII, 5,11,15; Vasis* VIII,1., Vishnu XXIV, 9*
2* Gau* IV, 2, Vasis. VIII, 1», Vishnu ibid*
3* Eau. IV, 3,5; ApaSell, 5,11,15716fTfasis.VIII,2, Vishnu 
STTV, 10*
A. Baud* II, 1,1,37*
5. VaSis. XVII* 73; Baud. IV, 1,15*
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marriage is voidable and not void and (b) tbe girl can re­
marry like a kanya (maiden) , even though the marriage has 
been consummated.
We turn now to the subject of repudiation of a wife
whose marriage as such was not irregular♦ A wife could be
abandoned, after a specified period, who bore daughters
only and whose all children die; but a quarrelsome wife
could be abandoned without delay.^ So say the texts, no
doubt reflecting custom in some measure. A wife must be 
2
abandoned who surrenders herself to her husband !s guru or 
pupil, who has intercourse with a man of degraded caste, 
and especially one who attempts to kill her husband but a 
wife could not be abandoned unjustly.
The distinction between texts which authorise the 
husband and wife to be separated (for breach of requirements 
or qualification of marriage) and texts which authorise a 
husband to "abandon" his wife is vital. Confusion arises 
because of the paucity and lack of clarity in the Sanskrit 
Vocabulary used in texts of different ages. The former 
implies an absolute restriction placed on the choice of a 
bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, the breach of 
which would render a marriage void, where as the latter
1, Baud, II, 2,4,6.
2. Taels a XXI, 10.
* rbid*
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points out to the possibility of a divorce or supersession. 
What does the word abandon mean here? Does it mean 
abandoned from sexual intercourse and " joint living” or 
either of these? The implication seems to be in some cases 
abandonment from sexual intercourse and in some cases 
abandonment even from joint living.
The elaborate rules of the sutras show the existence 
of some sort of matrimonial causes but what was their 
nature? Did they provide for what we now call supersession, 
divorce or nullity? We return to the topic later,
IV, "Nullity1 in the Arthasastra:
Kautilya uses the term upavartaja^ for "nullity”,
although a marriage performed in one of the first four forms
of marriage could on no account be repudiated, A marriage
performed in any of the other four forms might apart from
2
any question of nullity be dissolved by mutual consent.
There are eight forms of marriage, viz,, Brahma, (where the 
girl is offered in marriage clothed with costly garments 
and ornaments, to a bridegroom, who is specially invited by 
the father for the purpose) 0 Prarjapatya (where the girl is 
offered in marriage by the father, with an injunction that
1, Kautilya; Arthasastra, Ed. by T, Ganapatd Shastri, 
vol.II, p . W “ “ --
2. ibid.
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the couple should perform their religious duties together), 
Daiva (where the girl is offered in marriage, decked with
A
ornaments, to the officiating priest), Arsha (where the 
girl is given in marriage by the father, by pronouncing the 
words prescribed for making a gift, after accepting from 
the bridegroom a cow and a bull or two pairs for fulfilment 
of the sacred law), G-andharva (where a suitor and the girl 
fell in love and consummate their proposed marriage),
A
Asura (where the suitor receives a maiden after paying a 
reasonable price for her), Rakmshasa (where the suitor takes 
away a girl forcibly after a fight, and marries her) and 
Patsacha (where a man seduces a girl while she is asleep, 
intoxicated or disordered in intellect)*
We find that in Arthasastra a husband may be aban­
doned by the wife under certain circumstances which includes 
his impotence* What does Tya,j.yah, abandoned mean here?
Does it imply divorce or nullity? Literally it means 
”abandonable” or ”to be abandoned” but it probably denotes 
separation from conjugal intercourse, as opposed to mokga, 
which might be technical divorce* It is not clear whether 
after ”abandoning” her husband she is free to marry again*
1* See Ap. II, ii, 17-21; G-aut* IV* 6-15; Vasis, I, 17-35; 
Baud. 1, 20, 1-21, 23* Vishnu XXIV 18-28; Manu III. 21; 
Yajn0l, 58-61.•
2. Kaut. Arthasastra III, 2, 48 translated by P.P. Kangle, 
p*2$l*
3* Jayaswal: Manu and Yajn, p.230*
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In some (low) castes she may have been*
In the Arthasastra we find that in the case of 
marriages of first three varnas (castes) there can be an 
annulment of preliminaries of marriage including betrothal 
up to the time the marriage is completed, whereas in the 
case of sudras the annulment can be made even up to the time 
of consummation of marriage, partly because of the inform­
ality of their preliminaries*"^" We also find that in case of 
all the four varnas "nullity" is possible even after the
marriage is completed where the husband or the wife is 
2impotent*
V. "Nullity" in the Smritis:
There is conflict as to the age of the Smritis but 
for our purposes we can say that they were compiled between 
500 B.C. to A*D* 300*^ Much of our difficulty stems from the 
fact that phenomena closely allied to, if not identical, 
with "nullity" share a vocabulary with matrimonial remedies 
falling far short of "nullity" in the modern sense* The 
Sastra is clear on the distinction between "failure to com­
plete" and "undoing" or "annulling", but matrimonial remedies 
as such have a loose and (perhaps intentionally) confusing 
vocabulary*
1* Kaut: Arthasastra: Ed* by T* Ganapati Shastri, vol*II, 
p *92*
§; ylA 'i ^
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In Smritis we find certain words which seem to 
imply "nullity”, e*g., Vinivartayet,^  Vitatha  ^(in the 
sense of or void) and dattanasha.
The ceremony of marriage is twofold. It consists 
of choice of the bride or the betrothal which must take
Ll ,
place first of all which is succeeded by panigrahana (the
ceremony of joining the bride and bridegroom*s hands) and
the saptapadi (taking seven steps round the sacred fire)
5
when the marriage is complete.'' These ceremonies produce 
the mental impression that he or she has assumed a new role 
or that this girl is the manfs wife, and wifeness arises 
from her having undergone the samsakara.
These questions we must consider in order:
(1) traces of "nullity" from betrothal to consummation 
of the marriage;
(2) "nullity" of the marriage arising from infraction 
of a secular and spiritual grounds for prohibition;
(3) "nullity" (if this is the correct expression)
1. Manu VIII, 165* See Manu-smriti: Ed. by Vasudeva Laksh- 
mara Pansikar (6th edn. 1920) at p. 298; See also Manu- 
smriti: Ed. by Pandit Gopala Sastri at p.252;
2. Manu cited in A V B. 1952, Bom* L.R. 725 at p. 739*
3. Rfarada ibid. a^T p«~~
4. JSaraHa XII, 2.
5* Manu VlII, 227.
6. J.lJ.M. Derrett: The Discussion of Marriage by Gadadhara 
at p. \<&>
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arising from dissatisfaction between spouses.
(1) "Nullity1* from betrothal to consummation:
(A) "Nullity” of betrothal:
We have to consider whether the problem of nullity 
arises even before marriage because it might be urged that 
the girl belongs to the husband after betrothal. From a 
social point of view this certainly could be urged under 
Indian conditions, though the law makes careful distinction 
between betrothal and marriage.
The texts admit that a girl may be abandoned (i«e. 
betrothal may be annulled) between betrothal and wedding in 
certain circumstances, e.g.,"1*
(a) if she has been given fraudulently; or
(b) when a more suitable suitor presents himself after
2verbal engagement; or
(c) if there is an actual fault, ^ which in the case of 
a woman includes affliction with a chronic or loathsome 
disease, deformity, loss of her virginity and a proved
ZL
intercourse with another man.
It does not become quite clear how far a proved 
intercourse with another man differs in import from the loss
1. Manu IX, 72, 73.
2. farada XII, 30.
3. ffarada XII, 31. 
4< Narada XII, 3<?.
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of Tier virginity <> It is submitted that a "proved intercourse 
with another man" means pregnant or who had a child with 
another man, whereas "loss of her virginity" has the literal 
meaning.
We even find that a girl may also "abandon" or 
"give up" (i.e. betrothal is annulled) a suitor if there is 
an actual fault, which in his case includes madness, im­
potence, deformity, affliction with a chronic or loathsome 
disease, loss of caste and that he has forsaken his 
relatives.'1’
Some light on the climate of these ancient textual 
rules is thrown by the parallel rules answering these 
questions: what is the effect of retraction of a promise to 
marry either by the father of a girl or the suitor? What 
would happen if, a girl is promised in marriage to several 
suitors, or after accepting a girl in marriage verbally 
the suitor goes abroad, or a girl's suitor dies after 
betrothal?
a) The effect of retraction of a promise:
(a) By the father:
It is considered improper to retract a promise made 
in betrothal because a breach of a promise is culpable and 
counts as puruganrta, whose heinousness is thousandfold
Narada XII, 36.
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that of an ordinary o f f e n c e I f  the father of a girl with­
draws his promise to give her in marriage to a suitor, who 
has no faults of the kind specified which will justify the 
cancellation of betrothal, he is liable to punishment and 
must make good the expenses incurred by the discarded
p
suitor,
(b) By the suitor:
Similarly it seems that if a suitor abandons a 
maiden after betrothal, who has no faults of the kind speci­
fied which will justify the cancellation of betrothal, he
*
has to marry her even against his wishes,
(ii) Effect of a girl being promised to several suitors; 
If a girl has been promised in marriage to several
suitors in succession, but is still unmarried, and all the
suitors seek her, the suitor to whom the first promise was
made should get her. In such a situation the other suitors
4.
are entitled to restitution of their presents, if any,
(iii) "The suitor goes abroad”;
If, after accepting the offer of a girl in marriage, 
a suitor goes abroad, the girl should wait for three monthly
1, Hanu IX 715 Yajn* 1, 65.
2, Narada XII, 3?2; Yajiiuls 165o
Narada XII 35; Yajru 1, 66,
4, Ka£, quoted in Grihastha Prakesh of Prithwichandra, tras, 
by J.H.^Dave 1953 Bom,I* B»pp,25-31 at p. The same sloka 
(Anekel^hyo) appears at Gpihasthakanda of LaksmidhSra, 
K.KoT, Ed, by K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar p,5&«
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periods and then select another suitor,^ so says the texts:
If within this period she is married to a second person,
according to Kat. the marriage is void and the first suitor
2shall have her# This is an instance of implied term in 
contract#
To grasp the point of the implied term and its social 
reality we must ask whether the period was really three 
months (in those days of lengthy journeys) o t  rather three 
years? The word used is ”ritu” which, according to the 
dictionary, means, ’’any settled point of time”, ”a period 
of the year”, ”a season” (the number of seasons is some­
times limited to three, or sometimes to five, hut is more 
commonly reckoned as six)# It also means ’’menstrual evacua­
tion" •
Zl 15
Nand; arguing from a passage of Babdh#;  ^takes
!rituf ‘monthly period1, as synonymous with ’varsha1,
6 7’year'. We find support for this form Vasistha, and Manu. 
According to them a maiden who has attained puberty shall 
wait to marry for three years and after three years have
1. Narada XII, 24.
2. Kat# quoted in Grihastha Prakesh of Pithurichandra, tras# 
1Sy~"J.H. Dave 1953 Bom# LoR._pp#25-31 at 5 # 31. The same 
sloka appears at Gpihasthakan&a of Lakgmidhara, K.K.T. 
ed# by K 07. Rangaswami Aiyangar pp• 59-60 (purvam)
3. Monier-Williams: Sanskrit-English Dictionary p. 180.
4. Quoted in S.BoE.TSd. ty P, Max ffiiller, vol.7 at p.109.
5. Baud. IV, 1, 14.
6. Tasls. XVII, 67,68.
7. Nanu IX, 90.
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passed, she may marry a suitable husband of her choice. But
1 2  3the analogous passages of Gautama, Vishnu and Narada
never have that meaning and indicate "three monthly periods"« 
The question is: Can these passages be reconciled?
The word !ritu!, it is submitted, means three 
monthly periods and the above passages can be reconciled 
in the following manner. The concept of pre-puberty mar­
riages coupled with superstition (sic) was behind Naradafs 
view. We know that during the Smriti period child marriages
became common. We are told that a girl must be married at or
zl ,
before signs of maturity became apparent (e.g. appearance
of menses) which was, according to the texts, the completion
5 6of tenth year. The age of seven or eight was considered
suitable for a girl to be given in marriage.r The people
believed that different Gods enjoyed or possessed a girl at
different stages of her physical development, unless she is
married, and as if to steal a march on them the parents
were anxious to marry their daughters before the marks of
1. Gautama XVIII, 20.
2. Vishnu XXIV, 40.
3. Narada XII, 24* ^
4-* Narada XII, 27 • See Sternbach "The Panchibantra And
Smritis" [1950] Bharatiya Vid^ p.221-3W  &t 252-56.
5# Parasara VII, 6; Samvarta V, 66.
6. Yama III 21,22; Maaau.
7* Por evidence of tHis practice in pre-British times see
documents printed at J.D.M. Derrett: "Hindu Law in Goa"
z.v.r. 1965
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puberty appear.1 As to the reconciliation of different pas­
sages * it is submitted* that a girl shall wait for only three
months where the father or the guardian will not marry her 
even if a suitable suitor is available* whereas she has to 
wait for three years if the marriage is not possible through 
their active efforts* Or the different texts refer to differ­
ent conditions* i*e., a girl betrothed at eight has three
years or less before she reaches the danger points of 
2puberty*
(iv) The effect of suitor’s death:
A girl* whose suitor dies after accepting her
1* A Nepalese Manuscript of Narada S.B.E. vol.33 (minor 
law books part 1) pVlVl footnote 28: "Soma springs into 
existence when the marks of puberty appear* and enjoys 
women. Their breast[s] is a Qandharva* and Agni is said 
to dwell in their menstrual discharge." [therefore let a 
father give her in marriage before the marks of puberty 
have appeared].
The great importance of the notion is proved by 
the first slokas appearing in the Pancatantra: Ed. by 
goregartenV A3 :<5fl»rfpl29
See also Samvarta quoted in Smritichandrika Samskarakanda
I Ed. by 1/. S'r inivas a chary ap. p. 213. "At the time when 
(pubic) hairs appears Soma enjoys the maiden. At the 
time of (first) menstruation a Gandharva, but Agni (fire) 
at the appearance of breasts. Therefore one should marry 
a maiden [the law requires the marriage of a "maiden" 
for a typical dharmic. "righteous", marriage] before she 
reaches menstruation. *1
See also Kane: Hist, of Dh.S. vol.II(i) p.443*
2. See Mitak. on Yajn. I* 63>64-. trans. by Gharpure 
vol.IT, part I, p.183.
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verbally but before tbe ceremony of marriage, remains tech­
nically a ttanya "maiden" under parental control* This will 
be so even if the betrothal was made with formal libation 
of water provided she has not been married with mantras *
In the case of betrothal leading to an ^sura marriage, in 
which a bride price had been paid, other members of the
family of the proposed bridegroom (i.e. his brother) can
2
marry her, if she be willing*
(B) Nullity of unconsummated marriage:
A distinction has been made between the annulment 
of a marriage which has been consummated and which has not 
been consummated. If a girl is married with mantras, but is 
subsequently discovered to have grave faults, she may be 
"given up" (i.e. marriage is apparently annulled) if the 
marriage has not been consummated, but if it has, she must 
be maintained.
The question is: what is the effect of concealment 
of a defect by a suitor, or the girlfs father and/or the
1. Yama quoted in G.P. of Prithwichandra, trans. by Dave, 
1953? Bom. L.R. ppo25-31 at p.
The same sloka (vacha) appears at G-rihasthakanda of 
Lakgmidhara: K.K,T. Ed. by K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar at 
p.SO.
2. Vasistha cited in Grihastha Kanda of LaksmicLhara K.K.T. 
eS. "by K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, pp*60-Si; llanu IX 69*
3. Sumantu quoted in G.P. of Prithwi chandra, Trs. by J.H. 
Dave 1953 Bom. L.R. pp.25-31 at p.30.
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if
girl herself? The answers appears to he thai/the suitor 
conceals his defects and marries a kanya, the marriage may 
he annulled and the suitor is liable to fine.1 If the failure 
to disclose defects, which consisted in withholding the in­
formation or misleading the suitor, lies with the girlfs
p
father then he is punished, and the §ulka paid hy the
*
suitor is returned. This rule will not apply in case there 
4
are issue, which suggests that the defects relate to 
hedworthiness, or are such as waived hy intercourse and 
(ii) the marriage is voidable and not void. Similarly if a 
girl marries without disclosing her faults and the failure
5
to disclose lies with her the marriage may he annulled.-^ It 
may he noted at this stage we are not implying judicial 
annulment.
1. Narada and Eat, quoted in G.P. of Prithwiohandra.
2. See Sternbach "The Pancatanatra and the Smritis11 [1950] 
Bhartiya Vidya pp.22/ «=309* See pp.297-iol pp®299-300 
(where it has been said that if the father or guardian 
of the girl declares openly all the defects of the girl 
given in marriage he is not liable to punishment, hut if 
he does not do so, then he will he punished hy the King
... and the suitor may annul the contract with this man 
and abandon, or repudiate the girl who had some defects",
5. Narada and Kat. quoted in G.P. of Prithwi Chandra, op.cit. 
Narada XII; 33, Manu VIII 224; Manu IX 73; Yajn 1, 66. 
Narada and Manu quoted in G.P. of Prithwi Chandra.
Cited above
4. ibid.
5* ibid.
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(2) "Nullity1 arising from infraction of a secular and 
spiritual grounds for prohibition:
We find that* in Smritis, certain restrictions were 
placed on the selection of the bride* Great importance was 
attached to the family during this period and it has been 
suggested that one should always marry in the best families.^" 
These restrictions have been prescribed to ensure health 
and healthy children, for the well being of the society*
p
A man is advised not to marry a sapinda, (belonging 
to the same particles of the body) sagotra,^ (a sogotra is 
a relative bearing the same family name, laukika gotra) 
samanapravara ^  (a saVaVapravara is one descended from the 
same Rishi, Vaidika gotra) and brotherless girl.^ He is 
advised to avoid a girl whose family neglects sacred rites
of e
and the study/veda. This advice seems to have been based 
on several different considerations, or consequences of 
different importance*
What would happen if the rules prescribed are 
violated or the advice is not followed? We must make a
1* Manu IV, 244-; see also Yama quoted in Sm* C.I. p.78* 
Asv. !?5jl; Kamasutra III, 1,2.
2. Manu III, 5* Yajn. 1, 53®
3* Sir* gr* 1, 19,2; Gobhila gr* III, 4-,4-.
4-® Narada XII, 7; Manava gr * 1,7*8; Varaha gr. 9*
5* Manu Til, 110; see also Ya jn* 1, 53; Manava gr. 1,7?8«
6. Manu III, 6,7®
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distinction between an infraction of a dristagi^a doga
(dosa = fault, blemish). Drishtagura means the qualities
Vs*
being visible (in tbe sense of secular) and adpistagu/a 
doga (spiritual). In tbe former case tbe prohibition is 
only recommendatory. A rule, i.e. tbat a girl suffering 
from a disease should not be married will not annul a 
marriage, if in spite of tbe rule, tbe marriage has taken 
place, whereas in tbe latter case tbe prohibition is abso­
lute or mandatory because of an invisible consequence. The 
prohibition as to tbe Sapinda, Sagotra, Sapravara marriages 
come under this category. If such a marriage has taken 
place, it is void and an expiation is recommended for tbe 
husband. ^
(5) Traces of "nullity” arising from dissatisfaction 
between tbe spouses:
In order to exclude tbe possibility tbat such traces 
of "nullity" as we have found in tbe texts might also be 
paralleled from other instances of separation between 
spouses, we are forced to look into tbe whole range of such 
separation*
We turn to marriages which are not susceptible to 
tbe remedies mentioned above. We find provision for super­
seding, abandoning, "giving up", deserting, expelling and
1. Kane: Hist* of PS* 2(i) 437-438;
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■banishing a wife. We even find prevision for the "abandon­
ing" of a husband, too, under circumstances which we shall 
examine *
(i) Supersession:
We find that in certain circumstances a wife could 
be superseded which means that a husband can remarry during 
the lifetime of a previous wife or wives. The grounds for 
which a wife could be superseded may be divided into those 
relating to worldly as well as religious aspects of the 
marriage•
The grounds relating to worldly aspects are, drunk­
enness, disease, bad conduct, evil disposition and wasteful­
ness.^ * These grounds are less serious in gravity to the 
grounds relating to the religious aspect of the marriage.
A wife could be superseded, who was barren, who bore
daughters only, all of whose children die, and who has
o
reached atiprasava (menopause) without bearing any children. 
These grounds defeat the religious purpose of the marriage 
since the release of the ancestors from torments after the 
death is considered to be brought about only by the contin­
uation of the line through sons. But a wife can not be 
superseded for the above mentioned defects, it is submitted,
1. Manu IX, 80, 
2* Manu IX, 81.
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unless they are lasting* A sufficient time must be given to 
tbe wife to make it clear whether or not the defect is 
lasting, i.e., the husband must wait ten or eleven"** years 
respectively in case where the wife was barren or bore 
daughters only* The periods are illustrative and must take
p
effect according to the age of the wife, says Lakgmldharao
But a diseased wife who is kind to her husband may only be
superseded after securing her permission and must never be 
*
disgraced* The Smritis show here and there pronounced 
humanitarian trends for a primitive society.
When a superseded wife goes out of the home in 
anger she must either be instantly confined or cast off in
4
the presence of the family, i.e., the prestige of the hus­
band and his family suffers if the initiative is allowed to 
remain with her.
The husband must provide for her maintenance by a 
proper arrangement for it has been laid down in a popular 
verse that the father protects her during maidenhood and
5
the husband guards during youth, but of course, if she runs 
away and refuses to come back no maintenance is payable.^
!• Manu IX? 81.
2. K.K.T. op.cit., at p.104.
3* Manu IX, 82*
4. Manu IX, 83*
5* Manu IX, 3*
6. Yajn. II, 148.
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A distinction, however, has "been made for the purpose of 
payment of
/maintenance, between a wife who has no separate property of
her own and one who has. In the former case the maintenance
allowed is a sum equal to the expenses of her marriage^ or,
2
according to the interpretation of Laksmidhara, as much as 
the new wife receives as wedding gift, i.e., a supplemental 
amount should be given.
(ii) M Abandon11;
A wife could be "abandoned" on grounds which may 
be divided (as for supersession) into relating to worldly 
as well as religious aspect of the marriage. In the former 
category are, drunkenness, bad conduct, disease, insanity, 
commission of adultery, attempt to kill her husband and
*
commission of a heinous crime including procuring abortion. 
In the latter category are barrenness, birth of daughters
lL
only and menopause. A wife could also (and here we notice 
the law*s failure to make nice distinction between nullity 
and separation) be abandoned if the marriage was performed 
by fraud, ^ i.e., in case of impersonation in which a girl
lo Ya.jn. II, 148o
2. K.K.T. op.cit., 105a
3a Yama quoted in Sm. Chandrika trans. by Gharpure, p.518* 
Harita quoted in Sm. Chandrika trans. by Gharpur e, p . 519 • 
Yajn. ibid., at p.519- 
Devala ibid., at p.520.
5* Manu IX, 72.
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other than the betrothed girl is substituted during the 
ceremony.
A husband should not abandon a wife through infatu-
l
ation for another woman. He should, also, not abandon a
wife who is obedient, of pleasant speech, vigilant, virtuous,
o
and has issue* (In any case a husband had to bear with a 
wife, for one year, who hated him)*^ In case he abandons 
such a wife he should be punished by the king like a thief*
He should be compelled by the king to give one third of his 
property to the wife whom he desires to abandon* If the 
husbandfs property is small, he should be compelled to pro­
vide sufficient maintenance for her.^ However in a true 
case of nullity this might not always be instrumental on him* 
We find that a wife may be justified in abandoning 
her husband when he is lost (sic) or presumed dead, when he 
has become a religious ascetic, when he has been expelled 
from the caste, or when he is suffering from an incurable
or contagious disease and who is impotent^ although he may
7
be potent with another woman and impotent with his own.
But in case where the husband goes abroad for some sacred
1* Devala quoted in Sm. Chandrika trans* by Gharpure,p*517 •
2. Narada XII, 95*
3. Devala quoted in Sm. Chandrika oo.cit*. x>o517.
4* Hanu'lX. 77 o
5» Ya.in. Achara 76.
6. Manu IX 176, Naroda XII, 97*
7* Narada XII, 18.
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I
purpose the wife must wait for him for a specified period.
What does "abandon" mean in Smritis? Does it mean 
nullity? Does it follow that in the true cases of nullity, 
the wife severed initially all connection with the husband? 
We have seen how in cases strongly suggestive of nullity 
( "7S ,the word "abandon" is used# We, there­
fore, must inspect, all other contexts in which the word 
appears. In Smritis "abandon" does not necessarily imply 
"nullity" because the scope for divorce and/or supersession 
was so large that need for nullity was small.
(iii) "Give up":
We find that a marriage may be annulled for defects
existing. These defects are: blameworthiness, belonging to
a different caste, defectiveness on account of committing
criminal acts, bad conduct or suffering from an infectious
2or contagious disease. The expression used is parityajya,
i.e., she should be "given up".
This is an example of the failure in the smriti to 
distinguish different classes of defect. Whereas "difference 
of caste" might mean "nullity" in a modern sense, the other 
grounds suggest a relegation of a less radical kind. But
1. Manu IX, 176.
2. Sumahtu quoted In Grihasta Prakash of Prithwichandra 
trans. by J.H. Dave [1953] Bom. L.R. 25-31 at p.31*
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for tlie possible meaning we must await the general effect 
of several authorities over the whole range and contexts*
(iv) Deserting:
We find that a wife could be deserted by the husband 
for a temporary period* i*e*, three months (at first it 
seems utter nonsense) and deprived of her ornaments and 
furniture, on the following grounds: her being disrespectful 
to the husband, bad conduct, drunkenness and disease* What 
does deserting mean? It is submitted that "deserting” means 
a revocable remedy available to the husband which never has 
the effect of dissolving the marriage. This is in the nature 
of temporary separation in the interest of peaceful family 
life and for the chastisement of the wife*
(v) "Expelling” and "banishing from the town"
We are told that a husband could expel the wife
from the house, who always shows malice towards him, or who
2
is unpleasant of speech, or who eats before him. We also 
find provision for banishing a wife from the town, who 
wastes the entire property of her husband under the pretence 
that it is her stridhana or who procures abortion or who 
attempts to kill her husband. The word expel means, it is
1. Narada IX, 78.
2. Ibid., XII, 93.
3. ibid., XII, 92.
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submitted, tbat the husband sball prohibit the wife from 
principal habitation and assign her a separate dwelling 
within his control# This, also, is a temporary separation 
and never has the effect of dissolving the marriage* The 
principal difference between "deserting" "banishing" and 
"expelling" is, it is submitted, as follows: In the former 
cases the wife during the period of desertion, need not live 
under the husbandfs control (i#e#, she can go and live with 
her parents etc#) whereas in the latter case she has to live 
under his control#
(4) Provisional Conclusion:
In the Smriti period particular care was taken that 
the girl marries before or as soon as she attains puberty 
because in this period people were pessimistic with regard 
to the virtue of a girl and only in marrying at an early 
age was the virginity of a bride warranted# A marriageable 
girl, without marrying, living in her father*s house was 
considered to be a Vyigall
Similarly a father who did not marry his daughter at the 
proper time was considered to commit a sin#
We find a possibility of annulment of betrothal if 
either any concealed defect is discovered in the suitor or 
the girl, ice*, deformity or any gross corporal or spiritual 
defect on ground of fraud or impotence (see above pp# )
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In Smritis a husband was entitled to supersede a 
wife and maintain her, abandon, desert, expel or banish her* 
Similarly a wife could also abandon a husband* None of these 
will appear to be instances of "nullity"*
We find that there was a possibility of "nullity" 
where a suitor had married a sapinda, sagotra or samanapra- 
vara girl* A marriage could also be annulled where the wife 
or the husband was impotent or suffered from an infectious 
or contagious disease or where the marriage was performed 
by force or fraud*
(vi) "Nullity" in Buddhist texts:
We do not find any specific mention of "nullity" in 
the Buddhist texts» (A*D >200 In the higher section of 
society divorce was considered unusual, as we know from 
Kaphadlpayana-jataka,^ where a woman who did not love her 
husband, when asked by him why she did not take another 
husband, said that it is not the custom in this family for 
a wife to take another husband* But in the lower section of 
society we find evidence of divorce* We find that a woman 
who refused to return to her husband because he had con­
tracted a second marriage in her absence, was adopted by a
p
king at the request of Buddha, was married off to a nobleman*
1. J 444 (Book IV) Ed. by Cowell pp.17-22 at p.21.
2. Dhammapada II, 82 and Comm*
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We also find reference to a dasi (dancing girl) who had had
1 — 2 several divorces in her life. In Mafihima Nikaya we find
a reference to a family where the elders were anxious to
divorce a discarded wife even against her wish and to marry
her to another man.
-  3We also find certain nataka-^ stories from which we 
get reference to supersession, i.e., In Ruhak- tj at aka, the 
Brahman chaplain of the king had a wicked wife who made her 
husband a laughing-stock to everyone, but after realising 
her wickedness he superseded her and took another wife. In
^  _ Ll
Godh a-tjataka, a wife who had been neglected by her husband 
was advised to forsake him as the bird forsakes a barren 
tree.
We can conclude that there is evidence of divorce 
unilaterally and supersession by a husband in the Buddhist 
texts.
(vii) Nullity in Jaina Law:
There is no specific mention of nullity in Jaina 
law. However, we find that a betrothal as well as a marriage 
may be repudiated on grounds which we shall consider. We
1. Therigatha, 72 and Comm.
2. Vol. IV, p.109.
3. J 191 (Book II) Edo by Cowell, pp.79-80.
4. J 333 (Book III) Edoby Cowell, pp.71-72.
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find that a "betrothal may be repudiated if some defect is
discovered in the caste of the bridegroom, or the bridegroom
is found to be ill-behaved.'1' There is a difference of
2opinion whether this can be done before gaptapadi or
before lj?aiiigrahana,^ (i#e,, the joining of the hands).
Jaina law provides information on what could be
considered qualifications for marriage. A man is not allowed 
✓S zl
to marry a iagotra girl or a girl belonging to a different 
5
Var&na. However, subject to local custom, a man may marry 
paternal auntfs daughter, the daughter of the maternal 
uncle and the wife*s sister.
The question is: what is the effect of not observing 
the rules laid down for the Selection of a bride? It appears 
that some conditions are obligatory, i.e., as to gotra, and 
some are not. The non-observance of an obligatory condition 
will have the effect of making the marriage void (see 
above) whereas in case of non-obligatory condition it will 
not have the effect of annulling a marriage.1
1 ♦ Trivariiikachara XI, 174- cited in the Jaina law: Champat 
Eal j ain~~44^
2. ibid.
3. ibid XI, 175 at p.4-5.
4. ibid XI, 3 at p.38.
5. ibid XI, 36, 40 at p.36.
6. ibid XI, 38 and 175 at p.39.
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VIII0 Nullity in the Brahmanical legal commentaries:
(1) Concept of nullity:
The concept of nullity and annulment is 1 present hy 
the period when our commentaries “begin (A.D. 700)* Medhati-
1  —  -rthi uses the term apramapi Karaya for nullifying mortgages
and sales which literally means "making the defid of no
authority in law"; so the phrase really means "Cancelling"*
-  2Bharucin would use the common term Vinivartana which has
*
been used by Mamr himself* Medh* also uses the terms 
il . 5
nivpitti and anusaya ^  for 1 revoking1 the former gift* This 
is enormously important because nivpitti in this context 
means non-effectuating the nature of marriage, whereas 
anusaya strictly means "repenting" (see below )•
(2) Test of Nullity:
The test of nullity is indicated by Medh*^ and 
Lakgmldhara * ^ The prohibitions against marriage are divided 
into two categories, e.g., recommendatory and mandatory or 
absolute* The breach of a prohibition which is only recom­
mendatory does not effect the validity of a marriage. Whereas
1* Medh* on Manu VIII, 165*
2. Bhar on Manu VIII, 165. 1 sun grateful to Prof* Derrett 
for ref. to Bhar.
3. Manu VII, 165.
4* Medho on Manu, III9 24.
5. Medh. on Manu VIII, 238.
6* Medh* on Manu III, 11*
7* K»K.T. cited above p. 31.
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a marriage performed in breach of mandatory prohibition is 
a nullity, (See above and below,loj  ^  ^  )
(5) Nullity of betrothal:
n _
Medh# uses the term nigphalagi -Kuryat for 1 annull­
ing1 the betrothal which means 1render fruitless1, 1render
2 -  —void of effect1# Medh# show/>that, since na vivaha-kala
-  -  -  -  3 ,
eva danam pra^, api vivahad varana-kale asti danam (i#e#,
the ownership of the girl passes from her father to the
bridegroom by gift - prior to marriage - at the date of the
betrothal) a girl may be tyajya, Ttabandoned1 for any fault,
provided it arise or appear between the betrothal and the 
- 4wedding. Bhar.1s commentary is not complete but he only 
says that "abandonment” must be for a cause.
(4) Distinction between nullity of a consummated and 
unconsummated marriage:
In the commentaries a distinction has been made 
between annulling a marriage which has been consummated and
15
one which has not. We find a passage in the Smriti Chandrika^
referring to the marriage of a married woman: evagt caj^ani
1. Medh. on Manu IX, 73*
2. Medh. on Manu IX, 72#
3. Medh. on Manu V, 149•
4. Bhar on Manu V, 149*
5. Smritichandrika: J.Ra Gharpurefs Bombay Edition (1918) 
Part I, p o 83.
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Bagis.karad Tjrdhvam akg at ay &ny ab punar-udvaha-paragl tani 
Yu^antarabHhiprayaplti mantavyagi, The words mean, ,fTlius the 
texts which, relate to a remarriage (or second or subsequent 
marriage) of a girl whose Yoni has not been broken [i.e., 
the marriage has not been consummated] subsequent to the 
samskara are to be understood as having reference only to 
previous Yugas" (This is a passage referring to acts for­
bidden during the Kaliyuga ^  including the remarriage of a 
married woman). If such girls were under consideration, the 
remarriage of a girl whose marriage had been consummated 
was, a fortiori, out of the question. This means, it is 
submitted, that a marriage which has not been consummated 
can be annulled for a cause but a marriage which has been 
consummated can not be so annulled and, it seems, the wife 
should be maintained, i,e,, the initiative does not lie 
solely with the husband - as is proper in the nullity pro­
ceedings, The texts, according to the Commentators, provide 
for nullity without the possibility of the girlTs remarriage. 
This is correct since if she has such faults no one would 
want to marry her,
(5) Traces of “nullity” arising from dissatisfaction
between the spouses:
We find certain grounds on which a wife might be
1, As to acts forbidden during the Kaliyuga see
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Mgiven up" and a wife or tlie husband might be abandoned.
(i) "Give up"
If a man marries a Kanya in childhood without know­
ing her true nature and when grown up he finds out that 
she has defects, he can by all means, says the Brihan
i
Naradiya give her up. A wife shall certainly be "given up" 
who has been given by fraud, i.e., who is defective in limb, 
or has white or other kind of leprosy and is given in mar­
riage while her defects are concealed under her garments or 
when the fraud consists in one kanya being shown to the 
bridegroom earlier and another being given in marriage to 
him - a real possibility where brides appear at the ceremony 
heavily veiled. In such cases, the gift of that kanya shall 
be made void by that kanya being returned to the giver 
because the mantras of panigrahana are inapplicable to 
akanyas ( akanya means one who is no longer a maiden) for
p
in this case the mantras and rites are ineffective, i.e., 
the marriage is capable of being annulled.
(ii) "Abandoned"
We find that a wife may be abandoned for three 
months and "deprived of her ornaments and appurtenances"(sic)
1. Cited in G.P. of Prithwichandra, trans. by J.D. Dave, 
1953, Bm. L.R. 25-31 at p* 31.
2. See Grihasictha Prakashoof Prithwi chandra, cited above 
at p.31*
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who neglects her husband who is mad, intoxicated or diseased?* 
Manu^ uses, ty aga, meaning (according to
temporary separation. This abandonment etc,, it is submitted,
-  3is for the purpose of bringing her to her senses, Bhar, is 
of the opinion that here the wife should not be sent away 
from the house although the husband does not have inter­
course with her,
IL
We also find that, according to Medh,, a wife is 
justified in leaving a husband, who is mad, or an outcaste, 
or impotent, or seedless (sic) or afflicted with chronic 
or loathsome disease • The question is: what is the dis­
tinction between impotent and seedless because both denote 
absence of manly vigour? According to Medh, the difference 
is that while impotent indicates futility of the seed, 
seedless implies total absence of virility.
We must answer the questions: What would happen if
one gives a girl in marriage without disclosing her defects? 
What are the faults of a kanya for which nullity is possible? 
What do anuSaya and "abandon" mean here?
1. Medh, on Manu IX, 78,
2 • k
3. Bhar. on Manu IX, 78.
4-. Medh. on Manu IX, 80.
5. Medh. on Manu IX, 80,
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(6) Effect of non-disclosure of defects:
1Medh* infers that one does become liable to punish­
ment if one gives the girl in marriage without disclosing
2
defects* Jha in his translation improves on the text read- 
ing akathayato for kathayato (no doubt rightly)* The words 
are Datta api adatta bhavati meaning fthe given girl is un- 
given1 , i*e*, it is null and void as a gift* Thus in his 
view defects render the marriage voidable and the giver 
liable to a penalty* If one asks why voidable and not void 
the answer might be that the gift does not operate as a 
gift, but if the husband does not repudiate it the girl 
becomes his wife by his accepting her. Another possibility
Ow
is that this a transaction which is void until rectified,
3 - 4-a peculiarity of Hindu law* Bhar *1 s commentary is damaged 
here, but from the remarks it is perfectly clear that where 
the defect has been stated, and she has been married, even 
though she has faults, there is no question of abandoning 
her (dogavatya api parity a go nasti) * No other commentator 
on Manu maJces this point, but it is evidence of what the 
Sastra was about A*D. 700*
1* Medh* on Manu VIII, 205*
2* fTTJha: Cited above Vol.IV(2) pp*251-52*
3* J.D.M* Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p*\$7
4-. Bhar on Manu VIIl” “2U3“*-------------------------
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(7) Faults of a Kanya for which Nullity is possible:
i __
Medh, says that faults of a kanya (for which
nullity is possible) are those which are dharma-pratja-
samarthya-Vjghata-hetavah. The last phrase has been trans- 
2
lated by Jha as ’detrimental to morality, to progeny, and
to capacity in general1. However, we would translate it as
’Causes of detriment to dharma or capacity for bearing
issue’ but Jha’s translation may be right. The trouble is
that samar thy a does mean ’Capacity1, but it is not used
absolutely (i.e. without capacity for something). According 
- 3to Bhar such fault is a ’disease which obstructs dharma
and offspring1 (dharma-pratja-nirodhina-rogepta) . There is a
- 4cryptic reference to a lunatic bride in Bhar, but the 
problem is connected with criminal law and we need not 
clarify it. Medh.^  shows that a sterile wife could be aban­
doned at the husband’s option. In Jha’s^ translation, 
’revoking* of the former gift1, the word for revoking is 
nivptti, which we already know (see above p. ). In Medfcu^  
"abandonment” is tyaga again and the faulty bride who cannot
1. Medh. on Manu VIII, 224.
2. d-o Jha: Manu smriti, vol.IV, part II, at p.272.
3. Bhar. on Manu VttI, 224.
4. IS3Z.
5- on Manu VIII, 227*
6. G. Jha: Cited above at p. 276.
7. Medh. on Manu VIII, 227.
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be abandoned is one wbose faults do not include the funda­
mental faults dealt with earlier in the commentary, as he
immediately shows (see above p. )• The simile of the girl
1
with a cloth is amusing. Marriage, according to Medh?,
stands on the same footing as 1using1,and just as the cloth
that has been used and worn out cannot be returned to the
seller, so the maiden also who has been married cannot be 
__ o
abandoned. Bhar on the other hand, argues that even a girl 
who has had premarital intercourse cannot be abandoned 
after saptapadi. He very carefully says that a sick girl
must not be abandoned if she can attend to dharma and
prajanana, but if she can attend to neither of these she 
should be abandoned, parityajya. In other words a girl 
unfit for bearing children, whether because she is impotent 
or lack of fertility (no menses), can be abandoned, unless, 
(i) the defect is stated beforehand, or
(ii) intercourse has taken place.
(8) Meaning of anufeaya:
Ve have seen that for revoking a former gift the 
word used is nivptti whereas anuSayg is also used for 
"revoking1 o Thus it is necessary to investigate the meaning
1. Medh. on Manu 227.
2. Bhar on Manu VIII 227.
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of anu£aya.
Anu£aya, according to Medh.1 is "revoking” which 
means repenting and not actually resiling from# If there is 
no repenting, how much the less could there he resiling from 
gSgSj#* The lunatic wife is na tyajya, !not to he abandoned1# 
But the girl who is not a virgin is not a wife, so there 
can he an anuSaya* They may repent and this strongly 
suggests a voidable marriage, not a void one as the ’not a 
wife* clause would suggest* He says it is equal to a 
sapinda marriage, i*e«, void. But the word anu§aya strongly 
suggests an option not to repent. This is typical of the 
verbal confusion and vagueness tolerated by the Sanskrit 
sources.
(9) Meaning of ”abandon”:
What does the word ’’abandon”, tyaga and parityaga
mean in Commentaries? Does it mean supersession, or divorce,
2 -or nullity? Medh* defines tyaga as giving up all intercourse 
with her and forbidding her to do household work. However, 
"abandon” here unfortunately denotes things, namely,
(i) It implies supersession,^ where the hus­
band abandons an obedient, pleasant speaking, son-bearing
1* Medh# on Manu VIII, 238.
2. Medh* on Manu VIII, 389* trans. by Jha: op.cit*, vol.IV 
(iij p*413#
3«Mitak on Yajn* III# 76#
90
and skilful wife* Medh,1 says that for the wife going off 
in anger, caused hy supersession, there are two optional 
alternatives in the shape of confinement or divorce* Here 
Jha!s translation needs to be checked* Medh* in fact says 
tyaga or samplrodha, abandonment or confinement, in that
_  p
order, are alternatives* Bhar, Medhatithifs predecessor, 
says that some people construe the verse so as to show that 
Abandonment1 means Cessation of association in praja-karma, 
which last we take to mean begetting of offspring and parti­
cipation in sacred rituals* He insists that neither step
should be taken if repugnant to Vedic rituals* Further, the
*
quotation from Brihan-Naradiya, in the continuance of the 
treatment of marriage in Grihasta Prakash of Prithwi chandra, 
is so placed that the sloka immediately preceding it des­
cribes the physical and other defects of a girl whom a man 
might marry* One is advised not to marry such a girl and 
it does not follow that parityajet refers to nullity* It 
may well refer to supersession*
(ii) It may imply a divorcium a mensa ot thoro, 
where the wife is pregnant by another man, or attempts to 
kill her husband, or commits heinous crimes*^ In such cases
1* Medh. on Manu VII, 80.
2. BKar on Manu IX, 83.
3. trans* by J.H. Da.ye 1953, Bm. L.R. 25-31 • 
li|. Mitak on Yajn* III, 72*
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she will he abandoned from sexual intercourse and joint 
living•
(iii) It may mean temporary separation, e.g., where a 
wife is abandoned for three months for the purposes of re- 
forming her# We will notice that in commentaries also a 
husband has to bear with a wife who hates him for one year
and after one year may deprive her of her property and
2cease to cohabit. Medh. commenting on this says that the
meaning of the verse is that he shall not turn her out of
the house. Though the use of the root !vas! with fsam* is
not compatible with the accusative ending in * enam; and
1samvaset1, cohabit, would stand for, 1samvasayet1, 1 allowed
to live with* - yet it should be taken to mean Tchiding1.
The confiscation of her property also, according to him, is
for the purpose of bringing her to her senses; and it does
- 3not mean absolute taking away of all her belongings. Bhar 
uses nigkaranagL, !turn her out of the house ■*, 1 driving away*. 
He says that the husband does not have intercourse with her, 
not that he should send her away from the house* But he 
notes that another author (anonymous) says this means, tyaga, 
temporary separation.
1. Medh. on Manu IX, 78; Bhar. on Manu IX, 78#
2. Medh. on Manu IX, 77*
3. Bhar on Manu IX, 77*
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(iv) It may imply breach, of promise by the suitor, e*g., 
where the proposed bridegroom abandons a faultless maiden*’*'
(v) Lastly, (subject to conditions classified above in 
Medh. Bhar etc*) it may also mean "nullity", e.g. betrothal
p
may be annulled for a cause or a fault; a marriage can also
be annulled on the husband*s option where either the wife is
*
sterile or the bride has fundamental faults*
IX* Conclusion:
Ve approach the dharmaskstra texts as a whole. We 
find that certain restrictions are placed on the selection 
of a bride, e.g. a man is advised not to marry a sapinda, 
sagotra, samanapravara, brotherless girl and a girl whose 
family neglects sacred rites and study of Veda. We also 
find that it is considered an imperative duty of the parties 
to the marriage and their guardians to disclose serious 
defects of the proposed bride or the bridegroom. These
defects include, in case of both the proposed bride and the
bridegroom, affliction with a chronic or loathsome disease, 
insanity and deformity. The fact of loss of a girl*s virgin­
ity and impotence of the proposed bridegroom are also such 
defects*
1. Mitak on Xajn*
2. Medh. on Manu IX, 72; Bhar on Manu IX, 72.
3. Medh* on Manu VIII, 22T*
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The question is s what is the effect of breach or 
violations of the restrictions? What is the effect of con­
cealment or non-disclosure of defects? What remedies would 
an ancient or medieval husband or wife need? What remedies, 
if any, will their relatives want? Was there, ultimately, 
nullity in the modern sense of the term?
The answer is that if a rule restricting a marriage 
is dpigtanta (i.e. secular) it may be ignored, if adpigtanta'*" 
(i.e. spiritual in object) it is imperative. Hence, if a 
suitor happens to marry a sapinda, or sagotra, or samanapra- 
vara girl, the marriage even though performed would be as 
good as not performed. The reasons being that the character 
of marriage as a samskara is determined by scriptural 
injunction, and a transgression of the injunction means the 
non-accomplishment of the rite, and the girl can never 
become the wife of that man. Hence it has been ordained 
that such a girl, even though she may have gone through 
the sacramental rites shall be given up, i.e. she must be 
given up. The result is virtually nullity, but she may 
have a right of maintenance. The prohibition of 
marriage with girls belonging to families
dyistanta = haying a "seen" end ) Thege ^  similar
dpistartha = having a "seen" object ) concepts.
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that may have dropped the sacred rites and so forth is “based 
upon dpigfragucia dosa, and, therefore, where such girls are 
married, the marriage is duly accomplished, the girl actually 
becomes the man*s wife and shall not be given up, i.e., it 
is not in itself a ground for nullity* The same must be 
said of other "requirements1 that are dpistanta, such as 
marriage with a brother less girl or with a man who has for­
saken his relatives*
If the parties to the marriage and/or their guardians 
fail to disclose defects of the proposed bride or the bride­
groom to the other side and the marriage takes place, the 
other party can get the marriage annulled. In such cases 
and cases where the marriage was performed by force (p.S'S' ) 
or fraud (p. £\ ) the effect of consummation is vital and may 
be decisive. Where the marriage has been consummated it can 
not, despite the defects, be annulled although the wife may 
be superseded and is entitled to maintenance, i*e*, the 
effect of consummation is to cure the defect.
The most important of all the defects is impotence. 
The Smritis insisted on careful examination of the proposed 
bridegroom*s fitness for intercourse♦ A distinction has been 
made by Narada between curable and incurable impotence. The
marriage as well as the betrothal may be annulled if the 
proposed bridegroom is found incurably impotent. If the
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defect is curable a sufficient period will be allowed to 
pass in order to give time for the cure to have effect*
This is on the ground that a gift is no gift which has been 
given in error or ignorance.1 The gift of a girl is solely 
for raising progeny and a person who receives the gift of a 
girl or is given a girl in the wrong belief that he is 
potent, but is found not to be so, the gift is no gift*
Ve find that a marriage performed by force or fraud 
is voidable* The force may consist in abducting a girl and 
marrying her against her wishes. In case of fraud it may 
consist of either impersonation, i*e, a girl other than 
betrothed is substituted during the ceremony, or in conceal­
ing the defects of the proposed bride or the bridegroom.
In both the cases consummation makes the marriage valid.
A husband in ancient or medieval times had several 
remedies open to him. We find provisions for a wife to be 
expelled from the house, or temporarily deserted, or ban­
ished from the town, or "abandoned", i.e. physically separ­
ated from the husband, and to be superseded by another wife. 
A husband could also be abandoned by a wife. The terms 
"expel from the house", "deserted by the husband" and 
"banished from the town" amount to more or less the same
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thing. They mean a temporary separation for the peaceful 
family life and (if relevant) correction of the wife*s 
hehaviour. This is the Commentators view* which "improves” 
upon the happy-go-lucky notions of the Smritis * some of 
which* as we have seen* would tolerate divorce and re­
marriage* In all the above cases* the implication is that 
the husband should refrain from sexual intercourse but in 
exceptional cases* such as where the wife attempts to kill 
him* he might even abstain from all association with the 
wife*
The term "abandon” thus denotes several ideas and 
is not confined to the grounds for nullity or its effects*
It means complete or temporary separation from conjugal 
intercourse or joint living* ( \^\ )* It may also mean super­
session (p*^)* divorcium a mensa et thoro ( ) and as
we have seen nullity*
In dharmasastra generally supersession is the remedy 
preferred by both the husband and the wife and their 
relatives, because remarriage of a girl was not so easy in 
practice and since the initiative did not lie with the wife 
the prestige of the husband and his family suffered if the 
wife decided to take the initiative, divorce the husband and 
remarry*
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We find that in the dharmasastra nullity existed.
We also find that there was a distinction between void and 
voidable marriages* A marriage was void if the parties 
were within the prohibited degrees of relationship* A 
marriage was voidable on the grounds of incurable impotence, 
force or fraud which included fraudulent concealment of 
impotence, insanity, a chronic or loathsome disease, or any 
other serious defect of the purporting bride or the bride­
groom, and finally non-disclosure of such defects*
(B) Legislative History of nullity of marriage in Hindu Law*
(1)"Nullity" of marriage before 1935:
The Hindu Law of Marriage as laid down by the 
Smritikaras and the Commentaries in ancient days remained 
static almost till the advent of the British rule in India
as moulded and altered from time to time custom and
1 X©^4
usage. The pre-1955(recognised the validity of the marriage
of an idiot or lunatic on the footing that the marriage was
2 3a samskara* However, according to Banerjee, the idiot or
lunatic being (where the loss of reason was complete)
1, S.V. Gupte, Hindu Law of Marriage, p*2.
2* See Venkat acharyulu V . Rangactiaryulu [J390]I.L.R. 14 Mad. 
316-31&Y BhagwaYl V » Parmeshwari L1942] All#518-589-590♦ 
Amrithammal yT Yallimay^ Ammal L1'942] Mad * 807 B. B.
3# Banerjee, Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana (5th edn*) 
pp*40-43# See also Mayne, loth edn. 150-3#
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incompetent to accept the gift of the bride, which was a
necessary part of the ceremony of marriage, it was not easy
to understand how their marriage in such a case could be
regarded as marriage at all. Similarly, a marriage with a
person who was impotent at the time of the marriage was con-
1
sidered to be a nullity. We also find obiter dicta in some
cases to the effect that a marriage may be set aside by
p W
Courts for force or fraud. /^Aunjana Dasi V. Prahalad
7y
Chandra, Norman, J, said,
T,I think: that the Court must have jurisdiction in 
auch suit to declare the marriage void if procured by force 
or fraud, and celebrated without the consent of the necessary 
parties or without the formalities necessary to render it a 
binding marriage according to Hindu Law." However, as under 
dharmasastra, a marriage solemnized between persons with the
Zl
degrees of prohibited relationship was void.
The first attempt to introduce element of nullity 
by legislation was made in 1896. In Madras the Malabar 
Marriage Act, 1896, was passed, whereby poligamy was forbidden
1. Rakeya bibi V. Anil Kumar [194-8] l.L.R. 2 Cal.119; 
Ratarmoni Debi V .Tagen&r a A.I.R. 194-9 Cal.404;
2TY. B Ll9$2l g4^om. L.R. 725.
2. Aunjona Iasi V. Prahalad Chandra [1870] 6 Bengal Law 
Reports 24 p; VenKatacHaryulu V. Rangacharyulu [1890] 
l.L.R. 14- Mad. 3l6 at 3£07MuicfaancTBuahia [ ] 
l.L.R* Bom. 812.
3. [1870] 6 Bengal Law Reports 24-3 at p.254-.
4-. Mayne, 11th ed. 144.
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if the first marriage was registered and divorce was recog­
nised among those who were governed by the Marumakkattayam 
or Alliasantana law* This Act was repealed by Madras 
Marumakkattayam Act, 1932, which prohibited bigamous 
marriages among Hindus in or outside the then Presidency of 
Madras who were governed by the Marumakkattayam law of 
inheritance and among Hindu males whether governed by that 
law or not who married Hindu females governed by that law. 
Similarly, the Madras Namboodari Act, 1932, made provision 
for preventing a Namboodari marrying another woman during 
the life time of his wife except in certain circumstances.
In 19A6, the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous 
Marriage Act was passed. Section A of this Act provided 
that, “notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the 
contrary, a bigamous marriage shall be void, -
(a) if it is contracted in this State after the coming 
into force of this Act.
(b) if it is contracted beyond the limits of this State 
after the coming into force of this Act and either 
or both the contracting parties to such marriage 
are domiciled in this State.
A bigamous marriage, according to this Act meant'*'
1. S.3(1)
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’’the marriage of a person during the lifetime of his or her 
spouse, if the marriage of such person with such spouse has 
not been dissolved, or declared void by a court of competent 
jurisdiction or has. not been dissolved, or is not void 
according to the custom or usage of the community to which 
either of the parties to such marriage belongs; but does not 
include the marriage of a person during the lifetime of his 
or her spouse, if such spouse at the time of such marriage 
shall have been continually absent from such person for the 
space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by 
such person as being alive within that time provided that 
the person contracting such marriage shall, before such 
marriage takes place inform the person with whom such 
marriage is contracted of the real state of facts, so far as 
the same are within his or her knowledge*”
Similarly, the Madras (Bigamy Prevention and
1 2 Divorce) Act, 194-9 and the Madhaya Pradesh Prevention of
Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1955? made bigamous marriages
to be void, and punishable under section 4-94- of the India
Penal Code, 1860* The HMA, 1956, repealing the Bombay and
Madras acts enacted detailed grounds of nullity.
1. S.4-.
2. S.4-.
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(2) Nullity of marriage raider HMA, 1955«
There are two sets of circumstances in which a 
marriage may he annulled, according to HMA, namely,
(i) where there has never "been a valid marriage, e.g., 
where either party has a spouse living at the time of 
marriage (p. \o^ > helow), or the parties are within the pro­
hibited degrees of relationship or the parties are sapindas 
of each other (p. below)* In such a case the marriage is 
said to be "null and void"; and (ii) where there has been 
a marriage which was in its inception valid in all respects, 
but which has turned out to be so defective, that it is con­
sidered in public interest that it ought never to have taken 
place, e.g., because of the respondents impotence (p*V^ ' 
below), or either party!s idiocy or lunacy at the time of 
marriage (pAV3below), or where the consent ... was obtained 
by force or fraud (p.'lS^below), or respondents concealed 
pregnancy at the time of marriage (p. bA below)* In such 
a case the marriage is said to be voidable*
The question is: what practical differences are 
there between a marriage which is alleged to be "null and 
void" and one which is only alleged to be "voidable". There 
is lack of comprehensive treatment of the subject, however, 
following may be said to be a fair account which, it is 
submitted, may be approved by the Indian Courts*
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(a) A void marriage is regarded as never having taken 
place and can he treated by the parties to it as null without 
the necessity of a decree. A voidable marriage is valid
l
until annulled by the Court.
(b) In a void marriage the decision depends on the
ascertainment of facts instantly verifiable at the date of
the marriage. In a voidable marriage the decision depends on
2supervening circumstances.
(c) The husband and wife are competent to be called as
witnesses, in case of a void marriage, against each other
*
but this is not so in the case of a voidable marriage.
(d) A spouse can allege and prove the fact of marriage 
being void in any Court at any place if a decision on that 
matter is relevant to an issue properly before that Court.
But the question whether a marriage is voidable can not be
Ll
raised incidentally in other proceedings.
(e) A void marriage can be put in issue by third 
parties, whereas a voidable marriage will not be declared 
null except at the instance of the injured party.^
1. T. Rangaswami V. T„ Arvindammal A.I.R, 1957 Madras 24-3 
at 24-9*
Ross Smith V. Ross Smith [1962] 1 All.E.R. 344- at 381
(H.L.), DeHRenviTle V De Renville [194-8] 1 All.E.R.56.
2. Ross Smith V. Ross Smith 11962] 1 All.E.R. 344- at 381.
3* kVV. Algar L1953J 2 III.E.R. 1381 at 1383; (criminal
case); Wells V Fisher [1831] 174 E.R. 34* (civil case).
4. Ross Smith W"Ross'Smith [1962] 1 All.E.R. 344 at p.356
W 7 l 7 ) -------------------------
5* T. Rangaswami V. T.Arvindammal A.I.R. 1957 Mad.243 at 
249", VeITs~Y Cot tarn L.1863J 5 SW.Tr* 364 = 164 E.R.1316
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(f) A void marriage may be declared a nullity at any 
time but it has been decided that a voidable marriage can 
not be declared a nullity after the death of the parties, 
i.e., time may be a bar to the granting of a decree*"^
(g) In case of a void marriage the nature of grounds
is immaterial (i.e., whether the petitioner was sincere or
not) whereas in case of a voidable marriage a decree will
not be granted if it is asked for on grounds that are not 
2sincere .
(h) Transactions which have taken place during the 
marriage on the footing that it is subsisting, or in direct 
contemplation of marriage which afterwards takes place (e.g., 
ante or post-nuptial marriage settlements) can be affected, 
by subsequent decree of nullity, in case of a void marriage, 
but they can not be so affected in case of a voidable 
marriage•
(i) A void marriage generally can not be ratified or 
condoned but a voidable marriage may be validated by ratifi- 
cation.^
1. Ross Smith V. Ross Smith [1962] 1 All.E.R. 344 at 356. 
(H.t.) Dodworth V T D ale [1936] 2 All.E.R. 440;
B V. B FT568'jPD.,559; Inverclyde V. Inverclyde [1931] 
HTTETR. 39* ------ -------------
2. Dodworth V. Dale [1936] 2 All.E.R. 440;
3. See "Re iCaves, Eaves V, Eaves [19391 4 All .E.R. 280;
See also Eowke V.~ Eowke Ll958] 2 All.E.R. 638.
4. See Jo Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of Marriage, 
pp.80-84.
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(j) A wife alleging a void marriage can rely on her 
own domicil before marriage but she can not do so in the 
case of a voidable marriage and must admit, until the case 
has been decided, that her domicil is that of her husband
»
c
(k) In case of a void marriage Lex loci Celebrationis
is to be applied to determine the issues but it can not be
2
so applied where the marriage is alleged to be voidable*
(l) Lastly, in the case of a void marriage the decree 
merely declares status and is a judgment in rem, whereas 
in case of a voidable marriage it changes the status and is 
a judgment in personam*
1* Ross Smith V* Ross Smith [1962] 1 All.E.R. 344 at 358 (H.L*)
2. ibh:----------
3« T» Rangaswami V* I* Arvindammal A.I.R. 1957 Mad.243 and
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CHAPTER II 
BIG-ANT
I* Introduction:
A marriage solemnized after the commencement of HMA, 
shall he declared null and void if either party has a spouse 
living at the time of the marriage^ and shall he punishable 
under section 4-94- and 4-95 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.^ 
Section 4-94- provides that, "whoever, having a husband or 
wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is 
void by reason of its taking place during the life of such 
husband or wife, shall be punished,... This section does 
not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband 
or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction, nor to ary person who contracts a marriage 
during the lifetime of a former husband or wife, if such 
husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, 
shall have been continually absent from such person for the 
space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by 
such person as being alive within that time, provided the 
person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before 
such marriage takes place inform the person with whom such 
marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as 
the same are within his or her knowledge
1* S.11 read with 5(i)*
2. S.17.
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The parallel provisions of the [Kenya] ^ Hindu
p
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, I960, and [The Uganda]
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1961, provide that,
"A marriage solemnized after the commencement of this 
ordinance shall be void if the former husband or wife of 
either party was living at the time of the marriage and the 
marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force” 
and provisions of respective Penal Code shall apply in such 
a caae.
The provisions of HMA appear to have been based on 
section 19(4-) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869» and section 
24(l)(i) read with section 4(a) of the Special Marriage Act, 
1954* The provisions of the Uganda Ordinance corresponds to 
parallel provisions of the Kenya Ordinance except for the 
difference in section number of the Penal Code,
The constitutional validity of the provisions not 
allowing second marriage has been challenged as contravening 
the fundamental rights guaranteeing, equality before
ZL
law and equal protection of law, prohibiting discrimination
5
on grounds only of religion, race, caste"^  etc, and providing 
for freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and
1. Cap, 157. S.7(3); Cap.157 8 .11(a)(1).
2. S*7(l).
5. S.171 of the Kenya Penal Code and S.170 of the Uganda 
Penal Code,
4. Article 14 of the Constitution.
3m Article 15 of the Constitution,
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1 2 propagation of religion* In Ram Prasad V State of U.P.
this argument was, however, rejected where Kidwai, J, held
that, Mthe act of performing a second marriage in the
presence of the first wife can not he regarded as an integral
part of Hindu religion nor can it he regarded as practising
or professing or propagating Hindu religion**.1
II. Essential requirements:
In order to obtain relief under the clause the 
petitioner has to 1 satisfy1 the Court, on the following 
matters:
(1) There must he a spouse living at the time of the 
marriage;
(2) The second marriage must he a form of marriage 
recognised hy law.
(1) 1 * * * spouse living ...1
The question is: what does the term f,spouse living1
1. Article 25 of the Constitution.
2. A.I.R. 1957 All.4-11 at p.4-14. See also The State of Bombay
V Narsn Appa A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84 (a case under Bombay
Pr event Ion of Hindu Bigamous Marriage Act, 194-6, where 
Chagla C.J, observed (at p.86) that, 11... a sharp distinc­
tion must he drawn between religious faith and belief 
and religious practices. What the State protects is relig­
ious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter 
to public order, morality or health or a policy of social 
welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the relig­
ious practices must give way before the good of the people 
of the State as a whole11. See also Hisnam V Oughi 
A.I.R. 1959 Manipur 20.
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imply? We know that a person whose former marriage with the 
party in question has been terminated by death or dissolved 
by divorce or declared void or annulled is not a "spouse 
living" for our purposes, i.e. there is no prior valid sub-
i
sisting marriage. However, we must answer the questions:
whether a person who marries in contravention of section 15
HMA, which limits the capacity of a recently divorced person
to marry, has a spouse living? Is a spouse entitled to rely
2on the presumption of death of the other spouse where the
other spouse has not been heard of as alive for seven years
by those who would normally expect to hear from or about
him or her if he or she were alive and marry again, without
informing the person with whom such marriage is contracted
of the real state of facts so far as the same are within
*
his or her knowledge, without fear of committing bigamy?
(i) Marriage in contravention of section 15 HMA:
Section 15 provides that when a marriage has been 
dissolved by a decree of divorce and either there is no
1. See Janki V Parmeswaran A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. (Tra-C.) 
4152. Binoy Y Satisfa. A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 480, 481, (where 
a girl was given in marriage by mother with the consent 
of the father who was in jail. The girl subsequently 
married another person. It was held that the first 
marriage was a valid marriage.
2. S. 108 Indian Evidence Act.
3* See S.494 Indian Penal Code4
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right of appeal against the decree [superfluous words in 
view of section 28 HMA, according to which all decree and 
orders made by the Court in any proceeding under HMA may be 
appealed] or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time 
for appealing has expired without an appeal having been 
presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been 
dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the 
marriage to marry again*
Brovided that it shall not be lawful for the respect­
ive parties to marry again unless at the date of such 
marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the 
decree in the Court of the first instance.
Section 15 appears to have been modelled on section 
13(1) of the [English] Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 re­
enacting section \:l C Oof the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937*
In the parallel provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869^
2
and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 the words used are ,Tbut 
not sooner”* However, the period prescribed is, respectively, 
six months and one year*
The general principle appears to be that a marriage 
solemnized in contravention of the rules laid down by 
section 15 is void and should be so declared when the
1. S.57.
2. S.30.
110
opportunity is presented regardless of whatever changes may 
have resulted from it or how long it may have endured 
However, it is submitted that, the Court may refuse to so 
declare if it seems inequitable or against public policy to 
do so, for the capacity of a recently-divorced person to 
marry has been limited "to prevent confusion of paternity yqAW; 
than hasty or collusive divorces intended speedily to
facilitate fresh marriages*"
2
In Chister V Mure a case under section 57? MCA,
*
1857? ancl Rogers V Halmshan^ it was held that a second 
marriage contracted within the time limited by section 57?
4
MCA, was totally void* Similarlyf in Noble V Noble, a 
marriage contracted between decree nisi and decree absolute 
was held by Lord Penzance<^to be bigamous.
Jackson V Jackson^ appears to be the first Indian 
case on the question, where the successful petitioner in a 
suit for dissolution of marriage entered into a second
1. See S.V. Gupte, Hindu haw of Marriage, p.108; P.V. 
Deolalkar, The Hindu Marriage Act, 1^55? pp*36-7; J.D.M. 
Derrett, Introduction to Modern “Hindu Law, p.164;
D .H ,Chaudhry, Ttie Hindu Marriage Act, l'9'$5? 82; See also
S. Venkataraman, "Remarriage After Divorce Under the 
Hindu Marriage Act11 T1"9"58J S".C.J.(J)7
2. LlS63'J SW and Tr. 223 = 164- E.R. 1259.
3. [1864-3 3 SW and Tr 509 = 164- E.R. 1373.
4-. [18693 L.R. 1 P and D.691.
5. [19113 1 L.R. 34- All. 203.
Ill
marriage within six months of the decree for dissolution of 
marriage becoming absolute, it was held'Hy Chamier, J,
following Sir James Hannen, P, fs observations in Warter V
2
Warter that, "The Indian law, like our own, does not com­
pletely dissolve the tie of marriage until the lapse of a 
specified time after the decree* This is an integral part 
of the proceedings by which alone both the parties to the 
marriage can be released from their incapacity to contract
a fresh one,1' that the second marriage was void* Similarly,
3 4-in Battie V Brown» following Jackson V Jackson, the
petitioner asked for a decree of nullity of the marriage on
the ground that the marriage was null and void as having
been contracted within six months of the date on which a
decree absolute had been passed dissolving the earlier
marriage of the respondent* Wallis, J, not only declared
the marriage void on the date when it was solemnized, but
also that the previous marriage was still "in force" within
the meaning of S.19C4-) Indian Divorce Act 18. The learned
5
judge gave his reason in the following terms, " ... the 
former marriage is to be considered still in force at any 
rate to the extent of preventing a subsequent marriage during
1* Jackson Y Jackson [1911] 1*L.R. 34- All* 203 at p*204— 5. 
2* L1S90J L.R. 15 P and D 152 at 155.
3. A.I.R. 1916 Nad* 84-7*
4-. Cited above.
5* Battie Y Brown A.I.R. 1916 Nad. 84-7 at 84-8.
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the lifetime of the other party to such marriage until the
prohibition resulting from the survival of such other party
is removed by virtue of the section. Now the prohibition
is not removed by virtue of the section till the lapse of
six months, or the happening of the other event therein
mentioned* In Turner V Turner, a similar case, Sanderson,
2
C.J*, following Warter V Warter observed that, MIn my 
judgment, therefore, by reason of the provisions of section 
57 and. of the fact that the time specified by section 57 
had not elapsed from the date of the High Court confirming 
the decree nisi, the marriage with the petitioner^ former 
wife was in force on 0.. the date on which the petitioner 
went through the form of marriage with the respondent ..."
In this case Woodroffe, J, went to the extent of suggesting 
that, " where a minister licenced to solemnise marriages 
is made aware that there has been a previous marriage which 
has been dissolved he should require that the decree 
absolute should be produced before him so that he may see 
whether the period of six months prescribed by law has
h.
elapsed”. In» Nagabhushanam V Nagendramma, a case under 
Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 194-9*
1. A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 517.
2. ibid at p.518*
3. Turner V Turner A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 517 at 519.
4-. A.I.R, 1955 A.P. 181 at 183.
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Chandra Reddi, J, (following Battie V Brown) held that, "It
follows that a second marriage solemnized within six months
from the date of the alleged divorce is void.’] However, the
effect of section 15 may he avoided by , "where it is
available, recourse to a caste tribunal to a divorce court,
for the decision of caste tribunals is validly given
normally terminates the marriage and sets the former spouses
1
free to marry again without delay if they wish*"
(ii) When marriage may not be void:
The Court may not declare a marriage^solemnized in
contravention of section 15» HMA, where to do so would be
inequitable or against public policy* This would include
a case where any of the parties to the dissolved marriage
dies after the decree for divorce but before the expiration
2of one year from the date of the decree. In this case, 
since the death terminates the marriage it would be against 
public policy to declare the marriage void. This may be 
illustrated by Wickham V Wickham, where A obtained a decree 
nisi, by reason of her husband*s cruelty and adultery* Her 
solicitor told her on the day of the decree nisi was pro­
nounced that her attendance would not again be required;
1. J«D.M*Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.164.
2. S.V.Gupte, Hindu "Law of Marriage, p.211; see also
P.V. Deolalkar, The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s pp.127-8.
3. C1880] 6 P and DTT!
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that the making of the decree nisi absolute was a matter of 
form, and he would attend to it. On the belief that all 
things necessary had been done, and that the decree nisi 
had been made absolute, the petitioner went through a 
ceremony of marriage, before decree absolute, with another 
man. She did not become aware until quite some time, that 
the decree nisi had not been made absolute, and that her 
second marriage consequently was invalid* In this case the 
Court made the decree absolute. It has been rightly suggested 
by Mr. Gupte,*1' that nAn amendment of this section [So 153 
seems to be therefore necessary to clarify that any of the 
parties may remarry on the death of the other of them or on 
the expiry of the period mentioned in the section, whichever 
is earlier.”
(iii)”Presumption of death”
A spouse is entitled to rely on the presumption of 
death of the other spouse and marry again without committing 
bigamy if the other spouse has not been seen or heard of 
for at least seven years by persons likely to have heard of
p
him if alive. Similarly, it is submitted that, if a married 
person whose other spouse has disappeared and who desires
1. S.V* Gupte, Hindu Law of Marriage, p.211.
2. S.49^ Indian Penal Code, 1&60. ^  
J.D.MoDerrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.
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to marry again such a spouse may, after making all possible 
inquiries, remarry, provided that nothing has happened within 
that time to give that spouse reason to believe that the 
other party was then alive, for the Court, in any future 
proceedings, will regard a marriage contracted with proper 
formality as binding in the absence of evidence to the con­
trary, However, if the first husband reappears the second 
marriage would be a nullity.
This proposition may be supported by Spurgeon V
1 2  -5Spurgeon and Tweney V Tweney. In Spurgeon V Spurgeon^ the
question arose whether the Court could grant a decree of
dissolution in respect of a second marriage in the case of
a petitioner who had married again after her first husband
had disappeared and she did not know whether he was alive
or dead. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
"the Court could grant a decree, notwithstanding
the fact that, despite exhaustive inquiries, it was not
definitely known whether the first husband was alive or
dead. There was a certificate of the second marriage which,
■ 0()i coupled subsequent cohabitation, was a prima facie evidence
of a valid marriage, and it would certainly be binding as
1. C1930] 46 T.L.R. 396.
2. [1946] 1 All. E.R. 564.
3. [1930] T.L.R. 396 at 396.
116
against the petitioner if in any Court she attempted to say 
that the second marriage was a nullity**.” Bateson, J, 
accepted this argument and granted a decree nisi.
In Tweney V Tweney'*" the wife petitioned for dissolu­
tion of a second marriage on the ground of desertion. Her 
husband by the previous marriage had disappeared six months 
after that marriage and nothing had been heard of him again 
notwithstanding exhaustive inquiries. The question for 
determination was whether, in the absence of evidence that 
the previous husband was dead at the date of the second 
marriage, the Court had jurisdiction to dissolve it as a
valid marriage. Pilcher, J, arriving at the conclusion that
2the second marriage was a valid marriage, observed that,
"The way in which the matter should be regarded is 
in my view this. The petitioner^ marriage to the respondent 
being unexceptionable in form and duly consummated remains 
a good marriage until some evidence is adduced that the 
marriage was, in fact, a nullity. The position with regard 
to the evidence is that I am quite satisfied that the 
petitioner herself, during the years which intervened between 
the time when she was deserted by her first husband and the 
time she married her second husband, made every reasonable
1. [1946] 1 All. E.R. 564.
2. Tweney V Tweney cited above at p. 565*
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effort to ascertain the whereabouts of her first husband. 
There is no question that the marriage between the petitioner 
and respondent was attended by all proper formalities. This 
court ought to regard the petitioner* who comes before it 
and gives evidence of a validly contracted marriage* as a 
married woman* until some evidence is given which leads the 
court to doubt that fact.”
(2) ... form of marriage recognised by Hindu Law:-
The question is whether the words "marries"'*" and
p
"solemnized" implies going through any form of marriage or 
a marriage performed according to a form recognised by the 
law of the place where it was celebrated. It is submitted 
that it implies a marriage solemnized with all the essential 
ceremonies which are necessary to be performed in order that
a valid marriage may take place. The proposition may be
illustrated with the help of Kalan V Emperor, Swapna V
zl 5
Basanta and Halan V State of Bombay•^
In Kalana V E m p e r o r ,^ Davis, J.C., thinking that
it is not sufficient for the prosecution merely to show that
something which the prosecution prefers to call "some form
1. S,4-94-, Indian Penal Code* 1880.
2. S.17* HMA.
3. A.I.R, 1938, Sind 127.
4-. A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 533*
5* A.I.R. I960 Bom. 393*
6. Kalan V Emperor A.I.R. 1938 Sind 127 at 128. See also 
Sant Ram V Emperor A.I.R. 1929 lah. 713; Emperor V Soni 
A .1,R. 1936 Nag. 13*
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of marriage ceremony,? was gone through., observed that,
"We think it necessary for the prosecution to prove 
that the form of marriage was a form recognised by or known 
to the law, otherwise it would be open to the prosecution 
by mere assertion to constitute any mutual act on the part 
of the man and woman to form a marriage. For instance, 
taking an absurd example, ... if the complainant chose to 
come forward and say that the man and woman held hands 
while the man crowed like a cock and the woman clucked like 
a hen, that was a form of marriage . . * when the word 
"marries” is used in S. 4-94- l.P.C. it means marries by some 
form of marriage known to or recognised by the law. S.4-94-, 
when it uses the word "marries” does not of course refer 
to a valid marriage". In Swapna V Basanta  ^where A, an Indian 
Christian and having a Christian wife living, marries again
"not because of the existence of the Christian wife . ♦. but 
because of the fact that there can not be a valid form of 
marriage between an Indian Christian and a Hindu woman 
celebrated according to Hindu rites." Renupada Mukerjee,J,
be convicted of an offence of bigamy, the second marriage
1. A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 535.
2. ibid at p.534-.
5. ibid.
a Hindu woman according to Hindu
-\W l
rites (was held to be void'
3was of the opinion that, " in order that a person may
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must be a form of marriage recognised by law otherwise it 
would simply be an adulterous union...”. Similarly, in 
Malan Y State of Bombay, Miabhoy, J, laid down the follow­
ing test to be followed in a case under question,
"In order that an offence under S.494 may be com­
mitted it is necessary, at least, that all the ceremonies 
which are necessary to be performed in order that a valid 
marriage may take place, ought to be performed and, 
ordinarily, all these ceremonies would amount to a valid 
marriage but for the fact that the marriage becomes void 
on account of the existence of a previous wife."
The Supreme Court of India considered the meaning
of "solemnize" in Bhau Rao Shankar Lokhande V The State of 
2Maharashtra where it was urged by the appellants that in 
law it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that 
the alleged second marriage of the appellant had been duly 
performed in accordance with the religious rites applicable 
to the form of marriage gone through. It was also contended 
by the appellant that the essential ceremonies for a valid 
marriage were not performed. On behalf of the State it was 
urged that the proceedings of that marriage were in accord­
ance with the custom prevalent in the community of the 
appellant for Gandharva form of marriage and that, therefore,
1. A.I.R. I960, Bom. 393 at 305.
2. [19653 Bom. L.R. 423 (S.C.) .o-X
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the second marriage of appellant was a valid marriage * It 
was also urged for the State that it is not necessary for 
the commission of the offence under S*4-94-, Indian Penal 
Code, that the second may be a valid one and that a person 
going through any form of marriage during the lifetime of 
the first wife would commit the offence *,. even if the 
later marriage be void according to the law applicable to 
that person,
uy
Raghuiiar Dayal, J, delivering the judgment of the 
Court (fftidholkar, J, and Ramaswami, J,) observed, as to 
the meaning of ’solemnize1, "The word 1 solemnize * means, in 
connection with a marriage, 'to celebrate the marriage with 
proper ceremonies and in due form1, according to the Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary, It follows, therefore, that unless the 
marriage is "Celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies 
and due form1 it can not be said to be ’solemnize^* It is, 
therefore, essential for the purpose of S.17 of the Act, 
that the marriage to which S.4-94* Indian Penal Code, applies 
on account of the provisions of the Act, should have been 
celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. Merely 
going through certain ceremonies with the intention that 
the parties be taken to be married, will not take the
1. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v The State of Maharashtra 
LI9S£T B o m . ' L r i a t T 4 2 4 - ’*-----------------------
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ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established 
custom."
Raghubar Dayal, J, considering the argument that it 
is not necessary that the second marriage be a valid one and 
that a person going through any form of marriage during the 
life time of the first wife would commit the offence under 
S.494, Indian Penal Code, came to the conclusion that,'*’
"Prima facie, the expression 1whoever ... marries1 
[in S.494 Indian Penal Code] must mean 1 whoever ... marries 
validly1 or whoever ... marries and whose marriage is a 
valid one1. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to 
the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being 
void by reason of its taking place during the life of the 
husband or wife of the person marrying arises* If the marriage
1* Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande V The State of Maharashtra 
U965J Bom* lVrY 423 at 425” 5ee also Emperor V Mantju
A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 374 (where it wao hold lay Chagla, C. J.,
observed that ”... Mr. Shanbhag [the Counsel for the 
accused] has taken the point that the prosecution case 
was that this marriage was contracted according to the 
Gandharva form and that that form is obsolete to-day 
under Hindu law, and that, therefore, no marriage at all
was in fact contracted and, therefore, no offence was
committed* Now, it is important to note that both the 
accused admitted having been married. They do not say 
that they have not contracted marriage, and the law with 
regard to bigamous marriage is clear that it is not 
necessary in order to commit an offence that a valid 
second marriage should be solemnised. It is enough in law 
if the parties accused of bigamous marriage go through a 
form of marriage when the first marriage is still sub- 
sising*n>^ Et is submitted that, in view of Bhaurao1s Case 
[1965] Bon* L.R. 423? This case is of doubtful authority*
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is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of 
law. The hare fact of a man and a woman living as hushand 
and wife does not at any rate, normally give them the status 
of hushand and wife even though they may hold themselves out 
before society as hushand and wife and the society treats 
them as hushand and wife*"
III* Approbation of a bigamous marriage:
The question is: can there he approbation of a 
marriage preventing a party £ely&ar on a plea that a marriage 
was void on the ground of bigamy. It appears that such a 
marriage may he approbated if the wife marries on the pre­
sumption of death of the first hushand and at the time of 
the marriage the hushand knew all the circumstances concern­
ing the wife’s earlier marriage. Thus, he is estopped from 
raising the question of validity of his marriage. However, 
"it is distinctly advisable, in view of the ease with which 
petitions may he presented under the HMA, that a marriage 
should he dissolved where the spouse has been missing for
seven years, whenever remarriage is contemplated."^
2
Lord Merriman, P, in Bullock V. Bullock observed, 
obiter, that, "♦ it is not universally true that
1. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.226.
2. [I960] 2 All.E.R7W ’^afllTT:
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estoppel is prevented from operating merely because a biga­
mous marriage is involved.” In Bullock Y. Bullock^in 1921 
the wife married one K. There were two children and in 1926 
K deserted his wife. In 1929 the wife obtained an order in 
the magistrates court for the payment by K of maintenance 
for herself and the children on the ground of K ’s desertion. 
In 1930, K being in arrears under the order, a committal 
order was made. A warrant was issued against K, to the police 
but was not executed by them as K. could not be found* The 
wife made no further inquiries about K. amd never heard of 
him again. In 1944, the wife describing herself as the 
widow of K*, went through a ceremony of marriage with the 
husband. At the date of the marriage the husband knew all 
the circumstances concerning the wife’s earlier marriage 
with K. In 1959 the wife applied by way of complaint in the 
magistrates1 court for an order for the payment by the 
husband of maintenance for herself on the ground of his 
desertion. The husband contended that there was no jurisdic­
tion to make any order since his marriage to the wife in 
1944 was bigamous and void ab initio. As the lapse of time 
since K. was last heard of was, now, thirty years and, in 
1944, had been fourteen years, the magistrates inferred that 
E. died before the wife’s re-marriage in 1944 and made an 
order in the wife’s favour. The husband appealed on the 
ground that, as the wife had made no inquiries about K., his
1. [I960] 2 All.E.R. 507.
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death before her marriage should not be inferred. It was 
held that the inference that K had died before the re­
marriage in 1944 was rightly drawn because (i) of the lapse 
of time between the date when K was last heard of and the 
date of the re-marriage (a period of fourteen years) and of 
the present proceedings (a period of thirty years), and
(ii) of the fact that the police were unable to execute the 
warrant against K • issued to them, which met the objection 
that the wife had herself made no inquiries concerning K. 
Lord Merriman, arriving at the above conclusion referred to
Wilkins V. Wilkins,'*' Woodland V. Woodland^and relied on Re
*
Watkins, Watkins V. Watkins.
Wilkins V. Wilkins,^ was a suit for nullity by the 
husband but during the subsistence of the so-called marriage 
the wife had petitioned for judicial separation on the 
ground of the husband*s adultery* The husband by his answer 
denied the adultery and alleged that at the time of his 
marriage to the petitioner she had a husband living. At the 
trial the jury found that the husband had committed adultery, 
and also that at the time of the marriage the first husband 
was dead. In fact he turned up some thirty years later, and
1. [1896] P.108.
2. [1928] All.E.R. 690.
3. [1953] 2 All.E.R. 1113.
4. [1896] P.108.
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the husband applied to the Court of Appeal to deal with the
situation, which could only he dealt with, the Court of
Appeal held, by getting rid of the original finding which
obviously, in effect constituted estoppel per rem judicatam,
i.e. it is plain, as was observed by Lord Merriman, P."**
that, "unless this new trial be set aside, the husband would
have been estopped from denying the validity of the marriage
2
..." Similarly,in Woodland V. Woodland, a husband was pray­
ing for a nullity decree on the ground that his marriage 
was bigamous, the wife having a husband living at the date 
of the marriage. There had been an earlier suit by the wife 
for restitution of conjugal rights, which involved the usual 
finding that the parties were husband and wife and which 
preceded, naturally, on the basis of their status being 
thus, conclusively established inter partes. A decree of
restitution of conjugal rights was granted. The Court
*
implicitly relied on Wilkins V 0 Wilkins, and the only 
difference between the two is that there was no appeal to 
the Court of Appeal to set aside the original decision which 
operated as estoppel. Accordingly, the husband’s petition 
was dismissed.
1. Bullock Vo Bullock [I960] 2 All.E.R. 307 at 310.
2. irg25TTir.x,Hr ’©o.
3. [1896] P.108.
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In Watkins V. Watkins  ^ a case -under Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Act, 1938, Harman J., paid marked atten­
tion to the lapse of time, which was something in the 
neighbourhood of twenty-two years, notwithstanding the fact 
that, though other people were said to have made inquiries 
and given evidence, the wife herself, who had been in touch 
with the husband's relatives at one time, had never appar­
ently even discussed with them, and had herself made no 
independent inquiries at all* Harman J*, however, found 
that she was in fact a widow, quite clearly basing his 
decision mainly on the long lapse of time.
IV. Bigamy in Kenya and Uganda;
The use of the expression "a marriage solemnized...” 
in the Kenya and Uganda Ordinance implies that, in order 
that a marriage may be bigamous, there must not only be a 
prior subsisting valid marriage but the second marriage must 
be solemnized in due form and with proper ceremonies.
The principles stated above may generally be applied 
to a case of bigamy under the Kenya or Uganda Ordinance.
1. [1953] 2 All.E.R. 1115.
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CHAPTER III
DEGREES OP PROHIBITED RELATIONSHIP AM) S API NH ASH IP 
I* Introduction
A marriage shall he declared null and void, under 
HMA, by a decree of nullity where the parties are within
the degrees of prohibited relationship1 or where the partie
2are sapindas of each other, unless the custom or the usage
governing each of them permits of the marriage between the
3 4-two* In the parallel provisions of Kenya"^  and Uganda law 
the expression used is ."prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
The former provisions of HMA are based partly on 
the pre-1955 law and partly on the Special Marriage Act, 
1954-t whereas the latter are based on one hand on the 
dharmsastra and on the other on pre-1955 law sus-d the SMA,
It may be noted that for the purposes of marriage 
degrees of prohibited relationship or sapinda relationship 
includes:^
(i) relationship by half or uterine blood as well as by 
full blood;
1. S. 11 read with S(5)(iv).
2* So 11 read with S(5;(v)«
5* Cap.157* Soll(l)(a)(ii; The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, I960.
4-. S. 9 (3)(a) read with Cap 113 S.13(l) of [The Uganda] 
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1961*
5. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 157*
6. S. 5 HMA expla to Cl. G.
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(ii) illegitimate blood relationship as well as 
legitimate;
(iii) relationship by adoption as well as by blood; and 
all terms of relationship [degrees of prohibited 
or sapindaship] shall be construed accordingly.
It is interesting to note that it is a punishable
offence , under HMA, to 1 pro cure1 the solemnization of one*s
own marriage in contravention of the law relating to
degrees of prohibited relationship and sapindaship•^  The 
2
dictionary defines procure as to bring about, cause, effect 
or produce. The question is what is the nature of this 
clause, i,e* whether it is absolute? Gan ignorance of law 
be excused, since the question whether one is within degrees 
of prohibited relationship or sapindaship is a matter of 
law? It appears that this clause is absolute, and hence a 
person may procure1 the marriage though the person is 
unaware that the other party is within the degrees of pro­
hibited relationship or sapindaship or that custom did not 
take the parties out of the rule,^ Similarly, it appears 
that since whether a person is within the degrees of prohib- 
ited relationship or sapindaship is a questionflaw, its
1, S* 18(b)o
2, Murray: A New English Dictionary, Vol,7(2) at 1418,
3, J•D,M ,Derrett, lbI-2^
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ignorance can not be excused, for Parliament imposed, for 
tbe first time, a penalty on ’procuring1 a void marriage
the Act must be construed strictly, and it appears that
1 2 mens rea is not required* However, Mr. Gupte thinks that
perhaps such ignorance might be excused*
The reasons for the rule prohibiting a marriage
on the ground of prohibited degrees of relationship or
sapindaship may be classified into moral, social and
physical* However, basically the reason for the prohibition
1* J*D*Mo Derrett, cited above, p*162*
2* S.V* Gupte, Hindu Marriage Act, p*216*
3* Bentham: Principles of the Ciivil Code, part III, Chapter
V, Sec* 1, 3£* "If there were not an insurmountable
barrier between near relations called to live together 
in the greatest intimacy, this contact, continual oppor­
tunities, friendship itself and its innocent carresses 
might kindle fatal passion* The family •,• would itself 
become a prey to all the inquietudes of rivalry, and to 
all furies of passion. Suspicions would banish confid­
ence - the tenderest sentiments of the hearth would be 
quenched - eternal enmities or vengeance, of which the 
base idea is fearful, would take their place* The belief 
in chastity of young girls, that powerful attraction to 
marriage, would have no foundation to rest upon; and the 
most dangerous snares would be spread for youth in the 
very asylum where it could least escape them.*."
Golapchandra Sarkar Sastri, A treatise on Hindu Law: 
[6th Edn* by R*N* Sarkar] p*127 "... The Joint family 
system ... accounts for the prohibition by the Hindu 
sages, of marriage between a large number of relations 
than by other systems of jurisprudence * „. those relations 
that are called to live together in the greatest intimacy 
from their birth, as well as those, one of whom stands in 
loco parentis to the other, should not be allowed to enter­
tain the idea of marrying each other, and an insurmount­
able barrier between their nuptial union should be raised 
in the form of legal prohibition, so that the belief in 
the chastity of young girls, that powerful attraction to 
marriage, may be maintained unshaken..." See observations 
to the similar effect in Narayana Ayar: The History of 
Ancient Law, p»170.
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appears to be as follows: The joint family is the normal 
condition of Hindu society and a marriage between the persons 
having the same particles of a body inhabitating under the 
same roof appeared to be repugnant to the Hindu law givers. 
Thus in order to guard against the possibility of incestuous 
intercourse it became imperative to place restrictions on 
the choice of the bride and attaching religious sanctions 
to them*
11* Degrees of prohibited relationship:
(1) Meaning:- The HMA defines "degrees of prohibited 
relationship" in the following terms:
"Two persons are said to be within the "degrees of 
prohibited relationship" —
(i) if one is a lineal ascendant of the other^ or
(ii) if one was the wife or husband of a lineal ascendant
2or descendant of the other; or
(iii) if one was the wife of the brother or of the
father!s or mother’s brother or of the grandfather’s
3
or grandmother’s brother of the othery  or
(iv) if the two are brother and sister, uncle and niece, 
aunt and nephew, or children of brother and sister
IL
or of two brothers and sisters.
1. S.3(g)(i) HMA.
2. S.3(g)(ii) HMA.
3. S.3(g)(iii) HMA.
4. S.3(g)(ii) HMA.
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(1) Lineal ascendant:
This sub-clause covers a wide field for no limit 
to lineal ascendancy is fixed, A person* under this Clause, 
may "be within the prohibited degrees of relationship to a 
person who is more than five degrees (inclusive) removed in 
the line of ascent through the father and three degrees 
(inclusive) removed in the line of ascent through the mother, 
i,e., persons within the degrees of prohibited relation­
ship1 may not marry even though they may not be sapindas 
(with or without the aid of custom derogating from statutory 
rules)
It may be noted that under this subsection a man is 
said to be within degrees of prohibited relationship with 
mother, mother!s mother, father’s mother, father’s father*s 
mother, father*s mother*s mother, daughter, daughter*s 
daughter, daughter's son*s daughter, son's daughter, son’s
p
son’s daughter, son’s son’s son’s daughter.
Similarly, a woman is within prohibited degrees of 
relationship with her father, father’s father, father’s 
father's father, father’s father’s father’s father, father’s 
mother * s father, mother * s father, father’s mother’s father’s
1, J.D,M0 Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p*161.
20 SoV. Gupte, Hindu vMarriage Ac£, 9^T<>
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father5 father’s mother’s mother’s father, son, son’s son, 
son’s son’s son, son’s son's son’s son, son’s daughter’s 
son, daughter’s son, daughter’s son’s son, daughter’s son’s 
son’s son and so on*'1'
(ii) If one was the wife or husband of a lineal ascendant 
or descendant of the other;
This sub-clause covers certain relations by affinity,
eaga in case of a man, paternal grandmother, paternal great
grandmother and so on, son’s wife, daughter’s son’s wife,
daughter’s daughter’s son’s wife, daughter’s son’s son’s
wife, son’s son’s wife, son’s son’s son’s wife, son’s
daughter’s son’s wife and so on, in the case of a woman
her maternal grandfather, maternal great-grandfather,
father’s mother’s husband, father’s mother’s mother’s
husband, father’s father’s mother’s husband and so on,
daughter1s husband, daughter * s daughter1s husband, daughter1s
son * s daughter1s husband, daughter1s daughter * s daughter’s
husband, son’s daughter’s husband, son’s daughter’s daughter’s
husband, son’s son’s daughter’s husband, son’s daughter’s
2son’s daughter’s husband and so on* A stepmother, it
1* S*V. Gupte, Hindu(ftarriage Aefe-, 99*
2* Ibid.
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appears5 is also excluded. *“
The use of the word "was” in this: sub-clause 
suggests that the terms "wife" or "husband" would include 
a former wife or husband, whether the marriage was termin-
p
ated with death or by divorce.
(iii) If one was the wife of the brother or of the
father*s or mother^ brother or of the grandfather1 s 
or grandmother1 s brother of the other:
A man will be, under this sub-clause, within pro­
hibited degree of relationship with his brotherfs wife, 
father1s brother1s wife, mother1s brother1s wife, grand­
father 1s brother * s wife, grandmother1s brother1s wife•^
*
The use of the word "was, like in sub-clause (ii) 
above, suggests, that the former wife, whether the prior 
marriage was terminated with death or by divorce, of the 
brother or paternal or maternal uncle, or any paternal or 
maternal grand -uncle is also excluded. There is no statutory 
bar, it appears, to a marriage with the former husband of a 
sister, nor the former husband of the father1 s or mother*s 
sister.^
1. JoDoMo Derrett, Introduction to Nodern Hindu Law, p.161.
2. See Gupte, cited above; .H.” Eerrett, cited above, 
Deolalkar, cited above.
3. S.V* Gupte, Hindu Marriage Act, 100.
4-. J.P.M.Derrett, "Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.161.
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(iv) If the two are brother and sister, uncle and niece, 
aunt and nephew, or children of brother and sister 
or of two brothers and two sisters;
Under this sub-clause certain relations are excluded 
who are related collaterally, e*g*, in case of a man, 
sister, brotherfs daughter, father!s sister, mother’s sister, 
father’s brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, mother’s 
sister’s daughter, father’s sister’s daughter and mother’s 
brother’s daughter} in the case of a woman, brother, 
father’s brother, brother’s son, sister’s son, mother’s
brother, mother’s brother’s son, father’s sister’s son,
mother’s sister’s son, father’s brother’s son.'*'
III. Sapinda
(1) The question is: what precisely is the meaning of 
sapinda and how it can be determined?
(a) Meaning of sapinda:
The expression sapinda has been variously interpreted, 
although giving the same derivation e*g., Samanah Pipdah 
Ye sham Te Sapipdah under the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga 
schools.^
1. S.V. Gupte, op.cit., 100.
2. J.R. Gharpure, SapipjJya, p.l.
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The tern "Pinda" has been interpreted by the
Mitakghara as meaning "blood particles11, whereas under the
Dayabhaga it means exequial offerings and is determined by
1the capacity to offer Pindas. However, the expression 
sapindaship prior to Vijnaneswara meant, ^  it appears, the 
relations by the funeral oblations and very likely referred 
to the agnatic relations in ascent or descent. Vijnaiie&wara 
gave a . wider meaning to the expression sapinda when he 
explained it citing Garb^panishad*^ Sapinda according to
1. J.R. Gharpure, Sapi^ya, 1 and 66*
2. Ibid., p.l. See Mayne, Hindu Law and usage (11th Edn.)
p. 14-5* See also ibid., p.2; Apas. 2,4-, 15-16; (on marriage) 
sago tray a duhitaram prayacchet/ matufeca yoni-sambandhebhy- 
ay/~ Apas. 2,5,16»2 (on impurity). But see Apas. 2,6,
T5,2; putrabhave yah pratyasannah sapipdah; kaudh.l,1,
1-3 • (where the term Is used only for agnates)» Vasistha 
4, 10-19 (for agnates on inheritance). In Arthasastra 
3,4-, 4-0; 3>6,22, sapinda is clearly a near agnate. However, 
Manu III, uses the term for relations on the mother’s 
side also.
3. J.R. Gharpure: Sapi$<Jya p.7*
1 This body consists of six sheaths, three are from 
the father and three from the mother. The bones, the 
nerves, and the marrow are from the father; the skin, 
the flesh, and the blood are from the mother.n
Similarly beginning from the father and counting 
his father and onwards to the ancestor in the seventh 
degree is understood to be the "seventh from the father."
In the same manner "in the case of two sisters, or 
a sister and a brother, or a brother’s daughter and 
father’s brother, in regard to marriage, the two being 
the first, from them the difference in branches is 
counted."
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Vijnaneswara, is one who has the same pinda (i,e,, "blood 
particles) and implies a connection "between the persons to 
whom it is applied with one body either immediately or by 
descent,^* i.e., the son stands in sapinda relation to his 
father because of particles of his father's body having 
entered his. Similarly, sapinda relationship arises between, 
grandson and paternal grandfather and the rest, son and 
mother, grandson and his maternal grandfather and the rest, 
nephew and maternal aunts and uncles, and the rest, nephew 
and paternal uncles and aunts# The wife and husband also 
are sapinda relations to each other, "because", as Professor
1* J.R* Gharpure, Sapip.<Jya pp.6-7• The passage runs as 
follows*
"A-sapindn* not a Sapip<J.a; Samanab ^common1 i,e# one 
pxpda body of whom, that (onej is Sapinda; not a Sapinda 
is an a-sapi£L<Ja; such a one (he should marry).
Sapinda relationship arises (between two people) 
through (their) being connected by particles of one body. 
Thus the son stands in sapi^La relationship to his 
father, because of the partxcles of the father's body, 
having entered (his). In like manner (stands) the grand­
son in sapip^a relationship to his paternal grandfather 
and the rest, because through his father, particles of 
his (grand-father) body have entered into this own).
Just so is the son (a sapip4a relation) of his mother, 
because particles of the mother's body have entered in 
his own# Likewise the grandson (stands in sapip.<J.a rela­
tionship), to his maternal grandfather and the rest, 
through his mother. So also (is the nephew) a sapip.<Ja 
relation of his maternal aunts and uncles and the rest 
because particles of the same body (the maternal grand­
father) have entered into (his and theirs); likewise 
(does he stand in sapip^a relationship) with his paternal 
uncles and aunts and the rest.
continued:
137
Derrett prefers to call it, "they together produce (or 
make) one body*" In like manner, brother’s wives also are 
sapindas of each other#
Cb) Co determination of "sapinda" according to Mitakshara; 
Vijnaneswara divides all sapindas into two categories,
(1) Samanagotra or sago.tra sapindas and (2) bhinnagotra 
sapinda or bandhus* The sagotra sapindas are within seven 
degrees of the common ancestor# The bhinnagotra sapindas
2
are cognates within five degrees of the common ancestor#
So also the wife and the husband (are sapip4a 
relations to each other), because they together beget 
one body (the son)* In like manner, brother’s wives also 
are (sapip^a relations to each other) because they pro­
duce one body (the son) with those (severally) who have 
sprung from one body i*e* because they bring forth the 
sons by their union with the offspring of one person, 
and thus their husband’s father is the common bond which 
(connects them)* Therefore, one ought to know that wher­
ever the word Sagipda is used# there exists (between the 
persons to whom it is applied; a connection with one 
body either immediately or by descent#"
1. J#DCM Derrett
2. Mitak on Yajn. I, 53* trans* by P.V#Kane, Hist* of DB. 
Vol#3(2) pp*453-5* "In this manner wherever the word 
sapinda occurs, there one has to understand connection 
with (or continuity of) particles of the same body_ 
either directly or mediately* On the word ’asapipdam’ it 
was explained that sapip^La relationship arises immediately 
or mediately by reason of the connection with particles
of the same body; this may prove to be_too wide a state­
ment, since in this beginningless samsara, such a rela­
tionship might exist in some way or other between all 
men; therefore, (the sage Yajnavalkya) states ’after the 
fifth on the mother’s side and after the 7th on the 
father’s side1# After the fifth on the mother’s side i*e#
continued:
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Kane gives the following rules for computing the 
degrees of sapinda relationship:
(1) In computing degrees the common ancestor is to be 
included; (2) regard is to be had to the father and mother 
of the bride and bridegroom both; (3) if computation is made 
from the mother’s side of either the proposed bride or 
bridegroom, they must be beyond the fifth degree (i.e. they 
must be 6th or further on) from the common ancestor and if 
it is made through the father of either, they must be 
beyond the seventh from the common ancestor (i.e they must 
be eighth &c.)* This last postulates four different classes 
of cases, viz* descent from a common ancestor may be traced 
through the fathers of both bride and bridegroom or through 
the mother of both, or through the mother of the bridegroom 
and the father of the bride or through the father of the 
bridegroom and the mother of the bride*
in the mother1 s line and after the 7th on the father fs 
side i*e* In the father’s line sapipja relationship 
ceases* These words (viz* sapipda #**_ceases) are to be 
taken as understood (in the text of Ya<j0)# Therefore the 
word ’sapipda’ though it applies everywhere (i*e* to a 
very wide circle of persons; by the expressive (i.e. 
literal) power of its component parts, is restricted to 
a certain definite sphere, like the words ’nirmanthya1 
and ’pahkaja*. And so the six (ascendants) beginning 
with the father and the six descendants beginning with 
the son and the man himself as the seventh (in each case) 
are sapipdas; wherever there is a divergence of the line, 
the counting shall be made until the seventh in descent 
is reached including him (i.e*the ancestor) from whom 
the line diverges; in this way the computation is to 
be made everywhere. And so the fifth (if a girl), who 
stands in the fifth generation when a computation is 
made beginning with the mother and going up to her 
(mother’s) father, mother’s paternal grandfather &c*, 
is styled In an indirect way ’fifth from seventh from 
the mother’s side (by Yajn). In the same way ’the 
seventh from the father’s side (in Yajn) is she who is 
seventh in degree (from an ancestor) when computation 
is made beginning from the father and proceeding up to 
the father’s father and so on."
\[, -04 .s. \l<=\ w s  CJ=Q Y
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Kane illustrates the application of the rules of 
sapinda relationship.
In all of them A represents the common ancestor 
and the letters S and D represent respectively sons and 
daughters. According to the Mtt* computation has to he 
made from (and inclusive of) the aommon ancestor in all 
cases and both the bride and bridegroom have to be beyond 
the prohibited degrees.
No.l. No.2.
A A
Here a valid marriage 
might take place between 
S(8) and D(8) because sap­
inda relationship for both 
is traced through their 
fathers and both are re­
moved from the common an­
cestor A by more than seven 
degrees or generations.
Here a valid marriage may 
take place between 8(6) and 
I) (6) because sapipda relation­
ship of both is in this case 
traced through their mothers 
and they are both removed from 
the common ancestor by more 
than five degrees.
No. 3 
A
No. 4
A
B(2) S(2)
S(3) S(3)
S(4) s m
D(5) s(5)
D(6) S(6)
3rr-figare-, lIi-Kto-^ 0r~Dg. Tgl.III (2) p
$  -\13. Kane, Hist, of DS. Vol.Ill (2) pp.4-56-58.
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Here a marriage cannot 
take place “between D(6) and 
8(6) as the sapip^a relation­
ship in the latterfs case is 
to he traced through his 
father and he is not more 
than seven degrees removed 
from the common ancestor* 
though D(6) whose sapipijjLa 
relationship is to he traced 
through her mother is more 
than five degrees from the 
common ancestor* According to 
Bala&hhajfa and some others 
marriage will take place as 
D(6) is "beyond five degrees 
(tracing through her mother)* 
though S(6) is within 7 
degrees (tracing descent 
though his father) and so is 
not outside s&pip^a limits
All these four examples are taken from the Dharma- 
sindhu (III Purvardha p #226-227)* Ho* 3 illustrates what 
is called sapip^a relationship hy frog’s leap1* Just as a 
frog leaps from one spot to another leaving intervening 
objects untouched, so in this example No*3* there is 
sapip<Jya between D(5) and. D(5)* hut S(6) and D(6) are left 
unaffected hy sapip<Jya (as relationship is traced through 
the mothers of both), while sapipdya reverts to affect D(7) 
and S(7)* The maxim of frog’s leap* is a very ancient one* 
being exemplified hy the Mahabhasya of Patanjali*
Here a marriage may take 
place between S(.6) and D(6) 
because the sapipja rela­
tionship is to be traced 
through their mothers and 
both are removed from the 
common ancestors by more 
than five degrees* But a 
marriage cannot take place 
between S(7) and D(7) as 
the sapinda relationship 
of D(7; is to be traced 
through her father and she 
is not more than 7 degrees 
from the common ancestor.
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(c) Determination of sapinda according to Dayabhaga;
The rules relating to prohibited degrees according 
to the Dayabhaga have been laid down by Raghunandara and
i
are stated by Sir Gooroodas Banerjee:
Rule I* (a) The female descendants as far as 
the seventh degree, from the father and his six 
ancestors, namely, paternal grandfather, etc*,
(b) The female descendants as far as the fifth 
degree, from the maternal grandfather and his 
four ancestors, namely, the maternal great-grand­
father, etc.,
(c) The female descendants as far as the seventh 
degree from the father ls bandhus and their six 
ancestors, through whom those females are related 
and
(d) The female descendants as far as the fifth 
degree from the mother's bandhus and their four 
ancestors through whom those females are related,
are not to be taken in marriage*
Rule II* The daughter and the daughter1s daughter 
of a step-mother's brother are not to be taken 
in marriage*
Exceptions: (1) A girl who is removed by three 
gotras from the bridegroom is not unmarriageable, 
though related within-, the seven or five degrees 
as above described (c )0
(2) When a fit match is not otherwise procurable, 
the Kshatriyas in all the forms of marriage and 
the other classes in the Asura and other inferior 
forms of marriage, may marry within the above 
degrees provided they do not marry within the 
fifth degree on the father's side and the third 
degree on the mother's*
1* Marriage and Stridhana 5th Edna p. 167 citing Udhvahata^va 3
II, 65.
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Kane illustrates these hy the following diagrams:
Paternal line
7
6
5
4
3
No.I Father !s maternal line
7
6
5
4-
3 father!s 
maternal 
grandfather
Father*s paternal
aunt
S(1)
(2) Grandfather = Grandmother FatherSs grand-
maternal mother1s 
uncjle
(1) father S(3)
sisjber 
S(2)
A(bridegroom)
N.B. - Here SI, S2 and S3 are the three pitybandhus 
of A, the bridegroom, and they are the starting points for 
calculating prohibited degrees among paternal cognates.
In the ascending line only the descendants of the common 
ancestors are excluded* For example, SI is a pitpbandhu 
and his descendants up to 7 degrees are excluded; but Slfs 
father is not a bandhu of the bridegroom; therefore Si's 
father*s sister may be married by the bridegroom. Under this 
rule the 6th descendant (a girl) of SI will be ineligible 
for marriage with A: but she will be 9th from A's grand­
father^ father who is the common ancestor* So_it will be 
seen that this goes far beyond the limits of sapip^ya 
generally prescribed and there is no valid reason assigned 
for this.
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No, II
Mother*s paternal line
5
4
3
2 maternal great 
grand-father
mother1s 
paternal 
aunt
SI
(1; maternal =maternal 
grand- grand 
father mother
mother
A (bridegroom)
Mother*s maternal line
5
4
3
mother *s 
mother1s 
sister
S2
mother1s 
maternal 
grandfather
mother1s 
mother1s 
brother
S3
N.B. - Here SI, S2 and S3 are matybandhus of . the bride­
groom. The maternal great-grandfather is the starting point 
in calculating prohibited degrees in the mother1 s paternal 
line. In the mother^ maternal line the starting points 
are S2 and S3* In the ascending lines of the matpbandhus 
the descendants of only the common ancestor are excluded.
For example, the girl descended from S3!s maternal ancestors 
may be married by the bridegroom and so also a girl descended
from the paternal ancestor of S2 or SI.
Another rule propounded by Raghunandana is that even 
within prohibited degrees a valid marriage may be contracted 
if three gotras intervene. In the case of girls descended 
from pit^bandhus and matpbandhus the computation of gotra
must be made from them. For want of space it is not thought
advisable to illustrate this by citing several examples.
But one example is given to illustrate this rule.
143
A (common ancestor)
/*-N
H 
C\J 
---
Q
- 1
S(l)
i
8(2)
i
s
j
B(3)
SO)D(3)
DO)
Here according to the Bengal school S(A) can marry 
D(A) because three gotras intervene between her and the 
common ancestor, although SA is only 5th in descent from 
the common ancestor; for according to the Bengal school 
it is not necessary that both the bridegroom and the bride 
be beyond the limits of sapip^aship, but only the bride 
need be so; while according to many writers of the Mitak- 
§ara school both must be beyond the limits of sapip^aship 
from the common ancestor.
(2) Sapinda relationship under HMA:
The HMA, abolishing the distinction between the 
Mitakshara and the Dayabhoga school and adopting a uniform 
rule, defines a sapind as, "two persons are said to be 
"sapindas" of each other if one is a lineal ascendant of 
the other within the limits of sapinda relationship, or if 
they have a common lineal ascendant who is within the 
limits of sapinda relationship with reference to each of
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them.”'1' The HMA. defines the limit of sapinda relationship 
as "Sapinda relationship" with reference to any person 
extends as far as the third generation (inclusive) in the 
line of ascent through the mother, and the fifth (inclusive) 
in the line of ascent through the father, the line being 
traced upwards in each case from the person concerned, who
p
is to be counted as first generation*"
(i) Lineal ascendant within the limits of sapindaship* 
The male sapindas under this category, according to 
Mr* Gupte, would be father, father!s father, father’s 
father’s father, father’s father’s father’s father, 
mother’s father, father’s mother’s father, father’s mother’s 
father’s father, father’s father1s mother * s father, father’s 
mother’s mother's father, son, son’s son, son’s son’s son, 
son’s son’s son's son, and daughter’s son; and the female 
sapindas would be, mother, mother’s mother, father’s mother, 
father's father’s mother, father's father’s father’s mother, 
father’s mother’s father's mother, father's mother’s mother, 
daughter, daughter’s daughter, son's daughter, son's son's 
daughter and son’s son’s son's daughter*
1* S*3(x)(ii)
2* S«3(x)(i)
3* ScV0 Gupte, Hindu/Ilarriage Act, pc97«
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(ii) Persons having common lineal ascendant within the 
sapinda relationship:
Two persons would be sapindas of each other if their 
common lineal ascendant is within the limits of sapinda 
relationship, i#e*, within the fifth degree (inclusive) 
through his or her immediate male ascendant and within the 
third degree (inclusive) through his or her immediate 
female ascendant# Mr. Gupte**" illustrates it in the follow­
ing manner*"In the diagram opposite ... S3 and D1 are not
lineal ascendants of each other but they 
can not marry because their common 
lineal ascendant fA* is within the limits 
of the sapinda relationship# Thus D1 
whose immediate ascendant is her mother 
D is within three degrees of A and 
similarly S3 whose immediate lineal 
ascendant is his father S2 is within five degrees of A# But 
in this very diagram S3 can marry D2 because the latter is 
not within the sapinda-relationship, she being beyond three 
degrees of A# It may be pointed out that both under the 
Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga law, S3 and D2 could not marry 
each other as both are sapindas of each other and also 
within the prohibited degrees laid down by the schools."
A
“T
D
I
D1
I
D2
S
SI
S2
S3
1# S.V* Gupte, Hindu (marriage Act, pp#97-8#
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The table on the next page Mr. Gupte'*’ shows the sapindas 
of both the categories mentioned above. If fB f is the 
bridegroom he can not marry any person indicated by letter 
M or D who are his sapindas. If 1B 1 is the bride she can 
not marry any of the persons indicated by letters F and S 
who are her sapindas. He or she can marry any other person 
■unless she or he is a lineal ascendant in addition to those 
mentioned in the table.
TO. Custom:
A custom or usage, if adequately proved, might
render most of the rules relating to degrees of prohibited
degrees—of relationship or sapindaship inapplicable. In
pre-1955 law a custom to be valid must be ancient, certain,
2
reasonable, in consonance with public policy and morality.
1. S.V. Gupte, Hindu Marriage Act, p098A
2. See Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage (11th Edn.) pp.65-8;
Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, p. 20; Mulla, Principles 
of Hindu Law, p«c\o-l*
See P.V. Kane, Hist, of D„S., Vol.III(ii) p.876 
the requisites of valid customs, according to the smritis 
and commentaries and digest, are similar to those laid 
down by the writer on Purvamimanasa, i.e* that they must 
be ancient, must not be opposed to Shrutti end Smriti, 
must be such that they are regeirded by respectable people 
as obligatory on them and as such are observed with that 
consciousness by the shistar, they must be strictly con­
strued end cannot be availed of by others not within 
their purview and must not be immoinal or severally con­
demned by popular sentiment,”
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However, the requirements of a valid custom or usage, 
under HMA, are that
(1) It must he a rule which, having been continuously 
and uniformly observed for a long time, has 
obtained the force of law among Hindus in any 
local area, tribe, community, group or family;
(2) It must be certain and not unreasonable or 
opposed to public policy;
(3) In the case of a rule applicable only to a family 
it has not been discontinued by the family*
(1) ».»nfor a long time” . "obtained force of law”* 
The que&tion is: what do the expressions "for a 
long time" and "obtained the force of law" imply?
(a) "for a long time"
Does it imply that the custom must have been in 
force from time immemorial? or that it should have been in 
use for a reasonably long time? It has been suggested that 
the words "long time" must be construed in accordance with
p
the pre-1955 law on the subject: a custom may be binding
In S3(a) HMA*
See as to "Custom" generally, S,V.Gupte, Hindu Marriage 
Act, pp*87-93; P.V. Deolalkar, The Hindu Marriage Act7 
T955? pp021-4; J.D.M. Derrett, In^rl^uction to Modern 
Hindu Law, pp. 12-16 at pp.15-16; b,F. Mulla, The Princi­
ples of~Hindu Law, pp. ; Treatise on Hindu Law
and tJsage tilth Edn.j pp.59-72; Trevelyan, Hindu Xaw 
(3rd EdnT) pp.29-35; S*Ve Gupte, Hindu Law in British 
India, pp.19-23o 
2* J.D.Ho Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p®15*
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in point of antiquity if it extends as far back as memory 
suffices, so that a custom proved to have prevailed for 
last 40 years or so may well he 3 ancient1 or have been 
observed for 1 a long time3 for our purpose* It is submitted 
that "for a long time" may mean that the custom or usage 
should have been in use for a reasonably long time as 
distinct from "time immemorial" *
The test which should be kept in view, in consider­
ing the meaning of "for a long time", may be found in the
observations of Pazi Ali, J, following Subhani V , Nawab’L
2in Gokalchand V Parvinkumar,
"A custom, in order to be binding must derive its 
force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the 
force of law, but the English rule that "a custom in order 
that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so 
long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" 
should not be strictly applied to Indian conditions* All 
that is necessary to prove is that the usage has been acted 
upon in practice for such a long period and with such 
invariability as to show that it has, by common consent, 
been submitted to as the established governing rule of a
1. A.I.E. 1941 P.C* 21 at 32.
2* A.I.E. 1952 S.C* 231 at 234 followed by Satyanarayana 
Ragu, J, in N*Venkata V T. Bhujangayya A.I.E. I960 A.P. 
412 at p.413-14. (discussed "below;.
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particular custom."
Similarly, Madhav Rap V Raghavendra Hao^ and N.
2Venkata V T. Bhutjangayya may be taken as illustrations 
explaining the meaning of "for a long time". In Madhav Rao 
V Raghavendra Rap, Gajendragadkar, J, observed that, "... 
it seems to be fairly well established that if in a partic­
ular case the party pleading a custom has produced general 
evidence of a respectable and reliable character showing 
that the particular custom prevails amongst the community 
to which the witnesses belong, and that the observance of 
the custom is well known for a fairly long period of time, 
that evidence can be accepted in support of the custom 
pleaded. The decisions also seem to lay down that if 
instances are cited covering a period of nearly 30 years, 
it would not be unreasonable to presume that the evidence 
of those instances shows that the custom had been in
existence even before the period covered by those instances
4In N. Venkata V T. Bhfi^ |angyya, where instances covering 
a period of nearly 40 years were presumed to establish the
5
existence of the custom, Satyanarayana Raju observed that.
1. A.I.R. 1946 Bom. 377• See also authorities cited therein
2. A.I.R. I960, A.P. 412.
3* Madhava Rao V Raghvendra Rao A.I.R. 1946 Bom.377 at 388*
4. A.I.R. I960 A.P. 412.
5* ibid at p*414.
151
"The plaintiff has produced evidence of a reliable 
character showing that the particular custom prevails among 
the community to which the witness belongs and the observ­
ance of the custom is well known for a fairly long period 
of time. The plaintiff*s witnesses have given instances 
covering a period of nearly 40 years and it would not be 
unreasonable to presume that the evidence of those instances 
shows that the custom had been in existence even before the 
period covered by them,,*1 .
(b) >rObtained the force of law" *
The term "Obtained” means 'to acquire, to get, to 
prevail upon" Thus the expression "Obtained the force of 
law" may imply a permissive custom or usage which has pre­
vailed upon among Hindus, in any area, tribe, community, 
group, or even a family. It appears, however, that a few 
instances of custom or usage being so prevailed may be 
sufficient to enable the Court to hold that the custom has 
"Obtained the force of law",
2
The Privy Council in A,jai V lib* Vitjaikumari, while 
dealing with the question of a custom excluding a daughter 
from inheritance in respect of an estate governed by male
1, Murray: A Hew English Dictionary, Vol.7(1) P*37*
2. A.I.R, iy$y p.c* 22.
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primogeneture, emphasizes that in proving a custom it was
not necessary to adduce proof of actual instances of custom
taking effect* It was observed by their Lordships that,*1’
"It is well established that proof of actual
instances of such a custom taking effect is not necessary* «•
The opinions of responsible members of the family as to the
existence of such a custom, and the grounds of their opinion
though generally in the nature of a family tradition, are
'!)
clearly admissible. It was held, following A.iai V Mt.
2
Vi.jai Kumari, in Madhava Rao V Raghavendrarao / Jae-ld- that 
In the case of permissive customs the test of invariability 
can not be rigidly applied; that the necessary proof in 
each case will depend on the nature of the custom alleged; 
and that the want of instances or paucity thereof does not 
prevent the Court from holding the custom; if there is a 
general consensus of opinion of persons who are likely to 
know of its existence, particularly when the evidence is 
all in one direction* Similar view was taken by Dixit, J, 
in Motiram V Sukma^ where it was held that, "... if the 
custom is permissive and not one obligatory or opposed to 
the ordinary law or modifying the ordinary law of succession, 
then there may be only few instances and perhaps none where
1* A.I.R. 1939 P*C. 22 at pp.24-5*
2* A.I.R. 1940 Bombay 377 sit
3. A.I.R. I960 M.P. 46 at 48.
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the custom was followed* In the case of a permissible
custom, the rule of invariability will not apply and a few
instances may be sufficient to enable the Court to hold
that the custom prevails in the community concerned,
The Court may, however, hold an alleged custom,
which runs counter to the fundamental conceptions of Hindu
law, not proved to be binding as if they were law. In
1
Chidambaram V Suberamanian three customs were plaeded to be 
binding as if they were law. It was alleged that according 
to the usual practice obtaining in the Nattukottai Chatti 
Community the manager is entitled to a decent remuneration 
for managing the joint family business and the properties; 
that it is customary for members of the family to make 
presents to sisters and that joint family properties, 
sufficient for that purpose might be set apart •,*; that 
there is a practice for a member of the family to live 
separately after marriage and whatever he draws from the 
joint family is thereafter entered in a separate account 
called !!Pathuvazhi1, which includes amounts drawn by the 
members for their maintenance,
Venkataraman, J, held alleged customs not proved to 
be binding on the ground that the customs relating to remun­
eration of the manager and "Pathuvazi" account were counter 
to the fundamental conceptions of the joint family.
1. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 492
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(2) must be "certain", not "unreasonable", not opposed 
to public policy”:
(a) must be tTcertain”:
When it is said that, "a Custom is void because 
it is unreasonable", what is meant that a custom to be 
accepted as a valid custom must be definite and opposed to 
vague, for the unreasonable character of the alleged custom 
conclusively proves that the usage, even though it may have 
existed from a long time, must have resulted from accident
i
or indulgence • In proving that a custom is applicable as 
alleged the burden of proof lies on the one asserting it.
It is his or her duty to say exactly what the custom is,
2 3and how it relates to the issue. Professor Derrett^ provides
us two examples on an uncertain custom, namely,
(i) A vague assertion that females never inherit; and
(ii) that a share is given to daughters, without proof 
of what proportion is in fact to be allowed.
Similarly, an alleged custom of total remission of rent by 
the tenants on the ground that a certain portion of the 
land was subject to inundation resulting in the destruction 
of crops, the extent of such destruction not being specific,
Zl
was held to be uncertain.
1. Shibnarain Y. Bhutnath -[1917] I.L.R. 45 Cal.475 4-79•
2. J.S.M.Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p*15«
5. ibid. See also £.V . Gupte, Handu Marriage Law, p .90*
4. Shibnarain V. Bhutnath [1911?] i.L.R. 45 Cal©475*
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(b) "Not unreasonable" :
A Custom to be valid must be reasonable. Now what 
is meant by reasonable? The test to be applied is whether 
the alleged Custom is repugnant to justice, equity and good 
conscience.^" An alleged custom to pass over cultivable
p
land or a custom which would result in precluding the land 
forever from being brought under cultivation^ or a custom
4
that one may take soil from anotherfs land is certainly 
unreasonable. So also an alleged custom of total remission 
of rent on the ground that a certain portion of land was 
subject to inundation resulting in the destruction of crops, 
the extent of such destruction not being specific.^ Similarlys 
a custom compelling the second husband to pay compensation, 
to the first husband's family in respect of the expenses of 
the first marriage would be void as amounting to restraint 
on a widow's marriage
(c) "opposed to public policy”:
This will include, it appears, a custom which is 
immoral, or opposed to a statute or abhorent to decency or 
morality.
1. Mayne, (10th ed.) p.71*
2. Venkadu V. Subbaramiah [1954-] 2 M.L.J. (Andhra section)24.
3* Sala&ur~V. Oajaddin CT936] I.L.R, 63 Cal.851*
4. J.b.Mo Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p»15*
5* Shibnarain V. Bhubnath Ll91?J I«£.R« 45 Cal.475.
6. Premnath V. Jasoda AIR. 1955 Ajmer 7«
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(i) immoral custom:
The question of immoral custom was considered in 
Chinna V. Tegarai, where, in a suit by the deva dasis 
(dancing girls) claiming to have by custom a veto upon the 
introduction of the new dancing girls into the service of 
that temple, the Court (Innes and Kernan JJ.) dismissing 
the appeal held that, "Assuming ... that ... by the custom 
of this pagoda, they have the rights they claim, and that 
the custom, in some respects, fulfills the requisites of a 
valid custom, it is still apparent that the Court in making 
the declaration prayed for, would be recognising an immoral 
custom, a custom, that is, for an association of women to 
enjoy a monopoly of the gains of prostitution, a right, 
which on the score of morality alone, no Couj't could 
countenance •"
The question is whether a custom allowing the re­
marriage of a woman whose divorce had taken place without
2
formality is an immoral custom? In Ujai V. Hathi it was 
held that a custom which authorises a woman to contract a 
natra marriage without divorce, on payment of a certain sum 
to the caste to which she belongs, is an immoral custom, 
which should not be judicially recognised. Whereas, it
1. [1876] I.L.R. 1 Mad. 168 at 1?1.
2. [1870] 7 B.H.C.R. A.CJ. 153.
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appears from Pay am V. Motiram1 that such a custom may he
p
valid. However* it has been suggested that "a custom to 
allow the remarriage of a woman whose divorce has taken 
place without formality, the custom allowing informal 
divorces, would not necessarily he invalid for immorality."
(ii) Custom opposed to a statute:
The question of a custom, heing void as opposed to 
a statute arose in Latchman V. Appalaswamy. In Latchman1 s 
case the custom alleged was that when a widow remarries, 
she forfeits her daim to the jewellery and other gifts 
given to her at the time of her marriage either hy her 
hushand or her relations. Sangeeva Row Naidu, J., declaring 
the alleged custom as heing invalid on the ground that it
IL
is contrary to Section 5 of the Hindu Widow’s Remarriage 
Act, 1856, and Section 14^ of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956* 
observed that,^ "A custom which attempts to defeat or nullify 
a statute must he struck down as invalid without further 
examination, for the simple reason that the Legislature had 
determined the policy of the law and what law would govern
1. AIR 1956 Manipur 18.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 16.
3. AIR 1955 An.Po W .  ”
4. S.5* -Safeguards and provides against the forfeiture of 
any such property.
5. S.14 - converts such movable property as her own absolute 
property.
6. gjc Ip-ri
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the parties; and that legislative enactment shall prevail 
■unless the enactment itself saves any prevailing custom to 
the contrary*1
(iii) abhorant to decency or morality:
In G. Hanumaiah V. G.Mallayya,1 for example, where
the question was whether a man might lawfully adopt his
daughter’s daughter’s son, it was observed that, the
witnesses depose that in the particular community it was
permissible to marry a daughter’s daughter ... it is not
necessary for us to decide whether the custom of marriage is
made out and whether it should be duly recognised* ”
The question is whether such a custom, adequately
proved, would be valid? We know that a marriage with a
2daughter of maternal uncle was allowed, however, the propo­
sition that a custom might validly be proved enabling a man
to marry his granddaughter is going too far* In Ramangauda 
3V. Shiva ,ji^  marriage with a niece was considered by the 
Bombay High Court to be incestuous and was held to be against
1* AIR 1959 An*P* 177*
2* See Venkata V * Subhadra [1884] I0L.R* 7Mad. 54*8} 54-9 
(regarding sister1s daughter and maternal uncle’s 
daughter); Venkatalinga V, Vigiathamma [1883] I*L.R* 6 
Mad. 43,48 (marriage among Suaras between a paternal 
uncle and his niece was considered unwarranted, even 
though instances of such marriages were present)*
3* cited in Mayne 10th edn* p. 169*
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policy, and invalid* Similarly, ttie Madras High Court in 
Ealusami V* Balakrishna, ^  a custom permitting a marriage 
with the granddaughter was proved, however, it was held that 
such a custom is void being contrary to public policy* In 
view of the decision in Balusamiys case, it is submitted 
that, Hanumaiah1s case must be considered as incorrectly
decided* The reason for this is provided by Professor
2
Derrett in the following terms, "The effect of this judicial
viewpoint has been to unsettle customary rules in so far as
these are not evidently mandatory (and of course in so far
as they are still not abrogated by the statutes), and greatly
to influence their interpretation in a manner favourable to
consistency with the existing personal law, even if the
rights at issue were created or allegedly created long
before the fCode! was enacted There cannot be any doubt
but that Parliament reprobated such matches (i*e* marriage
with daughter!s daughter)* Thus where any issue depends upon
the validity of an alleged marriage between a man and his
granddaughter there should be no doubt but that the alleged
marriage was void, no matter when contracted*"
*
Rambhafrai V» Kantji is an another example of a
1. AIR 1957 Mad,97o
2* J.D*M*Derrett, "Recent Decisions And Some Queries in 
Hindu Law", (I960) Bom* p. 17 ff*at p.18*
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custon "being void as opposed to public policy. In Rambhabai1 s 
case in a community where divorce is permitted by consent, 
an ante-nuptial agreement whereby a husband agrees to grant 
divorce to his wife on the happening of certain events was 
held to be void on the ground that public policy requires 
that the parties should not contemplate separation or divorce 
before or at the time of entering into marriage.
(3) fTPis continued”
In the case of a family custom, to be valid, it is 
necessary that it shall not have been discontinued* This 
discontinuance can not, however, be proved by non-user of a 
custom by a caste or sub-caste, unless the Court had declared 
it abcd^ute-. However, in case of a family custom discontin­
uance may be proved by intentional or merely accidental non-
2user of the custom by the family. This discontinuance 
could be proved by conduct $ and not necessarily from an 
overt agreement.
(4) Proof of Custom:
The HMA does not provide rules as to the proof of 
custom. However, a custom should be proved by clear end 
unambiguous evidence. It is not essential to prove a custom
1. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.16*
2. S*V. Gupte, Hindu £aw of Marriage, p»91.
3* J.D*M0Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.16.
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1 2 from actual instances and is not a matter of inference.
It was held in Madhavarao V. Raghavendra Rao that what is 
necessary to he proved is that the usage has been accepted 
in practice for such a long period and with such invariabil­
ity as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted 
to an established governing rule of the particular family 
or district. The general opinion of members of the community 
or elders, who are likely to know the existence of the
Z l
custom is entitled to great weight* Similarly, general 
evidence, as for example proof of conduct by members of the 
caste which could be explained upon the basis of the custom 
will often suffice.^
V. Degrees of prohibited relationship and sapinda relation­
ship in Kenya and Uganda:
There is no specific mention of sapinda relationship. 
However, a person within the prohibited degrees of consang­
uinity if - one is a lineal ancestor of the other,^ or one 
was the wife or husband of a lineal ancestor or descendant
1. See Madhavarao V. Raghavendra Rao A.I.R. 194-6 Bom.380*
2. Jitendra V. Bhagwat A.I.R. 1956 iPatna 4-57•
3. CT.R\*TW6',Bom;' 380.
4-. ibid*
5. J.D.M.Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, pp. 14— 15* 
Cases cited therein.
6. Cap.157• S.3(2)(a) [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, I960, S.3(2)(a) [The Ugand' ] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, 1961.
1 1 h sof the other, or one was the wife of the father* s or
mother1s brother or of the grandfather' s or grandmother1s
2brother of the other, or one was the husband of the 
father*s or mother's sister or of the grandfather's or 
grandmother's sister of the other,^ or one is the brother 
or the sister of the other, or one is the uncle and niece 
of the other, or one is children of brother of brother and
lL
sister and sister or of brothers and sisters of the other. 
Lastly a person also within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity if, one has a common ancestor not more than 
two generations distant (if ancestry is traced through the 
mother of the descendant) or four generations distant (if 
ancestry is traced through the father of the descendant).*^
In Kenya and Uganda Ordinance, like HM, a marriage 
between persons within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
is possible if the custom governing each of them permits of 
a marriage between them.^ Similarly, the term "relationship" 
includes relationship through half blood, uterine blood, as
7
well as by adoption*(
1* Cap.157. S*3(2)(b) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, I960; S.3(2)(b) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, 1961*
2. Cap.157* S.3(2)(c) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, I960; S.3(2)(c) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance. 1961.
3. Cap.157. S*3(2)(d) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance I960; S.3(2)(d) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, 1961.
4-. Cap.157.S.3(2)(e) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance I960; S.3(2)(e) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, 1961.
5. Cap*157* S. (3)(2)H. The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, I960; S*3(2)(F) [The Uganda Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1961.
6. Cap.157 S.3(l)(e) The Kenya Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, I960. S.3(3) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, I960.
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPOTENCE
I. Introduction
A marriage may "be annulled, under HMA, on the
ground of impotence where the respondent was impotent at
the time of the marriage and continued to he so until the
1
institution of the proceedings. In the parallel provisions 
2 3of the Kenya and Uganda- law it is provided, respectively, 
that, "... either party was permanently impotent, or 
incapable of consummating the marriage, at the time of the 
marriage", and "the respondent was permanently impotent 
at the time of the marriage."
The provisions of HMA seem to have been based on 
section 19(1) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 which pro­
vides as a ground that the respondent was impotent at the 
time of the marriage and at the time of the institution 
of the suit.
1. S. 12(1)(a).
2. Cap. 157 S. 11(1)(b)(i) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, I960.
3. Cap* 112 S.13(l)(a) (The Law of the Uganda Protectorate) 
Vol.Ill, p. 154-7.
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Distinction between 1 wilful refusal to consummate1 
and Mincapable to consummate"
A careful distinction must be made at the outset
between the nullity of a marriage on the ground of wilful
refusal to consummate the marriage and nullity of a marriage
on the ground of impotence or incapability of consummating
the marriage. It is submitted that "wilful refusal to
consummate", i*e*> refusal which does not arise from
incapacity whether physical or psychological, is something
that supervenes the marriage whereas "impotence" or
"inability" must be present at the time of the marriage and
continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings.
It has been observed that, "wilful refusal to consummate
as distinct from inability (whether due to physical or
mental causes) to consummate, is not a ground for nullity
In India."1 This observation, it is submitted, is equally
applicable to cases of nullity under the Kenya and Uganda
Ordinances. The reason for this may well be found in the
2report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce.
The Royal Commission recommending that "... wilful refusal 
should be made a ground for divorce, and not of nullity,
1. J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 189#
2. Presented to Parliament L ) .'956J (fmd. y£>ylS7 par a . 88, p. 31.
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1
in both England and Scotland"; gave the reason for its
p
recommendation as, "Refusal to consummate marriage may be 
evidence of impotence in the psychological sense, as for 
instance, some invincible aversion or repugnance which 
makes consummation impracticable. Such incapacity presumed 
to exist at the time of the marriage is a non-statutory 
ground of nullity both in England and Scotland. Wilful 
refusal, on the other hand, cannotes capacity to consummate 
the marriage but unwillingness to do so* To make this a 
statutory ground of nullity suggests some confusion of 
thought. Nullity should be granted for some defect or 
incapacity existing at the date of the marriage. Wilful 
refusal is something that happens after the marriage."
II Meaning of "impotence"
The expressions "impotent" and "impotence" are not 
defined either in HMA or by the Kenya or Uganda ordinances. 
"Impotent" and "impotence" means simply, respectively, in 
dictionary terms as, "wanting in sexual power" and "want
Ll
of sexual power" "physical inability of a man or woman to 
perform the act of sexual intercourse."^ A precise judicial
1. Presented to Parliament [1956] Cmd. 9678. para.89, p«31 
and para. 283 at pa83«
2. ibid., para.89, p<>31o
3o Murray; The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p.969*
4. ibid.
5 ? Earl Jo wit t: The Dictionary of English Law, p.94-2a
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definition of impotence is difficult to provide „ The 
earlier definitions or attempted definitions of impotence 
are* however, ambiguous in nature.
In 1731? the Ecclesiastical Court in Catherina 
Elizabeths V Welde,1 considering the question: whether the 
defendent is so incapable that he never can consummate, 
observed that, "it is necessary that the man should have a
visible incapacity in order to annul a marriage before a
2 ?> triennial cohabitation," In 1845 we find Dr, Lushington^
saying, as to the meaning of "impotence", that "if there
be a reasonable probability that the lady can. be made
capable of a vera copula [true union] of the natural sort
of coitus, though without power of conception I cannot
pronounce this marriage void. If on the contrary, she is
not and can not be made capable of more than an incipient
imperfect, and unnatural coitus, I would pronounce the
lL
marriage void." G ~ V G - was the first case enunciating 
the principle that the practical impossibility of consumma- 
tion is the true test of impotence. Lord Penzance-^ stated
1. [1771] 2 Lee 580 at 586 = 161ER 447 at p.449.
2. Now obsolete.
3. D - E V A - G [1845] 1 RojU* ECC. 280 at 299 = 165 ER 
1039 at p.1045.
See also J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment of 
Marriage, p. 209*
4. ITS71JL.R P and D Vol.II* p.287. 
5* ibid., at p.291* See also J. Jackson: The Pormation and 
Annulment of Marriage, p0211.
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the proposition as follows:
"... the basis of the interference of the 
court [in cases of impotence] is not the 
structural defect, but the impossibility 
of consummation* If, therefore, a case 
presents itself involving the impractica­
bility (although it may not arise from a 
structural defect) the reason for the 
interference of the court arises* The 
impossibility must be practical. It can 
not be necessary to shew that the woman is 
so formed that connection is physically 
impossible if it can be shewn that it is 
possible only under conditions to which 
the husband would not be justified in 
resorting. The absence of a physical 
structural defect can not be sufficient to 
render a marriage valid if it be shewn 
that connection is practically impossible, 
or even if it be shewn that it is only 
practicable after a remedy has been 
applied which the husband can not enforce, 
and which the wife, whether wilfully or 
acting under the influence of hysteria, 
is determined not to submit to*n
3-n Lord Dunedin approving the above
2observations of Lord Penzance observed that, "... a person 
is in law impotent who is incapax copulandi, apart from the 
question of whether he or she is incapax procreandi*M 
Similarly, in H V H ^  (CA) and S V S ^  the Court applied and
1. (H L) [1924] A.C.- 349.
2. [1924J A,C. 349 at p.333* See also J. Jackson: The forma­
tion and Annulment of Marriage, p.210.
3 e (March 31 > 1954) unreported cited in S V S [1954].
3 All ER 736 at p0 741.
4. [1954] 3 All ER 736.
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1 Pfollowed the test laid down in G - V G -« Singleton,
L.J5 and Karminski, J, respectively stated the proposition 
as follows:
"That shows the necessity of proving ... 
that the disability alleged is incurable 
or such as to make consummation practically 
impossible*"
and
"The true test of incapacity is the practical 
impossibility of consummation."
The exact significance of the definitions laid down 
at English law and shared by Indian law is material. In 
Indian cases the judges have applied and followed the 
definition laid down in English law.
IL
In Edward Charles Dawson V Matty Dawson, a case 
under section 19(1) of the Indian Divorce Act 1869* the 
Madras High Court defined impotence as, "... physical 
unfitness for consummation...". Similarly in Kanthy Bala- 
vendron V S. Harry, the court following English cases, 
understood impotence as meaning as "incapacity to consummate 
the marriage, that is to say incapacity to have sexual 
intercourse«..".
1. [1871] L H P  and D Vol.II, p.287.
2. [19543 3 All E.E 736 at 74-1.
3. H V H unreported cited in S V S [1954]3 All.E.E.736 at 741
4. ABTX916 Mad. 675 at p.676^----
5. AIE 1954 Mad. 316 at p.317.
6. D = E V A - G  [184-5], Eab ECO 280 = 163 E E. 1039;
G V G [1871] LE.PD. Vol.II, p.287.
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Cases -under H M A  define impotence in the following
terms« M V following S V S^ and Jagdish Kumar V Sita
-5 4Devi. following Lord Dunedin* s observations in G V G,
define impotence * respectively as, "The true test of 
incapacity is the practical impossibility of consummation" 
and, "Incapacity for sexual intercourse is an essential 
ingredient of impotency. Such an inability may arise from 
a variety of causes including the mental and moral disabil­
ity." Whereas in Gudivada V Smt. Gudivada, ^  Chandra Reddy, 
C. J., following T. Rangaswami V T» Arvindammal observed, 
as to the meaning of impotence, "the marriage would be 
avoided or dissolved on the ground of impotence if it is 
established that at the time of the marriage either of the 
spouses was incapable of effecting the consummation either 
due to structural defect in the organs of generation render­
ing complete sexual intercourse impracticable or due to 
some other cause." In T. Rangaswami V T. Arvivdanmial,^
o
Ramaswami, J, explained in detail the meaning of impotence 
as follows, "... if ... at the time of the marriage one of
1. C1963] Ker. L.T. 315.
2. [1954] 3 All.E.R. 736.
3. A.I.R. 1963 FCJ. 114. , fvvil)
4. .[1871] L.R. ~PD vol.II> 7't4 .C-VQl^  ^
5. A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 151.
6. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 243.
7* ibid*
8. ibid at p<>248.
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the parties is and continues to "be incapable of effecting 
or permitting its consummation either of some structural 
defect in the organs of generation which is incurable and 
render complete sexual intercourse impracticable or of some 
incurable mental or moral disability resulting in the man 
inability to consummate the marriage with the particular 
woman or in the woman to an invincible repugnance to the 
act of consummation with the particular man*"
We find that although impotence has been described, 
or explained in a variety of ways, we know, however, these 
do not represent a precise definition of impotence*
Thus impotence may be defined as a practical
disability for sexual intercourse due to some malformation
and/or invincible repugnance to the act of sexual inter­
op
course generally or quo(d hanc (towards a particular 
or hunc (towards a particular wsman) due to nervous and/or 
psychic disorder either proved as a fact or inferred from 
the conduct of the alleged impotent spouse*
The question is; what is meant by sexual intercourse 
apd how it is to be defined? Doubts have arisen whether 
sexual intercourse with the use of contraceptives or contra­
ceptive measures or where the husband had invariably 
adopted the practice of coitus interruptus (withdrawal
171
before emission) is complete intercourse? Similarly, whether 
conception or "birth of a child is evidence of consummation 
or ’’intercourse in law”."1"
(1) Meaning of intercourse:
p
Dr, Lushington defined sexual inter course as, ”... 
ordinary and complete intercourse”. What, then, was ’’sexual 
intercourse” in ecclesiastical law? The term used was 
flvera copula"^ (e«g. ”... a person is in law impotent who 
is incapax copulandi... ” ) ’’Copula” in the dictionary*' 
terms means simply ’’sexual union”, Thus the meaning of 
vera copula must "be sought elsewhere. Common understanding 
would seem not to he sufficient for this purpose0 The 
reason is not hard to find. Whereas commonly intercourse 
is not complete without orgasm on both sides, the possibility 
of orgasm in one spouse negatives his or her petition for 
nullity on this ground whether or not there is possibility 
of orgasm in the other* It is not practical to distinguish 
possibility of orgasm from the male’s erection and penetra­
tion, hence the law looks to erection and penetration and
1. J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment of Marriage,pe210.
2. D-e V A-G [1845] 1 Rob. ECC. 280 at 298 = 163ER 1039 
at 104
3. See G V G [1924] A C 340, at 365.
4. it>ia at 299 = 1045. '
5. Murray: A Mew English Dictionary, vol.2, p.977*
not to orgasm (which, in the case of male includes ejacula­
tion whether or not, by operation or otherwise, the ejacu­
lation of live sperm as such is reduced permanently or 
temporarily impossible).
1 Vera copula" according to D - e V A - and
p
White V White means, respectively, "Coitus" and "Conjunc- 
tion of bodies" and a true conjunction is achieved"^ ... 
as soon as full entry and penetration has been achieved,"
4
^ ^ ft it was pointed out that "Vera Copula consists of 
erectio and intromissio" • It was further pointed out that,
"... "connection" or the "conjunction of bodies" or 
"erectio or intromissio" is ... equivalent to consummation 
in the ecclesiastical sense interpreted in the light of modern 
authorities."^ Thus it is submitted that sexual intercourse 
is, for our purposes, erectio and intromissio without 
necessarily ejaculatio.
(2) Use of contraceptives:
The use of contraceptives against the wishes of
1. D - e V A - G  [1845] 1 Rob. ECCe 280 at 298 = 163ER 
1039 at 1045.
2. [1948] 2 All. E.R. 151 at 155.
3• ibid.
4, [1952] 1 All. E.R. 1194 at 1198.
5# ibid*
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the other spouse might give rise to serious legal problems 
in India resulting in a nullity petition on the ground 
that the respondent is unable to perform proper sexual 
intercourse (as to the meaning of sexual intercourse, see 
above ).
1
The first case on the question was Cowen Y Cowen 
where the wife petitioned for a decree of nullity on the 
ground that the husband refused to have intercourse without
2the use of contraceptives. This was accepted by Du Parcqu,
L.J* who granting the decree, following Dr. Lushingtonfs
t;
observations in D - e V A - G-, decided that sexual inter­
course could not be regarded as complete when its natural 
termination was artificially prevented.
ZL
Cowen V Cowen was expressly overruled in Baxter V 
Baxter ^  (H.L.) where opportunity thus arose to settle the
1. [194-5] 2 All.E.R. 197;
As to comments on the subject see: R.M. Willes Chitty 
"Marriage-Nullity- wilful refusal to consummate - use 
of contraceptives." [194-8] 26. Can. B.R* 576-581*
2. Cowen V Cowen op.cit. at p. 199*
3. Op.cit. "Sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of 
the term is ordinary and complete intercourse ... it 
does not mean partial and imperfect intercourse."
4-. [194-5] 2 All. E.R. 197*
5* [194-7] 2 All! e !r ! 886! (The Court of Appeal [1947] 1 All . 
E.R. 387? held in Baxter V Baxter that the husband
had disentitled himself to relief on the ground that by 
continuing intercourse with the use of contraceptives 
the husband had acquiesced in the wife*s refusal to con­
summate the marriage, as consummation had been defined 
in the earlier cases. The House of Lords affirmed the 
refusal of the decree on other grounds.
17 4
law* In this case the husband asked for a decree of nullity 
on the ground of wife*s refusal to permit intercourse with­
out the use of contraceptives* It was held by their Lord­
ships that the use of contraceptives did not prevent the 
consummation of the marriage. Lord Jowitt, L.C., observed, 
as to the use of contraceptives, that,'*'"... the use of a 
sheath is by no means the only method of contraception in 
common use *.. the use of the corresponding device of a 
mechanical pessary was at one point of the argument said 
to be indistinguishable from the use of a sheath, but at 
another point was likened to the employment of a douche, 
which, it was said, would not negative consummation because 
both were intended to operate after the sexual act was 
completed, so, it was suggested, was the pessary in the 
form of a spermatozool drug inserted before, but operating 
after, the sexual act ... it was a matter of common know­
ledge that reputable clinics had come into existence for 
the purpose of advising spouses on what is popularly called 
birth control, and, it is also a matter of common knowledge 
that many young married couples agree to take contraceptive 
precautions in the early days of married life* I take the 
view that in this legislation [THE M C A  1937] Parliament 
used the word "Consummate" as that xtford is understood in 
common parlance and in the light of social conditions known 
to exist.,
1. [1947] 2 All* E.R. 886 at p.
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1
It is submitted tbat Baxter V Baxter appears to 
have decided tbat while the use of contraceptives may 
prevent conception it neither prevents consummation of the 
marriage nor renders sexual intercourse imperfect* It is
p
further submitted that obviously Baxter V Baxter will be 
followed by the Indian courts because at a time where over 
population is the greatest problem it will be against the 
public policy to take the view that use of contraceptives 
renders sexual intercourse imperfect*
(3) Coitus interruptus:
Similarly it may be alleged that the practice of 
Coitus interruptus, renders the sexual intercourse imperfect 
and consequently the husband may be sued for nullity on the 
ground of impotence.
There is a conflict of authority on the question 
and the question was specifically left open by the House of 
Lords in Baxter V Baxter  ^where Lord Jowitt L.C. emphasized 
that he was expressing no view on that practice when he 
observed,
1. [194-7] 2 A11* 886*
2* ibid.
3 • ibid.
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tliis practice [i.e. coitus interruptus] as 
distinct from artificial methods of contraception, does 
not arise in the case before the House and I prefer to
express no opinion about it*1 The first case on the question
2is Grimes V Grimes where, on behalf of the wife it was 
argued that,
"... if the practice adopted is that of Coitus 
interruptus, there is no proper intercourse and, therefore, 
no consummation of the marriage ... for a marriage to be 
consummated there must be normal and full intercourse."
Einnemore, J, accepted this argument and granting 
a decree of nullity observed that,
ZL
" *.. The point here is whether Coitus interruptus 
is a natural and complete intercourse* All the authorities 
that have been cited to me, going back to a long time, 
plainly suggest that it is not, because, for there to be 
natural and complete intercourse, there must be emission 
within the body of the wife..*" i.e. the learned judge 
considered "ejaculation" as of the essence of the sexual 
intercourse. However, it is interesting to note that in
1. [194-7] 2 All. E.R. p *889•
2. [194-8] 2 All. E.R. 14-7.
3o ibid at p. 14-8.
4. ibid at p.150.
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Rice V Ragnold~Spring~Rice ^  a case decided shortly after
2
the decision in Baxter V Baxter» the Divisional Court came 
to the conclusion that coitus interruptus, practised hy one 
party against the will of the other, was a good ground for 
the other spouse to separate from the offending party, i.e., 
was such as to constitute a good defence to a claim based 
on desertion*
The cases adopting the opposite view are White V
7> lL
White ^  and Cackett V Cackett which appear to take the 
view that although sexual intercourse consists of erectio 
and intromissio, however, it does not necessarily include 
ejaculatio, i*e*, it does not include, in the words of 
Finnemor e, Ttemission within the body of the wifeTT* It
will be noticed in passing that whether or not ejaculation 
could lead to conception proof of ejaculation is for 
practical purposes proof of the possibility of orgasm on 
the part of the woman, so as to deprive her of a ground for
nullity for impotence on the part of her husband* Willmer,
in White V White,^ observed that,
" . ..^ it is contended that there is a complete
1* [1948] 1 All. E.R. 188.
2. [194-73 2 All. E.R. 886.
5o [194-8] 2 All. E.R. 151.
4-* [1950] 1 All. E.R. 677*
5. Grimes V Grimes [194-8] 2 All. E.R. 886.
6 . [194-3] 2 All. E.R. 1 5 1 .
7c ibid at p*155»
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conjunction of bodies - a vera copula - which means 
literally "true conjunction" - as soon as full entry and 
penetration is achieved. What follows goes merely^ to the 
likelihood or otherwise of conception. In my judgment, the
latter contention must be correct". Similarly, in Cackett
1 PV Cackett Hodson, J, following White V White rather than
Grimes V Grimes was of the opinion that,
"the Court would be driven into an impossible
position if it tried further to define what amounted to
normal sexual intercourse ... for where a woman alleged
that the man had failed to complete the sexual act, the
Court would have to inquire exactly at what stage emission
took place ... Here seed was emitted from the man in close
proximity to the woman and the woman might have conceived
IT.  » • «
It is submitted that, as we have seen, since sexual 
intercourse consists merely of erectio and intromissio 
without ejaculatio Coitus interruptus, following Cackett V 
Cackett and White V White, must be treated merely as a 
contraceptive measure and the practice of it from the com­
mencement of the marriage cannot be claimed to be failure
1. [1950] 1 Alio E.R. 188.
2. [194-8] 2 All. E.R. 151.
3. [194-8] 2 All. E.R. 147.
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to consummate by natural intercourse.
(4) Conception or birth of a child:
The conception or birth of a child does not in 
itself establish that the marriage has been consummated, 
(i.e., ordinary and complete intercourse has taken place) 
for such conception or birth may be by fecundatio ab extra, 
or by artificial insemination.
(a) Fecundatio ab extra
In Snowman V Snowman, for example, where the 
husband was incapable of ordinary and complete intercourse 
and the wife became pregnant by fecundatio ab extra Bateson, 
J., (followed D V A^and Russell V Russell^) granting a 
decree of nullity on the ground of the incapacity to
1. C1943] P. 186.
2. D ~ V A [1845] 1 Rob. Ecc. 280 = 163 E.R. 1039.
3- [1924] (HL) 1924 A C.687 a case of adultery where the
question was whether a birth of a child fecundatio ab 
extra by an unknown man is adultery# Lord Dunedin came
to the conclusion that it is not and observed, as to
fecundatio ab extra (see p#722) "Fecundation ab extra is
admittedly, by the medical testimony, as vouched by the 
learned judge in his summing up, a rare, but not impossi
ble, occurrence; but its accomplishment will depend, not
only or exclusively on the proximity of the organs, but
on certain other potential qualities of the particular
man.1
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consummate the marriage observed, as to fecundatio ab extra,
1
". . . semen migbt bave encountered tbe Vagina of 
tbe woman and caused a possible pregnancy without penetra­
tion or ordinary intercourse as it is properly understood.,f
2
Similarly in Clarke V Clarke a decree of nullity was 
granted to tbe husband due to tbe wifels incapacity where 
tbe wife was suffering at all times from fffrigidity” 
although the wife gave birth to a son, of whom, it was 
admitted, the husband was the father because on the facts 
and on the medical evidence Pilcher, J, arrived at the 
conclusion that the birth of the child was due to fecundation 
ab extra*' and thus the marriage had never been consummated.
00 Artificial insemination
lL
The leading case on the point is L V L. In that 
case the marriage was never consummated owing to the hus­
band’s psychological attitude in sexual matters. The wife 
was anxious to have a child and discussed artificial insem­
ination with her husband. She was artificially inseminated 
from her husband, but she had no success* However, she
1. Snowman V Snowman [194-33 P-186 at p. 188.
2. [194-33 2 All. E.R. 54-0.
3* Clarke V Clarke ibid at p.54-3* See also J* Jackson:
The Formation and Annulment of Marriage, pQ210.
a . L194-9J' t  Ari:’Tr;RTi%i~--------------
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continued her attempts to inseminate herself artificially 
from the husband* There were further ineffective attempts 
to consummate the marriage and the wife was urging the 
husband to undergo psychological treatment which he did* 
However, the treatment did not make the efforts to consum­
mate any more effective than they had been in the past*
The wife became pregnant by artificial insemination*
Pearce, J, granting a decree of nullity to the wife because 
it appeared from the evidence that the wife^ dominant 
motive in conceiving the child was the hope that the advent 
of a child might help her and her husband to have normal 
intercourse* The learned judge did not regard the
conception of the child, serious as it is *.♦ to be 
approbation [as to approbation see below] of an abnormal 
marriage", i.e* it does not amount to "intercourse in law"*
III* What Constitutes Impotence;
In order to substantiate the above definition, we 
shall now consider instances amounting and not amounting to 
impotence«
1# [194-93 1 All E.R. 145-146*
See also J. Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of 
Marriage, p*210*
(1) Structural malformation:
The structural malformation may consist, in case of
females, in abnormally shaped or missing female organs (i.e.,
wife with no uterus and a vagina forming a cul-de-sac making
complete coitus impossible) whereas in case of a male it
2may consist of in unduly large or small male organ. How­
ever, an allegation that the respondent did not attain 
puberty will not amount to structural malformation in itself* 
This malformation may either be curable or incurable (see 
next page as to effect of incurability,)
1. See D-e V A-G [184-5] 1 Rob. ECC. 279 (where the wife was 
with~ncT uterus and vagina forming a cul-de-sac rendering 
complete coitus impossible) V H V H [1861] SW. Tr,
24 (where congenital malformation of the wife rendered 
consummation impossible,) £)V S  [1954] 2 All. E.R. 598 
(where the wife was with no vagina and artificial vagina 
was created. See also Kanti Lai V Vimla, A.I.R. 1952 sav 
(where the respondent had no development of womanhood, 
her vagina was not developed and the uterus was in a rudi­
mentary state. The marriage was not annulled. However, 
the Bombay High Court in A V B [1952] 54 Bom. L.R.725 
came to a contrary conclusion7 where
2. Kanthy BalvencLram A.I.R, 1954 Mad. 316.
As to a detailed information about
malformation see John Glaister, Medical Jurisprudence and. 
Toxicology (11th Edn. 1962) chapter XII, pp.344-49';
Taylor1s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence 
Vol.11, (11th. Eon. 1937] pp»2-7; see also T. fiangaswami 
V T. Arvindammal A.I.R. 1957 Madras, pp.245-245 and 
books cited therein.
3. Dawson V Dawson A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 675*
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Curability:
A decree of nullity must be refused where the 
alleged structural malformation may be cured by medical 
operation and/or treatment without any danger to the spouse 
concerned, thus making consummation of the marriage a prac­
tical possibility* The Court, it is submitted, is obliged
i
to accept a genuine offer, at the trial, to undergo medical
treatment and to adjourn the case for that purpose. However,
the Courtfs former practice of adjourning a suit for further
2
attempts when it deemed fit is obsolete. It is self evident
See M V M [1956] 3 All. E.R. (where the offer was not 
considered as a genuine one and Karminski,J, refused to 
grant an adjournment) S Y S  [1954-] 5 All.E.R. 736 (where 
the hearing was adjourned to enable the wife to undergo 
the operation). The difference between two cases is that 
in S Y S  the wife alleged that she "is and was at all 
material times ready and willing to undergo the operation" 
whereas in M V M the wife knew about her condition and 
took no step and the offer of operation was an after­
thought. See also Gaboli V Gaboli [I960] The Times,
May 19th (where adjournment for an operation on wife 
thirteen years after the marriage was refused).
2. See T V M [18651 L.R. 1 P and D 31; see also B Y B [1958]
2 All.E.R. 76 (where the husband contended that a week 
was not long enough to determine whether the marriage 
could be consummated and it was held that "time must be 
considered as" factor in each case" (at p*78) and 
Barnard, J, observed that (at p.78) TTI have come to the 
conclusion, on the evidence put before me, that no amount 
of time would help this marriage to be consummated. The 
husband had ample time during the seven days of the 
honeymoon to consummate the marriage and he was unable to 
do it, and I do not think that it would help the matter 
if he were given any further time."
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that if even after the medical treatment the defect is not
cured the marriage would he annulled. ■*"
2In D-e V A-G, for example, where there was evidence 
that an operation on the wife ’’could not he effected with­
out endangering life, or running serious risk of doing so"
Dr. Lushington found that she was practically incapable of
x
consummating the marriage. Similarly, in W V H ^  where the 
evidence showed a congenital malformation of the woman 
which was not absolutely irremovable a decree of nullity 
was granted because, "... any attempt to remove it would be 
attended by considerable danger to the life of the woman."
S V S ^ (1954) which was followed ir M V S^ and S V S ^  
(CA)(no.2)(1962) are good illustrations in support of the 
proposition. In S V S (1954) the husband sought a
decree of nullity alleging that the wife was at the time of 
the marriage and had ever since been incapable of consummat­
ing the marriage. The wife denying this alleged that she 
was not subject to physical or mental abnormality save a 
hymeneal stenosis with a thickened hymen removable by a
1. See D V D  [1954-3 2 All.E.R. 598 )operation - artificial 
vagina was created - still no consummation - Marriage 
annulled) B V B [19553 P.42 (similar case).
2. [184*53 1 EoBTUCC. 280 at 305 = 163 E.R. 1039 at p.1047.
3. [18613 2 SW, and Tr.241 at 245 = 164 E.R. p.987 at p.989.
4. [19543 3 All. E.R. 756.
5. [19633 Ker. L.T. 315.
6. [1962] 3 All.E.R, 55.
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1
simple surgical operation which, she M is and was at all 
material times ready and willing to undergo", and which she 
did. In S Y S  (1954-)^  Karminski, J, applying Lord Moncrieff1
7
observations in WY Y AY ^  that» ,TIf incapacity is only
temporary and is subject to cure after appropriate treatment
then there is no reason for annulling a marriage" dismissed
4-the husband1 s petition on the ground that, ". •. the wife
is no longer incapable of consummation since the operation 
recently performed on her now has rendered her physically 
capable of consummation". Similarly in S Y S ^  (no,2)CCA) 
a decree of nullity was refused, where the wife had a mal­
formed vagina, too short to permit full penetration, but 
according to the medical evidence capable of being enlarged 
by an operation with good chance of the operation being so 
successful as to allow full penetration. The Court held that 
the fact that full penetration could only be rendered possi­
ble either by surgery eradicating a malformation of the 
wifefs vagina, or on the hypothesis that there was no 
natural vagina, by surgery creating an artificial vagina, 
would not prevent subsequent sexual acts amounting to
1. S Y S  [1954-] 3 All. E.R. 736 at Pc738.
2. ibid.
3. [194-6] B.C. 2? at 31 (Scots case).
4-. S Y S [1954] 3 All .E.R, 736 at 738.
5. U % 2 ]  3 All. E.R, 55.
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consummation of the marriage, i.e., in the words of Willmer, 
L.J.,*** "I do not see why intercourse hy means of such [i.e. 
artificial] vagina should not he regarded as amounting to 
"Vera Copula11, so as to satisfy the test laid down hy Dr. 
LushingtonM ♦
2
S V S is the nearest decision on facts to the 
Kerala Case of M V S  5 which followed S T S , In M V S  the 
wife!s vagina had at the time of the marriage too narrow 
an opening to permit of easy intercourse. Perinetomy was 
performed after which normal intercourse became possible.
The husband fs expert witness found her now fit for normal 
intercourse o The husband did not attempt intercourse and 
pursued his petition for nullity on the ground that she 
was and remained impotent. The Court accepted the medical 
evidence, the malformation having been eradicated by 
operation. ,fThe true test of incapacity is the practical
IL
impossibility of consummation'1« M V S was an even stronger 
case than S V S . In the former in any event, as so often 
in India the real object of the litigation was to extract
5
money from the relatives of the other party.
1. S V S [1962] 3 All. E.R. 35 at p.62.
2. 11954] 3 All. E.R. 736.
3- [1963] K.L.T. 315.
A ♦ ibid
5. ibid at p*> 315> 317* The husband's admissions in 
cross examination.
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(2) Venereal disease:
The question is: whether venereal disease may he a
ground for annulling a marriage on the ground of impotence?
It is submitted that venereal disease by itself may not amount 
to
/impotence. Only a venereal disease making normal intercourse 
impossible, as many syphilitical conditions do, may serve 
as a ground for nullity.
The proposition may be supported by Birendra Kumar 
Biswas V Hemlata Biswas,’*' where the petitioner asked that 
his marriage with the respondent may be declared null and 
void, on the ground that the respondent had been from 
before the marriage suffering from a loathsome disease of 
syphilitic origin alleged to be incurable and contagious in 
consequence whereof she is said to be unable to consummate
the marriage. Mookerjee, A.C.J., remanding the case for
2further investigation observed that,
” •. . It is the permanent or probably permanent
character of the malady, rendering sexual intercourse
impracticable throughout the continuance of the marriage,
*
that furnishes the reason for annulment...” Greaves, J, 
annulling the marriage (following English cases) observed,
1. A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 459 (before remand).
2. ibid at p. 463.
3« A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 464 (after remand).
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as to the effect of venereal disease, that,
" upon the evidence, having regard to the state 
of the wife’s health, I think consummation is a practical 
impossibility* I think the husband could not consummate the 
marriage without the very gravest risk to his health and 
to that of any offspring who might be born of the connection 
and I think this state of things is likely to continue and 
be permanent and in my opinion this amounts to impotency on 
the part of the wife*"
p
A contrary view has been taken in Wylie V Wylie 
where Stuart, C.J#, has observed that,
”..♦1, however, do not accept the view that the 
existence of a venereal disease in a woman constitutes 
impotence.. * n ,
It is submitted that although Stuart, C.J*, was 
right in holding that venereal disease by itself is not 
impotence, however, his dictum should not be followed, 
unless qualified, in cases under the HMA because of the 
following reasons
(1) V Wylie ^  the question was not properly
investigated* When Stuart, C.J., observed "There is no
1* A*I*R* 1921 Gal* 4-64. (after remand) at p* 4*66*
2. A,I*R* 1930 Oudho 83 at p«84.
3# ibid.
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authority in English law for the proposition that a woman, 
who is suffering from venereal disease, is considered to he 
impotent within the meaning of that word in English law” 
it is submitted his expression is too broad. In English law 
the position is that venereal disease may render sexual 
intercourse practically impossible; thus it could amount to 
impotence.
Similarly, the decision of Greaves, J, in Birendra 
Kumar* s case (after the remand) was not cited to the Court 
where the learned judge held that consummation of marriage 
under the circumstances (i.e. where the wife is suffering 
from an incurable venereal disease) is a practical impossi­
bility and ”... this amounts to impotency on the part of 
the wife, within the meaning of the decided cases”
(ii) The obiter dicta of Wazir Hasan, that ”... A 
question of law may arise which will have to be decided on 
a future occasion as to whether, when a wife suffers from 
a disease which might or might not be venereal and the 
husband has reasonable and well founded apprehension of 
infection in case he has sexual intercourse with such a 
wife, in those circumstances the Court would be justified
1. A.I.R. 1921 Gal..464.
2. A.I.R. 1950 Oudh. 85 at p c85*
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to record a finding that the wife was impotent", (i.e. if 
the sexual intercourse is a practical impossibility) makes 
the authority of Stuart, C.J.fs decision unsatisfactory.
It is submitted, however, that mere danger to the 
other spouse fs health and to that of any children who might 
be born of the marriage is the other party!s affair. If the 
syphilitic spouse refuses to take a cure then questions of 
cruelty for the purposes of divorce arise.
(3) Sterility:
The question is: whether sterility can be the 
synonym of impotence? In T. Rangaswami V T. Arvindammal ^  
where the power procreation and potency were not considered
distinct when it was observed, (which was followed in
o
Gudivada Venkateswararao V Smt. G. Nagamani) "Potency in 
case of males means power of erection of the male organ 
plus 1 discharge of healthy semen containing living sperma­
tozoa1 - "(which is not correct). In nullity suits based on 
impotence, it is submitted, the sterility (or the presence 
of "... living spermatozoa" is not relevant for power of
procreation and potency are distinct. Sterility as distinct
3 4from impotency, in case of a male^ and female, means,
1. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 243 at p.245.
2. A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 151 at p.152.
3« John Glaister, Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (11th
Edn. 1962) po34Zrr
4. ibid at p.347*
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respectively, "the inability to impregnate" and "incapacity 
to Conceive" * It is also submitted that sterility by a 
medical operation to avoid procreation of children should 
be considered on the same footing as use of contraceptives 
since it effects the same result which could have been 
effected by the use of contraceptives on each successive 
occasion#
The test had been laid down by Dr* Lushington in 
D-e V A-G ^  in the following terms,
" * *. The only question is, whether the lady [spouse] 
is or is not capable of sexual intercourse, or, if at 
present incapable, whether that incapacity can be removed"*
1.e* mere incapability of conception does not amount to
impotence# The "true distinction" between sexual intercourse
pand sterility has been stated by Dr. Lushington as follows, 
"If there be a reasonable probability that the lady 
can be made capable of a vera copula - of the natural sort 
of coitus, though without power of conception - I cannot 
pronounce this marriage void.,."* This test was approved by
1* [184-53 1 Robb. ECC* 280 at 296 = 165 E.R. 1039 at p*1044-.
2. ibid at 299 = at p* 104-5. In this a decree of nullity was 
refused merely because there was coitus. B - N V B - N 
(P.O.) [1854-] l.SP. ECO.and AD 24-8 = 164 E".RT'144- appears 
to support the view that proof that the wife is incapable 
of becoming a mother is not a sufficient ground for a 
nullity decree if she be otherwise apta viro.
See also J. Jackson: The Pormation and Annulment of 
Marriage, p.209#
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Lord Jowitt L.C. in Baxter V Baxter where it was observed
that, n . counsel were unable to cite any authority where
the procreation of children was held to be the test in a
nullity suit. On the contrary, it was admitted that the
sterility of the husband or the barrenness of the wife was
o
irrelevant." Lord Jowitt disapproved J V J [C.A.], a case
of sterility artificially produced before marriage, where
*
applying Oowen V Cowen ^  it was held that the husband, by 
his act in having the operation performed, rendered himself 
incapable of effecting consummation by reason of a structural 
defect which he had himself brought about in his organs of 
generation i.e. sterility due to inability to perform the 
sexual act is just as much sterility as sterility due to 
some physical defect or a medical operation. It is submitted 
that this view is not correct and the reason, which may be
IL
followed in cases under HMA, may be found in Lord Jowittfs 
adoption of words from Lord Stair*s^ Institutes, (of Law
1. [194-7] 2 All .E.R. 886 at p.890.
2. [19A7] 2 All.E.R. A3. There appears to be a printing
mistake in Baxter V Baxter when Lord Jowitt says that 
(at p.891) ,r... nor was it cited to the Court of Appeal 
in J V J .., Tf we find citation of J V J as [1946]
2 AT1.E7R. 760 which is citation of the report of the 
case before the Probate Division. It is presumed that 
Lord Jowitt was referring to J V J [194-73 2 All.E.R.43. 
See also L V L [1922] 38 T.L.n.(NS’) 697 acase the facts
of which are indistinguishable from those in J V J (both
were cases of sterility artificially produced~before 
marriage, but the operation had loft the husband in 
J V J able to achieve penetration and emission)*
5. T194-5] 2 AlloE.E. 197.
4. Baxter V Baxter, op»cit., p«891.
5. TTBI2T1, H t T T  "para 6 cited in Baxter V Baxter ibid.
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of Scotland)*
"So then it is not the consent to marriage, as it 
relateth to the procreation of children, that is requisite; 
for it may consist, though the woman he far beyond that 
date: but it is the consent, whereby ariseth that conjugal 
society, which may have the conjunction of bodies as well 
as of minds; as the general end of the constitution of 
marriage is the solace and satisfaction of man...".
It may, however, be noted that sterility effected 
through a medical operation, without the other spouse1 s 
consent, and without good medical reason, may amount to a 
cruel act, if it were found to have injured her health or 
to have caused reasonable apprehension of such injury. 
Consequently it may provide a ground for divorce on the 
ground of cruelty.'1'
A further word is necessary in view of two Indian 
features which may not occur to a reader of English cases. 
Firstly it is definitely in the public interest in India 
that the rate of growth of the population should be cut and 
permanent or temporary sterility in males by operation is 
encouraged. If such an operation is performed before 
marriage nullity for impotence at the instance of the wife
1. See Bravery V Bravery (C.A.) [1954-] 1 V.L.R. 1169 an& 
cases cited therein, specially Denning, L.J.*s (as he 
then was) dissenting judgment.
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must be excluded, since orgasm as such is not necessarily 
here because the operation in question does not 
prevent erectio et intromissio# Secondly, the Hindu religion 
regards marriage as a means to the birth of sons, and 
marriage without the possibility of sons or at least one 
son is offensive to Hindu ideas# In fact members of the 
Hindu public have suggested that bigamy should be rendered 
legal even under the HMA or that the HMA is unconstitutional 
in so far as it does not allow plural marriages, in cases 
where the first wife is sterile# It is not impossible that 
the modern Hindu law offends traditional sentiment in with­
holding nullity (since plural marriages are excluded, bar­
ring a change of religion) from a husband whose wife is 
sterile at the time of the marriage whilst allowing him 
nullity when her organs incurably prevent intercourse# But 
this is a by-product of the wholesale adopting of foreign 
laws by an Asian jurisdiction#
(A) Nervous and/or psychic disorders:
A marriage may be annulled on the ground of impotence 
where the respondent was incapable of sexual intercourse 
due to an invincible repugnance to the act of sexual inter­
course because of a nervous and/or psychic disorders#  ^This
1. See Porel, Sexual Question and Psychic Impotence [19353 
pp#85 and 219* See also T. Rangaswami V T. Arvindammal 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad# 243-4- al' p#'^#
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averment may be -universal or qu&d banc or bunc*
(a) Universal:
Tbe view bas been taken tbat latent incapacity,
wbicb would make tbe consummation of marriage impracticable,
arising from hysteria due to nervous affection or invincible
repugnance would amount to impotence*
1
In Wilson Y Wilson, for example, where tbe petit­
ioner showed tbat be made several attempts to consummate 
tbe marriage shortly after its performance end at various 
subsequent intervals, on each occasion tbe respondent 
evinced great aversion to tbe act of sexual intercourse *„,
and became hysterical* Tapp, J, granting a nullity decree
2
observed tbat " • •. where there is wilful wrongful refusal 
of sexual intercourse due to incapacity arising from ner­
vousness or hysteria or from an invincible repugnance to 
tbe act of consummation, thus rendering tbe consummation 
impracticable, a Court is justified in declaring such a 
marriage to be null and void on tbe ground of impotence." 
Similarly, in Kishore Sa.hu V Snebprabba Sahu, where every 
attempt of tbe husband to consummate tbe marriage immediately 
reduced tbe wife to a state of hysteria, e*g*, she bites and
1* A.I.R, 1931 Lab. 245*
2. ibid at p.246.
3. A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 185.
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kicks and cries "bitterly so that it is impossible to obtain
regards this as impotence on the part of the woman*.
(b) Impotence quoad hanc or hunc:
allegation that a respondent is impotent quoad hanc or hunc
Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Maquis, in such a form as to 
admit of no other conclusion "Quid refert, sive a natur 
rive ex accidenti" - the "accidens" here considered being 
the lack of inclination of a particular man to a particular
accidens reddat earn impossibilem"• And again: "Quacunque 
ex causa impedimentum perpetuae impotentiae consurgat,
1. A.I.R. 195-3 Nag 190.
2. Both before and after the Council of Trent, the doctrine 
of the Church admitted, and indeed enjoined nullity on 
such a ground.
3* Disputationes de sancto
Matrimonii' sacramantoir~Tl654) Book 7* vol.II, p.336t 
cited in C V C 11912]* P*399 at pp.400-401.
4. This compound verb promanfce is noted in the list of 
barbarous and unauthorized words at the end of 
Forcellini!s lexion. In the next line the sense appears 
to require alterutra See ibid., p.400.
consummation, it was held by the Court that,
In the earlier times it was uncertain whether an
2
is valid to support a decree of nullity. The law on the 
subject has been stated by Sanchez, as gathered from
woman - "impotentia promanet, ad irritandum matrimonium? 
Si vere impotentia utraque sit, im|0£diatque potestatem
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dissolvetur matrimoniuin. ea cognita, utpote quod irritum 
fruit*” ”Perpetua”, as is obvious from the context, is used 
to describe a condition in relation to a particular woman, 
subsisting, "mediis adhibitis ac experientia trienuali 
praemissa”•
(i) The origin of the doctrine:
The leading case on the question is divorce pro­
ceedings between the Lady Prances Howard, Countess of Essex, 
and Robert Earl of Essex ^  although there were circumstances 
of grave suspicion and doubts appear to have been entertained 
by the minority of the court as to the validity of a decree 
based upon the quoad hanc doctrine* The memorandum in which 
the then Archbishop expressed his doubts is so confused 
that it is impossible to ascertain whether they related to 
the facts or the law* The King said, as to doctrine of quoad 
hanc, that such defects are tricks worked by the Devil* The 
precedent, as to the King’s letter to the Archbishop, is 
the case of Abimelech who becomes frigid when he attempted
p
to enjoy Sarah, the wife of Abraham* In Countess of Essex’s
1. Cobbett's Complete Collection of: State Trials (1613) to
V o T 7 ll7  p p : 7 S 5 = S 5 ?:------------------ ----------------
2• Gen * 20 * 3•
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1
case it was alleged that, ".*. the said Earl hath had, and 
hath power and ability of body to deal with other women, 
and to know them carnally .. * that he can have no copulation
with the said Lady Prances". In this case the delegates
2deciding, that the Earl of Essex, for some secret,
incurable, binding impediment, did never carnally know, or 
was or is able carnally to know the Lady Prances Howard ..." 
declared the law to be, that impotentia coSundi in viro who­
soever, whether by natural defect, or accidental means 
whether absolute towards all, or respective to his wife 
only, if it precede matrimony, and be perpetual, is a just 
cause of Divorce a vinculo matrimonii.
This doctrine was indirectly recognised in the
zl 5
Duchess of Kingston^ case and Buryfs case,^  adopted and
S’Ea^eTlHraTsnroIT^
1# Countess of Essex Case. Cobett: / at p*786>. In Green- 
street, falsely called Cumyus V Cumyus [1812] 2 Phillium. 
ELL 10 - 161 ER 1062, although there was no allegation 
of impotence quood hanc nonetheless the marriage was 
annulled where the medical report stated that "...though 
the disease, and imperfection of the parts, was not such 
as to imply impotency to the execution of their functions; 
yet that, having heard his own accurate history of his 
alleged impotence, they [the doctors] put faith in his 
account; and as he was in good health, they could hold 
out no hopes of his impotence being remedied by any 
medical treatment."
2. Countess of Essex1 s Case cited above p, 804-.
3* ibid. . c
4-. Cobett: State Trials.£-0*1 Q ^  '
5* 5 Co-Rep. 96b = 77 E.R. 207 (ye&5S not mentioned in the 
report).
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discussed in N - R V H - e~*~ and firmly established in
2 "5 4C V C. In Duchess of Kingston1 s caser and Bury!s case it
has been stated, respectively, as if enunciating a platitude, 
that, "... the fact of a man proprer impotentiam marrying 
another woman and having children does not prove the judg­
ment false,T 1 for one may be habilis quoad hanc.1 and a 
man divorced by reason of perpetual impotency in himself 
marries again, the issue of the second marriage is legiti­
mate for "it is clear that by the divorce causa frigiditatis 
the marriage was dissolved a vinculo matrimonii, and by con-
5
sequence each of them might marry again." In N - R V M - 
Dr. Lushington discussed the matter, a decree of nullity 
was granted by reason of the husband's impotence where the 
medical inspectors reported that his impotence was not 
apparent, but that he was impotent quoad his wife. Dr. 
Lushington laid down a rule of common sense to be applied 
in such cases, when he said, "... the report of the medical 
gentlemen in this case narrows the averment to impotence 
to quood hanc. Does the rule of law do more, or rather can 
it by possibility do more? The rule of law and the report 
necessarily go on the same grounds, and no other, the non-
1. [18533 2 Rab. EGC 625 «= 163 ER 1435.
2. [1921] p.399.
3. [H7*] ^  % ^
4. 5 Go-Rep. 96b = 77 E.R. 207.
5* Cited above
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consummation after opportunity, who by possibility can say 
that such a man is necessarily impotent as to all women?
It may be so, or it may not. There can be no evidence to 
establish the affirmative, as the evidence of such cohabita­
tions is necessarily impossible. The utmost that can be said 
is, that there might be something of a guess made, by 
reason of the failuref that the probability is that a man, 
impotent quood hanc, would be impotent as to all; this 
however would be inference, not proof. Who can tell the 
physical cause of that one failure, when the man is appar­
ently without defect?
It is not until the judgment of Lord Birkenhead, 
L.C,, in C Y C ^  that we reach firm ground. The allegation 
in this case was that the respondent is incapable of con­
summating this particular marriage with this particular 
woman (i,e, the petitioner), C V G may, therefore, be read 
as deciding that an averment of impotence quoad hanc may 
be sufficient to support a decree of nullity.
The doctrine of quoad hanc or hunc may be of special 
importance under HHA., which leaves a loophole, since it 
casts no slurs, in effect, upon either spouse* An illustra­
tion as to where it might be useful has been provided by
1. C1921] P. 399-
Professor Perrett"1- in the following terms. "... spouses
who feel that their marriage is an insult to both, since
each is in love (actually or in imagination) with someone
else, may agree that "impotence" is their way out...". The
Court will look therefore very closely into the medical
history of the marriage and require the evidence of the
2spouses to be corroborated*
(ii) Illustrations of impotence quoad hanc and hunc in 
Indian cases.
The leading case on the question is S V B, a case 
under Parsi Marriage Act, where the plaintiff alleged that 
the husband was unable to consummate the marriage because 
of his general impotence, i.e., impotence as to women in 
general. This general imputation was abandoned when the 
medical inspectors found that there was no apparent defect 
in the defendant. The plaintiff, at the trial, limited her 
case to one imputing impotence only as regards copulation
1. See J.D.M. Derrett: Aspects of Matrimonial Causes in 
Modern Hindu Law [1964J Revue du sud-est asiatique,
p.2^6; Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, S 210 pp. 139-4-0.
2. See Arun V Sudhansu A.I.R. 1962 Or.65 SB - petition for 
nullity on the ground of impotence quoad hunc.
3. [1892] I.L.R. 16 Bom. 639c
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with. Tier, The delegates unanimously found that the consumma­
tion of marriage has been, and is, from natural causes 
impossible, because from the time of the marriage it was 
physically impossible for the defendant to have intercourse 
with the petitioner by reason of his impotence as regards 
her* Jardine, J, annulling the marriage (following N - R 
V M - E ~^ where Dr* Lushington, pointed out that on the 
report of the medical gentlemen the averment of impotence 
was narrowed to quoad hanc, and that proof of such limited
averment did hot amount also to proof that the man was
2
,fnecessarily impotent as to all women”,) held, on the find­
ing of the delegates, ”..."that section 28 of the Act
includes the physical defect found-”
o
The dictum in H V H , (a case under Indian Divorce 
Act) is an even clearer instance of the application of ther 
doctrine of impotence quoad hanc, where it was alleged by 
the petitioner that the husband was impotent so far as she 
is concerned, and that in fact the marriage was never con­
summated. The husband admitted that after the first fort­
night he never had intercourse with his wife because he
1. [1892] ILR 16 Bom. 639
2. ibid at p. 644-*
3* A.I.R. 1928 Bombay 279*
2 03
felt a coldness towards her, but he alleged that the marriage 
was consummated* Marten, C.J., refused to grant a decree of 
nullity, since he did not believe the wife!s story as to 
non-consummation of the marriage. The learned judge apply- 
ing C V C (where Lord Birkenhead L.C., held that a decree 
of nullity can be pronounced in a case like the present 
where, although the husband is not impotent as regards all 
women, he be regarded as impotent in fact, as regards a
p
particular woman, viz. his wife) observed that, "... we 
think there would be jurisdiction to pronounce a decree on 
the merits, provided the Court was satisfied that no inter­
course took place between the parties Similarly, in
Bull V Bull, the petitioner alleged that the respondent 
wife was incapable of consummating the marriage and stated 
that the capacity consisted of a nervous and/or psychic 
disorder and/or of an invincible repugnance in relation to 
the act of coitus, at all events in so far as the petitioner 
was concerned; a decree of nullity was refused merely due 
to petitioner^ delay in presenting the petition .McNair, J,
1. [1921] &.399.
2. H V H A„IcR„ 1928 Bom. 279 at p.280.
3. A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 684.
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I
held that, "... If the petitioner establishes the form 
of repugnance, that would in my view he sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of S.19 [of the Indian Divorce 
Act 18693 for it would apparently constitute a permanent 
physical disability
(5) Failure to consummate the marriage:
A practical disability for sexual intercourse, on
2
the part of the alleged impotent spouse, may be inferred 
under section 114 Indian Evidence Act from a failure to
consummate (distinct from wilful refusal to consummate) the 
marriage after a reasonable time. The view has been taken 
that such an inference may be drawn when after a reasonable 
time, during which the petitioner was willing, anxious and 
repeatedly urged to consummate the marriage, it is shown 
that there has been no sexual intercourse. However, no
1. A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 684.
2. S^114 provides that "the Court may presume the existence 
of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, 
regard being had to the common course of natural events, 
human conduct and public and private business; in their 
relation to the facts of the particular caseo" We must 
understand that circumstances favouring an inference
of impotence are not reasons for disability.
3. See G V G [18713 2 Pand D 287 (where theparties had 
slept together for two years and ten months but the 
wife had never permitted the husband to consummate the 
marriage because of her condition which was hysterical 
and to a certain extent beyond her control. There was
continued:
20 5
such presumption can he drawn merely from the fact that the
1wife was unwilling to live with the husband. Such inference
is readily drawn in case of a man. The reason may he found
2in Dr. Lushington1 s observations in Pollard V Wybourn,
"Here [where the woman was Virgo intacta and apta 
viro twelve years after the marriage] are the very strongest 
grounds to presume the impotency of the man. If the parties 
lay together in one hed for so many years, ... and the 
woman is certified to remain virgo Intacta, there can not 
he a stronger presumption that impotency existed, and that 
it was incurable."
no physical reason for denying intercourse. The marriage 
was annulled on the ground that the marriage would ever 
he consummated).
F V P [1896] 7s L.T.192 (where the parties slept together
but the wife habitually wrapped her night clothes and
bedding around her and absolutely refused all sexual 
intercourse). The Court inferred incapacity. See also 
B V B [1901] P.39 (wherein it was the husband who was 
adjudged impotent). See also S V B [1905] 21 T.L.R.,219 
S V S [1908] 24 T.L.R. 253; C VcT[1911] 27 T.L.R. 421;
fr V P [1911] 27 T.L.R. 429. Y'T'V [1912] P?8. (The wife
refused to live with the husband and consummate the 
marriage, impotence inferred); G V G- [1924] A.C.349 (It 
was held that the repeated and continued refusal of the 
wife to have sexual intercourse over a long period of 
time, though there was no structural incapacity, requires 
the Court to draw the inference that she does not have 
the psychological capacity to engage in the act).
1. Emmanuel Singh V Kamal Saraswati A.I.R. 1934 Pat.670.
2. TTS2BTT HoggT ECCT/72J aTT72S“= 162 E.R. 732 at 733.
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The question is: what is meant by a reasonable 
time? Is it possible to lay down a particular period? The 
answer appears to be that no hard and fast rule can be 
laid down,
i
In Coral Indira V Iswariah, for example, where the 
petitioner gave the respondent ample opportunity .. . for 
seven months and trying her best ... to induce him to have 
sexual intercourse with her, the Court passed a decree of 
nullity on the ground of impotence.
p
Similarly in S Y S , the Court did not think:, on
the facts of that particular case, that three months was
x
enough. However, in C V C, Bargrave Deane, J, was prepared 
to infer incapacity on the part of the wife, where the 
parties never lived together at all, because of her absolute
Zl
refusal to live with her husband. Whereas in F V P, there 
was one attempt made by the husband during the day time.
The wife was hysterical. They never spent a night in the 
same room,and on the facts of that particular case Bargrave 
Deane, J, was prepared to infer incapacity. The proposition 
is reinforced by Barnard, J,*s dictum in B Y B^ where
1. A.I.R, 1953 Mad. 858.
2. [1863] 3 SW and Tr. 240 = 164 E.R. 1266.
3. [1911] 27 T.L.R. 421.
4. [1911] 27 T.L.R. 429.
5. [1958] 2 All. E.R. 76.
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incapacity on the part of the husband was inferred only 
after seven days cohabitation* The learned judge observed 
that,^
"I have come to the conclusion, on the evidence 
put before me, that no amount of time would help this 
marriage to be consummated* The husband had ample time 
during the seven days of the honeymoon to consummate the 
marriage and he was unable to do it * *."
(6) Refusal to undergo medical examination and/or
treatment:
Similarly, a practical disability for sexual inter­
course may be inferred by the Court where the respondent 
refuses to undergo medical examination and/or treatment*
p
In Kanti Lai V Vimla, (a suit for dissolution of marriage 
on the ground of wifefs impotence) where the wife was 
examined by medical practitioner before the suit was filed, 
it was held that Court can draw adverse inference from her 
subsequent refusal in suit to submit for re-examination by 
the same doctor.
In some cases the Court has held it proper to grant 
an annulment on the ground of impotence where, in addition
1. [19583 2 All* E.R. 78.
2. A.I.R* 1952 Sauo 44- at pp*44-5.
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to evidence of a persistent refusal to consummate the 
marriage, it appeared that the defendant refused to submit 
to a medical examination as ordered by the Court* In W V 
it was held that the refusal of the wife to live with the 
husband and consummate the marriage coupled with her state­
ment that she will not take medical advice and with the 
fact that she declined to be medically examined pursuant
to the order of the Court, entitles the Court to infer 
2
that 1 some impediment exists pointing to incapacity on her 
part to fulfil the obligations of a wife, whatever that 
impediment or incapacity may be#u
IV* Proof of Impotence;
A petitioner is entitled to petition for a decree 
of nullity after the discovery that the respondent is 
incapable from structural malformation, or otherwise, for 
sexual intercourse upon which the Court may grant a decree 
on affirmative evidence, either proved or inferred from the 
facts (Inference dealt with above) by the petitoner# The
1. [1912] P 78*
2. ibid at p
See also B V B [1901] P 39 (wherein it was the hushand 
who was adjudged to he impotent); S V B  [1905] 21 T.L.R. 
219; S V S [1908] 24 T.L.R. 253; C‘T"C"[1911] 27 T.L.R. 
421; O H  C19113 27 T.L.R. 429.
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question is: what is the media and standard of proof in 
such a case?
(1) Media of proof:
Impotence nay either be proved by medical examina­
tion of the parties or by examination of the parties as 
witnesses•
(i) Medical examination:
The Courts have a wide discretion in ordering 
physical examination of the party alleged to be impotent.
The practice of the ecclesiastical Courts was to make 
mandatory orders for medical examination by doctors appointed 
by the Court* These orders are still made, under Matrimonial 
Causes Rules, 1950, in nullity suits on the ground of in­
capacity. However, as we have seen a refusal to undergo 
such an examination would give rise to an inference of 
impotence (see pal°^ above).
The general rule is that impotence may be established 
by the medical examination of the parties. However, the 
certificate of a doctor is not conclusive in itself. The 
certificate of the doctor, who examined either or both the 
parties, must be atrictly proved and the doctor must con-
p
vince the Court as to correctness of his conclusions.
1.^p, y. < A c x " v J7 ^ 6
2. Coral Indira V Iswariah 1953 Mad. 858; T. Rangaswami1 s 
case 195? Mad. 245 at 299.
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(ii) Examination of the parties as witnesses:
The question arose: what is the effect of admissions 
by the respondent? Is corroboration required?
(a) Effect of admissions:
The Court would act on the admissions of the respon­
dent and the party is not obliged to lead other evidence to 
establish the facts admitted, unless the litigation is 
collusive. The admissions may be ignored, as observed by the 
Supreme Court in Mahandra V Sushila"on the grounds of 
prudence only*1 (As value of admissions see p^'SH^ below 
under concealed-pregnancy) ,
(b) Corroboration:
The question was considered by !Lord Penzance in
2
U V J, where, on the general point as to kind of corrobora-
*
tion required, the learned judge said,
"to pronounce a marriage invalid on the unsupported 
Oath of the party who seeks to be relieved from its obliga­
tions is a serious matter, within the province of the Court, 
no doubt but only to be done when the last trace of reason­
able doubt as to the truth and bona fides of the case has 
been removed. If there be a direct conflict of testimony
1. C1964] Bom. L.E. at p.
2. [1868] L.R. 1 P.D. 460.
3. ibid 461.
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“between the two parties who alone know the truth, • .. the 
difficulties are much increased.”
It is clear from this judgment that corroboration 
may not be essential, but it is required whenever there is 
the slightest suspicion of collusion* Singleton, L.J., in 
Hodgkins V Hodgkins1 (C.A,) observed, as to corroboration, 
that ” *. * in a case of this nature corroboration is not 
essential* At the same time every judge looks for corrobora­
tion* If there be no corroboration * .. then the judge will 
exercise even greater care than he normally does to make 
sure that the case is proved before granting the relief
p
which is prayed.” Similarly, Ramaswami, J, laid down that 
,feven uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner is suffic­
ient if it can be believed* In cases of this nature, corrob­
oration can only be obtained from the evidence of the other 
party to the marriage.”
The dictum of Ramaswami, J, in T. Rangaswami V T. 
Arvindammal, it is submitted, is not quite correct for the
1. £1950] 1 All. E.R. 619 at 622.
2. T. Rangaswami V T. Arvindammal A.I.R* 1 as 7 Mad, 24*3 at
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evidence of impotence from other sources is possibleHow< 
ever, it is submitted that, Ramaswami, J,!s observation 
"... even uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner is 
sufficient if it can be believed . * .M may be taken as 
implying that such testimony is sufficient where there is 
no suspicion of collusion.
r x) S~kan(3-a:i?d- of proof:
^  There is no minimum standard of proof. The proof 
must be, as used to be expressed in the Ecclesiastical
Courts in England, not suspicio probablis but has to be
2 3Vehemens proesumptio. The view that^ "since there is a
strong presumption in favour of the validity of a marriage
1. T. Rangaswami V T. Arvindamma A.I.R. 1957 Mad 24-3* at 
249 following Kishore feabu V Snehpraleta, A.I.R. 1943 
Nag. 185 (it was observed "The conduct of the parties 
subsequent to the marriage would be important? Did they 
speak of the impotency to anybody? was it mentioned to 
any friend or relation or to their parents? If not, why 
not? Would it be natural not to do so? or was there no 
opportunity? It would not be natural for every body to 
speak these matters to another. A reserved or shy or 
reticent person would not.On the other hand, other types 
almost certainly would whether the parties to the case 
fall within the one class or the other, it is for the 
trial judge to discover).
2. T. Rangaswami VI, Arvindammal, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. at p.
3. See kayden on Divorce at p.llS.
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the Court requires to he satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that a spouse whose impotence is alleged was at the time 
of the marriage and has been thereafter incapable of con­
summating it," must not be taken as an indication that 
proof of impotence is to be regarded on the same footing 
as proof for quasi-criminal offence* "Proof beyond reason­
able doubt", it is submitted, is a reasonable conclusion 
based on fair inferences which would "satisfy" a prudent 
man, i.e*, the judge, that the respondent is and has been 
impotent (as to a discussion of standard of proof see 
below
factors Limiting jurisdiction:
A decree of nullity may be refused due to lack of 
sincerity of the petitioner or where the marriage has been 
approbated by the petitioner.^ A decree may also be refused
if the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion
2with the respondent. Similarly, a decree may be refused 
where the petitioner is taking^of his or her own disability.
(1) Sincerity or approbation:
Q.| ’
The term sincerity, which has been considered, by
1. Se23(e)
2. S.23(d)
3. S.23(a)
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Lord Bramwell^ as "a most remarkable expression, a curious
word”, appears to have been derived from a dictum of Sir
2
William Scott in Briggs V Morgan where he observed that, 
”... there are, however, rules adapted to cases brought 
forward with sincere motives..,”.
The question of ’’sincerity”, in spite of Lord
X
Selborne, L.C.*s view that^ ’’[sincerity] suggest a psycho­
logical question rather than one of law or fact, diving 
into the motives of a personfs mind rather than trying 
whether a cause of action exists or not...”, has a special 
and limited meaning and is to be confined to the sincerity
IL
of the plea and, in the words of Langton, J, ”... has 
nothing whatever to do with either (a) the general character 
of the petitioner as a sincere person, or (b) the conduct 
of the petitioner before [his or] her marriage or the 
motives which prompted [him or] her to enter into the 
marriage•”
The limitation upon the ordinary meaning of the
word ’’sincerity” was defined by Langton, J, in Nash V Nash
5
in the following terms
1, G Y M  (P.O.) [1885] 10 AC. 171 at p.201.
2. [1820] 2 Hog. Con. 524 at 530 = 161 E.R. 758 at 760.
5. G VfQfl Cited above &  at 186.
4. Sash V Nash [1940] 1 All. E.R. 206 at 209.
5. 1 W “ F “2T4.
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"The petitioner must be sincere in the sense of 
not having wavered in [his or] her view as to the action 
[he or] she would take to assert [his or] her rights after 
[he or] she attained full knowledge of the facts and the 
law concerning those rights. The Court will not allow a 
petitioner, after attaining such knowledge, to approbate 
the contract of marriage and obtain rights and benefits 
thereunder for a term of years and then subsequently repro­
bate the contract and claim that it is void upon the strength 
of those very rights which [he or] she had long elected to 
ignore” i.e., there must be no other motive on the part of 
the petitioner than a desire to obtain redress for a griev­
ance really entertained.
(b) Approbation:
The general principle appears to be that ”... 
there may be conduct on the part of the person seeking this 
remedy which ought to stop that person from having it; as 
for instance, any act from which the inference ought to be 
drawn that during the antecedent time the party has, with 
a knowledge of the facts and of the law, approbated the 
marriage which he or she afterwards seeks to get rid of, or
lo Cv. \o <vc- \-\\ cOr \g(>
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has taken advantages and derived benefits from the matri­
monial relation which it would he unfair or inequitable to 
permit him or her, after having received them, to treat as 
if no such relation had ever existed."
The expressions "sincerity" and "approbation" both 
apparently moj£r^  the same thing, i.e. that the petitioner 
has approved the marriage.** This is all very relevant to 
Indian conditions, under which matrimonial proceedings are 
often started to further a family quarrel and grounds are 
raked up if not invented, and the injuries or complaints 
in fact have long been condoned or winked at.
(c) Test:
The test to be applied in such cases has been laid
2down by Evershed, M.R.,
"Has the husband or wife (as the case may be) by 
conduct or overt acts consistent only with such affirmation 
approbated the existence and validity of the particular 
marriage, whatever may be its particular attributes?"
(i) By conduct:
(a) In R V R ^  the wife respondent suffered from an
1. See D. Lasok: "Approbation of Marriage and Validation" 
[19633 26 Mad. L.R.' 2^9 at 250.
2. V V W (C.A.) 1952 All.E.R. 858 at p. 862-63.
3. LNovember l4, 1934-3 unreported case cited in Latey on 
Divorce, p.202.
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incurable defect - a thick membrane which prevented penetra­
tion for more than one-and-a-half inches. Sir Boyad Merriman, 
P, however, was satisfied that prior to the marriage on 
frequent occasions the husband had such incomplete inter­
course as was possible and married the wife knowing well 
that there was a physical obstruction. After the marriage 
the wife underwent medical examination and the husband was 
appraised of the full position, but expressed himself quite 
content to go on with the marriage notwithstanding. That 
form of sexual relation went on for over three years, and 
there was medical evidence that the membrane had been 
stretched to some extent. The President, basing himself on 
the principle enunciated by Lord Selborne in G V M, dis­
missed the petition, and his decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal,*1'
Cb) Acceptance of Material benefits;
A petitioner may be estopped from asserting that 
the marriage is voidable if the petitioner/^with the 
knowledge of the facts and law, material benefits to which 
he or she would be entitled only on the assumption that the
p
marriage is valid.
1, [February 25> 19553 unreported case cited in Latey on
Divorce, po202, w O
2. ^  \* <V£- C '
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In Tindall V Tindall,^  the wife, after stating that 
she proposed to commence nullity proceedings on the ground 
of her husbandfs impotence, unsuccessfully took proceedings 
against him in a magistrates Court, charging him with 
desertion and persistent cruelty. She then appealed to the 
Divisional Court and obtained an order that the husband 
should pay £15 into court as security for the costs of the
p
appeal, Singleton, L.J., thought that, n... the application 
that the husband should lodge £15 security for the costs 
of the wife!s appeal to the Divisional Court, coupled with 
his doing so, may be said to be a pecuniary benefit to her 
••, which ought to estop her from subsequently asking for 
a decree of nullity,”
(ii) By overt acts:
Strong evidence will be required to rebut inference 
of approbation of the marriage where the petitioner has 
either submitted to artificial insemination treatment and/or 
adopted a child provided the petitioner had had sufficient 
knowledge of the facts and the law when she had the insemin­
ation treatment and/or adopted the child. Similarly, an 
inference may be drawn where the petitioner husband or the
1* C1953] 1 All. E.R, 159.
2. ibid at p,144-.
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wife continues to live with the respondent for a consider­
able period of time in such circumstances.
(a) Artificial insemination:
The leading case on the topic is L V L (also known
as R.E.L. V E.h.^  in which the petitioner was the wife and
the incapacity was on the husband’s side. The wife was 
anxious to have a child and discussed artificial insemination 
with the husband. She was artificially inseminated from 
husband, but she had no success. However, she continued her 
attempts to inseminate herself artificially from the 
husband. There were further ineffective attempts to consum­
mate the marriage, and the wife urged the husband, to undergo 
psychological treatment, which he did. However, the treat­
ment did not make the efforts to consummate any more 
effective than they had ^
husband had taken steps, by consulting a doctor, to try to 
improve his condition but without success. The wife had 
been artificially inseminated from her husband1 s seed, and 
at the time she presented her petition, though she did not 
then know it, she was pregnant as a result of the insemina­
tion. The argument for the husband was that the act plus
£.l*[194-9] 1 All. E.R. 141.
90:119^-81 p.m.11.
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the consequence of the artificial insemination amounted to 
such approbation of the marriage on the wife*s part that 
it would be wrong and unconscionable and against public 
policy for her now to be heard to say that the marriage 
should be annulled# It appeared that throughout the period 
the wife had written making it plain beyond a peradventure 
that, for her, normal sexual intercourse was an essential 
condition to the marriage# It also appeared that the wife!s 
dominant motive in conceiving the child was the hope that 
the advent of a child might help her and her husband to 
have normal sexual intercourse# Pearce, J,^ annulled the 
marriage because he thought that "... she never intended 
to approbate an abnormal marriage" (i#e# the petitioner 
intended subjectively to affirm or acquiesce in an abnormal 
marriage)# The question is: whether in view of the test 
laid down by Evershed, M#R#, L V L is of doubtful authority# 
It is submitted that formula adopted in L V L (i#e#, "intend­
ing to approbate an abnormal marriage) must be regarded as 
unsatisfactory because the "overt acts on the part of the 
wife would appear consistent with approbation of the 
marriage# However, on its particular fhcts, L V L may be 
supported because the consistent and clear expression by
1# [194-93 1 All. E*R, 141 at p#145
221
the wife or her insistence on normal physical relations 
affected and qualified the nature of, and the true inter­
pretation to "be given to, the act and consequence of the 
artificial insemination relied on as constituting approbation,? 
In Slater V Slater (CoA*)'L where the marriage was never 
consummated owing to the husband1 s incapacity the wife 
underwent treatment by way of artificial insemination from
a donor other than the husband. The wife was granted a 
decree on the ground that during the time of the treatment 
by way of artificial insemination the wife did not have a 
sufficient knowledge that the law provided a remedy, i©e,, 
if she had had sufficient knowledge of the law when she had 
the insemination treatment it might have amounted to appro­
bation of the marriage (as to adoption see below )•
(b) Adoption of children:
The leading case on the question is: W V W (C,A.) 
where on the suggestion of the peitioner, after he realised 
his wife1s incapacity to consummate the marriage, there had 
been the adoption of the two children, the first of whom 
had died before the adoption of the second. The Court 
(Evershed, M.R., Jenkins, L.J, and Hodson, L.J.) were of the
1. C19533 1 All. E.Ro 246 
•Sb e ^
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opinion that the petitioner knew hoth the facts and the law,
and that, in view of all the circumstances, (i.e., that the
husband initiated the adoption in the hope that the wife
would overcome her repugnance to intercourse) there was
approbation of the marriage, and the petitioner was held not
to be entitled to a decree of nullity. The principle is
2
succinctly stated by Jenkins, L*!.,
,TThe adoption of a child *. ♦ is a solemn act which 
involves a representation to the Court in the case of joint 
adopters that the joint adopters are husband and wife. On 
that representation ... the Court will make an order xtfhich 
transfers the adopted child from the legal protection of 
its natural parents to the legal protection of its statutory 
parents, as the adopters by force of the order in effect 
became .... It seems to me difficult to imagine any act by 
two spouses which could more clearly affirm the existence 
and validity of their marriage." Similarly, in Slater V 
Slater^(C.A. ), as we have seen (p. above) the marriage 
was not consummated due to the husband!s incapacity. The 
parties took to live with them, in the same month in which 
the wife underwent treatment by way of artificial insemination
la [1952] 1 All. E.R. 858.
2. ibid at p.864.
3. [19533 1 All. E.R. 246.
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a ‘boy aged two years with, a view to adopting him* In course 
of time an adoption order was duly made and the artificial 
insemination treatment ceased* However, the wife took legal 
advice and was informed that, if she could prove the 
husband fs impotence, there was available to her the remedy 
of nullity* Karminski, J, although satisfied that the 
incapacity was proved, arrived at the conclusion that the 
wife by her actions had approbated the marriage, and that, 
therefore, she was not entitled to the relief sought* How­
ever, the Court of Appeal granted a decree of nullity to 
the wife on the ground that the wife did not have 
sufficient knowledge of the law when she adopted the child. 
Singleton, L.J*, observed that,
"... All the circumstances must be examined to 
determine whether there has been approbation of the marriage 
so that it is inequitable or against public policy that the 
petition should be granted* The matters on which the most 
reliance was placed were the adoption of the child and the 
artificial insemination treatment of the wife* Both those 
took place before the wife had knowledge that she had any 
remedy. So far as I can see, there is nothing which occurred 
after she had that (somewhat hazy) knowledge which counts 
either way*n
__53*
U  [1953] 1 All. E.R. (^8.
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For India the argument that the wife did not know 
the law is likely to he important* Ladies are commonly 
ignorant of their ordinary legal rights let alone the 
technicalities. Solicitors are seldom consulted by ladies 
direct and their knowledge is seldom as good as that of 
their relations (may or may not advise them honestly.
Mere delay in presenting the poit^ton, if it can 
be satisfactorily explained, may not necessarily bar the 
remedy. However, if the petitioner, knowing that he can 
obtain a decree of nullity, continues to live with the 
respondent wife or the husband for a considerable length of 
time, this may amount to approbation, e.g. in Scott V Scott} 
where the husband had been content with a marriage without 
sexual intercourse for some five years and now sought relief 
in order to marry another woman, the Court held that he
p
could not obtain a decree. However, in G V 0 a decree was
1. C1959] 1 All. E.R. 531.
2. [I960] 3 All. E.R. 56. See also Clifford V Clifford 
(C.A.) [194-8] 1 All.E.R. 394- (where the parties cohabited 
for 17 years and the husband used every proper means to 
overcome his wife's aversion to the sexual act. There 
was a delay of some 36 years in presenting the petition. 
The delay of 9 years was due to his saving up so that he 
would have enough money to commence the proceedings. 
However, he also had a further reason for doing so as the
continued:
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granted after twelve years during which tine the husband 
never expressed satisfaction with the marriage and wished 
the wife to have an operation which would have enabled her 
to consummate it. The distinction between Scott V Scott and 
G V G is subtle. In the former case the husband was asking 
for a decree due to collateral motives* i.e.* to marry 
another woman, whereas in the latter the husband, insisting 
that the wife should have the operation, never had approbated 
the marriage.
(3) Collusion:
Collusion may be defined as the presenting or 
prosecution of a nullity petition by a bargain or agreement 
between the parties as their agents, to pervert the course 
of justice, whereby the true facts are hidden or facts 
pretended, if not invented, for a purpose of securing a 
nullity decree.^" Obvious examples are where the petitioner 
pays the respondent not to defend the petition, or where the
time, e.g., that he would be retiring in three or four 
years time and would not then be in a position to keep 
both himself and the respondents The Court held that he 
had never approbated the marriage. The delay of 17 years 
was reasonably explicable on the grounds that the 
husband was still seeking to achieve consummation, and 
the further period of nine years was also, explained by 
his having to save up to bring the petition*
1. Rayden on Divorce 240; Latey on Divorce p. 141; Lowndes V 
Lowndes [1950] 1 All.E.R. 999.
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respondent agrees with the petitioner to co-operatefjf where 
the nullity is sought on the ground of impotence quoad 
hanc or hunc,
(4) Taking advantage of his or her own disability;
The question is: whether an impotent spouse could 
plead his or her own impotence as a ground for obtaining 
a nullity decree? It appears that an impotent spouse could 
not plead his or her own impotence as a ground for obtaining 
a decree of nullity if the petitioner himself is aware 
of his or her own impotence and knowingly deceives the other 
spouse into contracting marriage, or if, at the time of the 
ceremony, he or she knew that the respondent was impotent. 
Similarly, it may be unjust in the particular circumstances
of the case that the impotent spouse be granted a decree on
2the ground of his own impotence,
(i) Where the petitioner knowingly deceives the other 
spouse:
It is self evident that it would cover a case where 
the petitioner is aware of his own impotence at the time of 
the marriage and is found to have deceived the respondent
1, Emanuel Emanuel [1946] P,115o
2, See Harthan V, Harthan [1948] 2 A11,E,R, 639 &t 644 (C,A,)*
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into the marriage.
(ii) Where the petitioner knew that the respondent 
was impotent:
Similarly^ this covers a case where a person enters
into a marriage with a person who is so crippled that he or
she realises that sexual intercourse will he impossible. In
such a case, however, if the petitioner founded his or her
claim to the relief on the respondents impotence as opposed
to his or her own, it is submitted that, he or she would be
refused relief on the ground that he had approbated the 
1marriage.
(iii) where it may be untjust:
The test as to what may be unjust was laid down by
p
the Court of Appeal in Pettit V. Pettit: whether in the
particular circumstances of the case it would be unfair and 
inequitable to grant relief.
In Pettit V. Pettit-^ the husband and wife cohabited 
for about twenty years during which the husband made several 
attempts to have intercourse, but without success* However, 
a child was born as a result of fecundatio ab extra. The 
husband fell in love with another woman. Notwithstanding
1. See J Vo J [19473 2 All .E.R. 4-3 (C.A.). ^ _
2. [1962J 2 All .E.R. 37 (G.A.) <*V» S-ocV.
3# ibid.
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this, the wife did her test to persuade the husband to 
remain with his family, but without success* Later the 
husband learned for the first time that he could, as a 
matter of law* file a nullity petition and he accordingly 
did so. Davies, L.J., applying Harthan V. Harthan^ thought 
that in a case such as this the Court must look at the whole 
of the circumstances, including the wifefs attitude and re­
action to the situation created by the husband*s impotence, 
in order to see whether it was just and equitable to grant 
the husband a decree against a wife in no way responsible 
for the non-consummation.
VI. Impotence in Kenya and Uganda Law:
A marriage may be annulled on the ground of impot- 
2 3ence, under the Kenya and Uganda-' law, respectively, where 
"either party was permanently impotent, or incapable of 
consummating the marriage, at the time of the marriage" and 
"the respondent was permanently impotent at the time of the 
marriage•"
1. [194-8] 2 AlloE.R.639 (C.A.) (In Harthan V. Harthan, the 
husband, who had been unable to consummate his marriage 
was held to be entitled to succeed. In Harthan1s case the 
petitioner had not known of his defect until after the 
celebration of the marriage. Similarly, the petitioner’ 
had not deceived the respondent about his condition)•
2. Cap. 157*8.11(1)(b)(i) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance I960.
3. Cap.112. S.13(1)(a) The Laws of the Uganda Protectorate 
Vol.Ill, p.154-7*
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The terms permanently Impotent” and "incapable of 
consummating the marriage" would mean, as under HMA, a 
practical disability for sexual intercourse due to some 
malformation and/or invincible repugnance to the act of 
sexual intercourse generally or quoad hanc or hunc due to 
nervous and/or psychic disorder either proved as a fact or 
inferred from the conduct of the alleged impotent spouse.
It is submitted that general principles, as to 
impotence, applicable to a case under HMA may be equally 
applied to a case under Kenya and Uganda Ordinance*
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CHAPTER V 
"MENTAL INCAPACITYn
I• Introduction:
A marriage may be annulled, under HMA, on the ground
that either party was at the time of the marriage an idiot
or a lunatic. The expressions used in parallel provisions 
2 3of the Kenya and Uganda^ law are, respectively, "of un­
sound mind or subject to recurrent fits of insanity or 
epilepsy" and "lunatic and idiot".
The provisions of HMA seem to have been based on, 
section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and closely 
resembles with the parallel provisions of the Uganda law, 
whereas the provisions of the Kenya Ordinance appear to 
have been based on the [English] Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950?^ section 8(1)(a)(b) reenacting section 7(1)Cb) of the
1. S.12 read with S.5(ii)*
2. Cap. 157* S.ll(b)(ii). The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance. I960.
3. Cap. 112, S.13 (l)(c)o The Laws of the Uganda Protector­
ate [1951] Vol.Ill, p. 154-7*
4*. MCA, S.8(l)(b) 1950, provides as follows: "...that either 
party to the marriage was at the time of the marriage of 
unsound mind or [was then suffering from mental dis­
order within the meaning of the Mental Health Act, 1959 
of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfitted for 
marriage and the procreation of children], or subject to 
recurrent [attacks] of insanity or epilepsy". N.B. The 
words in square brackets were substituted by the Mental 
Health Act 1959) Sched.7*
continued:
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Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937«
Since after, and not seldom because of, marriage 
one or even both, spouses may develop acute nervous or mental 
disorders, such as^ anxiety-,-neurosis, hallucina­
tions, delusions, and other maniacal symptoms, particularly, 
schizophrenia (now more readily recognised than in former 
years); and since the symptoms, their recurrence, duration, 
and severity might not offer grounds for divorce; it may be 
desirable to consider whether want of capacity to marry 
existed at the time of the marriage. Evidence of mental 
derangement after marriage may be sought to be used to upset 
the marriage itself. Therefore the accurate definition of 
ground for nullity for want of mental capacity is highly 
desirable. The position, as we shall see, is far from
1. See also S.7 of [New York] Domestic Relations Law cited 
in Grossman, New York Law of Domestic Relations S 85 at 
p.53* As to ,Tmental incapacity in "nullity" generally 
see, S.V. Gupte, Hindu Marriage Act, pp.108-110, 185-86; 
P.V. Deokelkar, The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? PP*37-40, 
96-7* D.H. Chaudhry, flhe Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? pp.83- 
4, 206-7; J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Bodern Hindu 
Law, pp .153-56, 188-89? D . K. Mull a, Principle s of The. EH r>du 
Law, p.802, 845* T.P. Gopala Krishna, Codified
Hindu Law, pp. 112-14, T.P, Gopalakrishna, Hindu
Marriage Law, 94-95; Shiv Gopal, The Hindu Code,
pp.322-3? 343-45; Dr. Gy an Prakash, The Hindu Code ,276:313: 
A jit Gopal, Commentary on Hindu Law (Past and Present)p.100 
See also J. Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of (101 
Marriage, pp.186-89; American Jurisprudence, vol.35? 
pp•242-535 American Jurisprudence 2d. vol.4, pp.458-60; 
McCurdy, W.E., "Insanity as a Ground for Annulment or 
Divorce in English and American Law, printed in Selected 
Essays on Family Law, published by The Association of 
Amerlcam taw School♦
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satisfactory so far as the actual verbal framework of the 
law goes* But there is no evidence that up to now any in­
justice has resulted, at least so far as post-1955 Hindu 
law is concerned*
The pre-1955 Hindu law recognised the validity of
the marriage of an idiot or a lunatic, on the footing that
1 2 marriage was a samskara * The objection to this position
in part facilitates the abolition of the ancient rule, but
only to the extent of making marriages voidable, for mental
incapacity.
Mr. Gupte^ asks: "Will such a marriage [i.e. of an 
idiot or a lunatic] be voidable and annulled by the Court 
if the person who was a lunatic or idiot at the time of 
the marriage has ceased to be so at the time of the filing 
of the petition or at the date of the hearing of the peti­
tion?" It is submitted that in such a case, if the idiot or 
the lunatic spouse consents to the marriage, the marriage 
may not be annulled for as has been observed by Professor
lL
Derrett, it would be against public policy to annul such
1* Venkatacharyulu V Rangacharyulu [1890] 14. Mad. 316,518; 
Bhagwati V ParmesWari [194-2] All. 518,589-90; 
Amirthammai V Vallimayil Ammal [1942] Mad. 807 P.B.
2. Mayne: Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 10th ed» 153; 
Derrett: "Nullity in Hindu Law of Marriage" [1952]
54 Bom. L. R*117e 
3* Hindu Marriage Act, pp.185-86.
^• Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, pp.188-89 at p.l89«
£>ee J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment of Marriage, 
80-81, and cases cited therein.
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a marriage.
II. Meaning of "idiot", "lunatic”, "of unsound mind”etc.
The fact that these expressions have not heen de­
fined by the respective statutes in which they are used may 
create confusion and difficulties. Thus we must explore the 
different possibilities in order to explain the different 
expressions.
(1) "Idiot"
The term "idiot” has been defined in a variety of 
ways. As with other terms in our contexi it is not merely 
an English but a "Hindu Law" definition which is to be 
sought. The dictionary^ defines it as "A person so deficient 
in mental or intellectual faculty as to be incapable of 
ordinary acts of reasoning or rational conduct# Applied to 
one permanently so afflicted, as distinguished from one who 
is temporarily insane, or fout of his wits1, and who either 
has lucid intervals, or may be expected to recover his 
reason." An idiot or fool natural is a person who from
his birth, by a perpetual or incurable infirmity, is of
2unsound mind."
The Mitakshara ^  defines the Sanskrit jada^ (an idiot)
1. Murray: A New English Dictionary, vol.5? P*21 at p.22.
2. Earl Jowitt: The Dictionary of English Law, p. 934-#
3° Ch* II, S.10, para.2. (Oolebrook* s trans.)
4-. At Ya(jn II, 14-1.
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as, "a person deprived of the internal faculty; meaning
incapable of discriminating right from wrong”. Coke^and 
2
Blackstone defined it, respectively, as, "he which from 
his nativitie, by a perpetual infirmitive is non-compos 
mentis” and ”a person without any glimmering of reason" ♦ 
Whereas Macnaghten defines an idiot as "A person deprived 
of internal faculty, meaning one incapable of discriminating”
IL
”A person not susceptible of instruction”; "one who can 
not support the performance of duties” ^  "devoid of know­
ledge of himself, and one whose mental faculties are
imbeciled;” "one who is incompetent to judge between what
7
is beneficial and mischievous”.f
8 9Professor Derrett and Deoalkar' define an idiot,
respectively, as "... an idiot is congenitally incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong" and "... of unsound
mind since his birth without lucid intervals ... A person
1. Institutes of the Laws of England revised by E. Hargrave 
etc. vol.2, S.403, 246b, 247a.
2. Commentaries on the Laws of England L7th Edn.] vol.I,p.304
3. W.H. Macnaghten: Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law, 
vol.II, p. 135* (cited in lirumaanagal V Kamaswami L1861- 
633 1 MHCR 214).
4. ibid Citing Jimutavahara. 
ibid Citing Raghunandara.
5. ibid Citing Chandevara.
6. "The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955”, P#37»
7. ibid Citing Misra.
8. Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.153.
9. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, P*37*
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who has no understanding or reasoning, and who is unable
to protect his own interests...”
The expression "idiot” in addition to the above
definitions has been defined in various cases. In Munishwar
2
Putt V Indrakumari% Tekchand, J, defined an idiot as,
" a person who is destitute of intellectual power
whether the incapacity is congenital or developmental or
accidental. It consists in total want of reason", Similarly
*
in Tirumamogal V Ramaswami, Holloway, J, observed, "we are 
fully satisfied that an idiot in Hindu law is one of un­
sound and inbecile mind who has been so from the birth", 
Sulaiman, J,^ (observing that, "We are not bound by the 
definition of an "idiot" as found in medical literature,
1, See also Shiv, Gopal, The Hindu Code, at p,343* ("In its 
ordinary significance the word 'idiot1 means a person 
deficient in mental or intellectual faculty as to be in­
capable of ordinary acts or reasoning or rational con­
duct " );
P.F. Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, p,845 ("In the 
present context it means a person so deficient in mind 
as to be permanently incapable of rational conduct...
An idiot is one born without any glimmering of reason,
D,H, Chaudry, The^Hindu Marriage^Act, 1955> p»206. ("An 
idiot is one who is' of unsound mind from the birth with­
out lucid intervals"); S.V. Gupta, Hindu Law of 
Marriage, p,109* (defines idiot, Citing Concise Oxford 
Dictionary;, as "...one who is so deficient in mind as 
to be permanently incapable of rational conduct"),
2, AoI.R. 1963 FU 449 at p,458.
3, [18633 1 MHCR 214,
4, Mt, Title V Alfred Robert Jones A.I.R. 1934 All.273*
See p. 264'.
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we have to read the word ‘idiot*, used in section 19*
Divorce Act, as a word used in its ordinary significance)9
explained the word "idiot" as, "one can not "be an idiot
unless his faculties have not at all been developed and he
has not acquired any appreciable intelligenceIn R, Muth-
ammal V Sri Subramaniaswami']' Hidayatullah, J, considered
a person as insane who appeared to be a moody, silent,
gloomy and sickly person with a vacant look, who was unable
to answer even the simple question about his name. It is
interesting to note that the [English] Mental Deficiency 
2Act, 1927* defines idiots as "persons in whose cafe there 
exists mental defectiveness of such a degree that they are 
unable to guard themselves against common physical dangers"; 
but this would, it appears, be too narrow a test for the 
purposes of Hindu law.
(2) "Lunatic"
The expression "lunatic" like "idiot" is defined in
3
different ways. The dictionary meaning of lunatic is "a 
person of unsound mind, a mad man". Derrett and Deokalkar ^  
define it, respectively, as "... one whose mental faculties
1. A.I.R. I960. S.C. 601, see p.608.
2 . S«1.
3. Murray: A New English Dictionary, Vol.VI, part (i) p*502.
4. Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 154-•
5. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1^55* P»37»
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are totally, though not necessarily incurably, wanting”,
and "... insane ... a person who has lost the use of his
reason by disease, grief or accident...” whereas Raghuvach- 
1 2ariar and Mulla define it, respectively, in the following 
terms, "In the case of a lunatic there is a mental eclipse 
which supervenes in a normal man due to various causes 
which makes him incapable of judging between right and 
wrong” and ”... one that had understanding but has tempor­
arily or permanently lost use of reason by diseaso, grief 
or other cause.
The HMA is framed in such terms as emphatically to 
suggest that Parliament understood by ”idiot” and "lunatic” 
two different grounds of incapacity to marry; yet the 
question remains: whether the expression "lunatic” can be 
used synonymously to comprehend both "idiot” and "lunatic”?
The answer is not easy to state. There are state- 
ments, on the one hand, in Hunishwar Putt V IndraKumari
lL
and Weinberg V Weinberg, to the effect that the term 
lunatic and lunacy include every kind of unsoundness of 
mind except idiocy. On the other, we find that "lunatic”,
1. Hindu Law. Principles and Precedents, p.
2. Principles of Hindu Law, 12th Edn. p.84-5.
3. A.I.R.19S3,Ftl.44-9 at p.453.
4. [1938] 8 N.Y.Sp 2d. 341 at p.344.
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according to the Indian Lunacy Act1 as likewise the English
p
Lunacy Act, means 1 an idiot or person of unsound mind"*
The confusion arises due to use of quaint language 
and it is submitted that modern terminology should be 
introduced into the nullity legislation.
However, it is submitted that the expressions 
"idiot" and "lunatic" are not interchangeable for a serious 
distinction has always been recognised between a lunatic 
and an idiot* The one might have a lucid interval; the 
others no power of mind whatever. It is relevant to add 
that lunacy being a disqualification at Hindu law from in­
heriting, sharing at a partition, giving and taking in 
adoption and some other acts of legal significance the law 
has been obliged to define the term closely and the question 
has arisen whether lunacy must be congenital in order to 
operate as a bar. No such discussion has ever arisen in the 
case of idiocy which at Hindu law has been (as we have seen 
from the reference to the Hitakshara above) an independent 
and additional disqualification.
1. [1912] 3(S).
2. [1870] S.90.
3. See Weinberg V Weinberg [1938] 8 N.Y.S. 2d. 34*1 at 344-; 
Hunishwari Butt V In&rakumari A.I.R, 1963> PU 44-9 at
p.4-53.
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(3) "Of unsound mind or subject to recurrent fits of 
insanity or epilepsy”.
It is not always safe to attempt to define a phrase 
such. as. the phrase ”of unsound mind,*.’’, as Sir Boyod 
Merriman, P, pointed out in Randall V Randall'*' (and followed
p
Mr. Commissioner Latey, Q.C., in Lock V Lock) there is a 
great risk that in attempting to define the words used by 
Parliament fresh difficulties will be created; the result 
may be to make confusion worse confounded. Admittedly, no 
distinction is to be drawn, according to the view of Sir 
Boyd Merriman, P, expressed in Smith V Smith, between the 
phrase ’unsoundness of mind” on the one hand and the word 
’’insanity” on the other. However, it is submitted that, the 
use of the word ’’fit”, though apt in connection with epilepsy, 
is not suitable in connection with insanity for unsoundness 
of mind is specified as being a ground, if it exists at the 
time of the marriage, while the word ’’insanity” is here used 
in connection with being subject to recurrent fits of 
insanity.
IL
The meaning of "insanity", according to the
1. [1939] Pd31 at 137.
2. [1958] 3 All. E.R, 472.
3o [1940] P. 179 at p.181.
4. Murray: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol.I,
p.1013#
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dictionary, is, "the condition of being insane; or unsound-
ness of mind as a consequence of brain disease; madness,
1
lunacy"; and "insane" is defined as being "not of sound
o
mind"* It is not certain, according to Merriman, P, ^ why 
the one phrase is used in one part of the section, and the 
other phrase in the other# Now to consider the phrase,
"subject to recurrent fits of insanity", the word "fit"^ is 
defined as "paroxysm, a sudden and severe, but transitory 
attack of illness, spec* a paroxysm of lunacy" whereas 
"paroxysm" ^  is defined as (in pathology) an increaseness of 
the acuteness of severity of a disease usually recurring 
periodically in its course". Thus it means that the respon­
dent was subject to an increase of the acuteness or severity 
of unsoundness of mind recurring periodically in its course P 
The phrase "person of unsoundness of mind or ... 
fits of insanity or epilepsy" designates cases of a very 
wide range of mental infirmity# Thus the question arose: 
whether this phrase may be taken to "equate with the terms" 
"lunatic" or "idiot"* The answer is that it may be so taken.
In Why sail V Whysall, for example, Fhillmore, J,
1* Murray: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol.I,p#1012# 
2# [1940] p.179’ at p#18l.
3# Murray: cited above, p#706#
4. Murray: ibid Vol.II, p*1436#
5.Smith V Smith [1940] F*179 at p.181.
6#H 9 5 9 J  5 WLR 592 at pp.598-599.
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considering the Mental Treatment Act, 1930, which provides 
that "The word 1 Lunatic* (except in the following contexts, 
that is to say, in the phrase 1 criminal Lunatic * ...) shall 
cease to be used in relation to any person of or alleged to 
be of unsound mind and there shall be substituted for that 
word whenever it occurs *,. the expression ’person of un­
sound mind* or *of unsound mind* or such other expression 
as the context may require", observed that "Here Parliament 
is equating the term "lunatic" with the phrase "a person of 
unaound mind".
Ill* Test of Mental Incapacity:
The question is: what degree of mental incapacity 
or what extent of intellectual alienation is required in 
determining whether a spouse is an idiot or a lunatic or a 
person of unsound mind? Is it a question of mere weakness of 
intellect, or must the spouse be incapable of entering into 
financial agreements.
(1) Weakness of intellect:
Mere weakness of intellect, it is submitted, may not 
be sufficient mental incapacity which may be relied upon to 
annul a marriage. People differ from one another in degree 
of intelligence possessed by them. Indeed, it would be a
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pity if a marriage were annulled simply because one of tbe 
spouses lacks intelligence.
The proposition may be illustrated by early English 
and Indian cases# We will consider cases in which it was 
held that there was sufficient mental capacity to solemnize 
a valid marriage and cases where such mental capacity was 
held to be lacking#
(a) Where mental capacity was found:
M'Adam V Walker 1 is the leading illustration where, 
a man sometimes insane, contracted a common law marriage
with his mistress during lucid intervals. Lord Eldon, C#,
2observed that, '’with respect to the evidence adduced here, 
there was no doubt but an unsound state of mind might mani­
fest itself by an accompanying ill state of bodily health. 
But it was admitted that the mind was in a sound state 
before, then they were to look at the state of bodily health; 
not as in itself an evidence of mental derangement, but with 
a view to ascertain what effect it had on the state of the 
mind# Then after looking at the evidence ... who declared 
that he was in a perfectly sound state of mind, it would be 
taking a liberty which man ought not to take with man to
1. [1813] 1 bow, P.C. 148 = 3 E.R. 654.
2. M'Adam V Walker [1813] 1 bow, P.C. 148 = 3 E.R. 654 at 664.
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say* that Mr* M fAdam, at the time of the marriage, was not
1
competent to contract,1 In Harrod V Harrod, Sir W. Pagewood
(V.C.) did not find any evidence of the unsoundness of mind,
where a woman deaf and dumb from childhood was alleged not
to have understood the marriage ceremory and nor to have
2been able to give her consent on the ground that, " ... the 
only fact brought forward to support this is, that she did 
not know the value of money".
~Z. 'YL
In Durham V Durham, Sir J* Hanen, did not think 
that a young lady, who was very shy before marriage and 
became unquestionably insane two years after the marriage 
was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage. Similarly,
IL
in Cannon V Smalley, Sir, J, Hannen, P, dismissed the 
husband !s petition for nullity of marriage by reason of the 
insanity of the respondent at the time of the marriage, 
where a young woman seemingly normal before marriage became 
morbid immediately after marriage and in a short time 
unquestionably insane* The learned President observed that 
she was then suffering in physical health, and it 
might be in this case that physical had something to do with
1* [1854] 1 Kay and J = 69 E.R* 344*
2. ibid at 13 = p*348.
3* [1885] LR 10. 80.
4. [1885] L.R.10, p.96.
5* Cannon V Smalley, op.cit*, at p.98.
244
mental health, and that even that date the balance of the 
respondents mind was unsettled and likely to be upset; but 
the question to be decided is whether it is shown to have 
been upset on ... the date of the marriage” and he did not 
find evidence to sustain the proposition that she was so 
incapable.
(b) Where want of mental capacity found:
The leading case on the question appears to be 
Turner V Meyers;^  Sir William Scott (as he then was) pro­
nounced a marriage null and void where, the son of a country 
gentleman, who was subject for thirteen years to attacks of 
delusional insanity, (occurring generally in the fall and
spring) married while on a visit to London to a woman he met
^  2on the street* In Browning V Re aye where a woman of seventy, 
with considerable means, married a man aged 40 it was alleged 
that, at the time of that marriage being solemnized, the 
woman was incapable, from a mental deficiency, to contract 
a marriage. It was alleged that she was always from her 
youth a silly or foolish person, possessing a very weak 
understanding, which nearly approached idiocy. Sir John 
Nicholl^ declared the marriage a nullity on the ground that
1. [1808] 1 Hogg. con. 414- = 161 E.R0 600.
2. [1812] 2 Phillim. ECC.69 = 161 E.R. 1080. 
3* ibid at 81 = p*1084.
"... A more complete picture of a poor crazy old woman can 
not well be drawn than is here exposed; totally incapable 
of doing any one rational act* and never having through 
life, but particularly in the latter part of it, held a 
rational conversation, or done any one act in the management 
of herself or her property”. In Lady Portsmouth V Lord 
Portsmouth,^  the Court annulled a marriage where a nobleman 
of weak and deranged mind married the daughter of his 
trustee* Sir John Nicholl found against the marriage "the
p
nobleman ” ... being at that time not of sound mind suffic­
ient to enter into such a contract”. Lord Penzance, follow-
^ il
ing Turner V Meyers, in Hancock V Peaty, found it imposs­
ible to doubt that the alleged lunatic was the subject of 
insane delusions at the time of her marriage, although the 
evidence clearly showed great eccentricity* However, the 
Court, after reviewing the facts came to the conclusion 
that*' "The symptoms point to no other conclusion; they are 
not reconcileable with mere eccentricity..."
The Court pronounced a decree of nullity by reason 
of the respondents insanity at the time of the marriage in
1. [1828] 1 Hagg. 355 = 162 E.R. 611.
2. ibid at 374 = at p.617*
3* [1808] 1 Hogg. Con. 414 = 161 E.R. 1080.
4* [1867] loL.R. Pd. 355.
5. ibid at p.339*
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Hunter V, Edney*^" In this case the young woman had marked 
delusions as to crimes committed by her and she was on the 
morning after the wedding in an extreme state of melancholia,
and requested her husband to cut her throat* Similarly, the
2
marriage was annulled in Jackson V Jackson, where an
artist, who was always of retiring and somewhat morbid
Vdisposition and developed paranoia about eighteen months
after the marriage was found to be of unsound mind at the
time of the marriage*
The proposition may also be supported by the Indian
cases where the view has been taken that a person, who is
although deaf or dumb but whose mental faculties are unim- 
*
paired-' or who is not up to the ordinary standard of human
intelligence or endowed with the capacity to manage his
zl 5
affairs properly or who suffers from foolish hallucinations^
or who is alleged to be eccentric or deficient to certain
6 7extent merely in his mental capacity or mere imbecile'(sic*)
o
or dull of understanding, is not an idiot or a lunatic.
1. [1881] L.E.P. 10 at p.93.
2. [1908] p.308.
3. Ran Bi.jai Bahadur 7 Jags.t Pal Singh [1890] 17 I.A. 173 =
I.L.k. 18 Clal. Ill P.O.
4. Surti V Rarain Das [1890] I.L.R. 12. All. 531, 533.
5. Mou.iilai V Chandrabati [1911] 38 I.A. 122 P.C.
6. G.E.G.E. V EVfO'.' 1925 Sind. 25.
7. Kt. fli-fcli V Alfred Robert Jones, A.I.R. 1934 All.273.
8. Kanhaiyalal V Harsing A.I.R. 1944, Rag. 232.
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Similarly, a person who drinks hard and is not generally in
a soher state of mind'*- or who is alleged to he "childish"
2
given to exaggerated emotions" or who suffers from a sudden 
attack of mania affecting him temporarily is not mentally 
incapable, for our purposes, it appears.
(2) Capacity to enter into a financial agreement:
The fact that a spouse alleged to he idiot, lunatic 
or a person of unsound mind, was incapable to enter into a 
valid contract may not he indicative of sufficient mental
3
incapacity to marry at the time in question# The view, 
that "... the basis of mental incapacity is the inability 
to enter into a valid contract ..." is, it is submitted not 
correct because a person may lack mental capacity in one 
respect and not in all respects. A person who is not capable 
of dealing with the problems of a "take-over bid" is not 
lacking mental capacity to marry. A person may have suffic­
ient capacity to solemnize a valid marriage, though he may 
not have capacity to enter into a financial agreement or 
contracts generally notwithstanding that the marriage itself 
gives rise to rights and liabilities of a financial character7-
1. Jainarain V Nahabir Prasad A.I.R. 1926, Oudh. 470,
2. Kaura Devi V Indra Kumari A.I.R, 1943 All.310.
3* Shiv Gopal : The Hindu Code (2nd Edn. p.302.
4. J.D.M. Derrett; Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 155*
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The question is: can there he different standards 
of mental capacity for making a contract and entering into 
a marriage?
The question was considered by Karminski, J, in
1 2 Park V Park, where taking the view nthat a lesser degree
of capacity is required to consent to a marriage than in 
the making of a will" the learned judge observed that " ... 
marriage in its essence a simple contract which any person 
of either sex of normal intelligence should readily be able 
to comprehend"* In this case the testator married and on the 
same day executed a fresh will. He was then am old man, 
suffering from mental and physical weakness* He showed 
little interest in the details of the business, being some­
times confused and sometimes lucid. He also became forgetful 
and untidy, and was quite unable to look after his financial 
affairs. It was held that the marriage was valid but the 
will was void because, it was held, the testator was not of 
sound mind, memory and understanding.
The question was again considered by the Court of
IL
Appeal, on appeal in the same case. "The contract of 
marriage", according to Birkett, L.J., "in its essence is
1. [19533 2 All. E.R. 4-08.
2. ibid at p*413#
3* ibid at p. 414*
4. In the Estate of Park, Park V Park (C.A.) [19533 2 All. 
E.R* p01411o
5. ibid at p*1434.
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one of simplicity." Birkett, L.J., citing Sir James Hannen,
1 2 P, !s observations in Boughton V Knight, that "The question
of unsoundness of mind is one of degree, and it is impossibl
to lay down any abstract proposition of law whicb will guide
*
you in determining it", observed tbat, " So, there can be 
no doubt that there are degress of unsoundness of mind, and, 
of course, there can be degrees of capacity quite apart 
from unsoundness of mind. Some men are very able and some 
are not, and it is -understandable, for example, that an 
illiterate, uneducated man, perfectly sound of mind, but 
not of a high quality, might be able to understand the con­
tract of marriage in its simplicity, ... but who, coming 
into a sudden accession of wealth, might be quite incapable 
of making anything in the nature of a complicated will,
quite apart from any question of unsoundness of mind."
Zl
Hodson, J., considering the question whether con­
sent to a marriage required a lesser degree of unsoundness 
of mind than that required to make a valid will, was of the 
opinion that, "... there is no sliding scale of soundness 
of mind by reference to which different matters of which the 
law is required to take cognisance may be measured".
1. Boughton V Knight, [1873] 3 P*65«
2. rBT^F.7T^T
3. Park V Park (C.A.) [19531 2 All.E.R. 1434.
4. iPark Y  Park [19531 ibid at p. 1435•
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It appears that in considering the question, there­
fore, a degree of mental capacity, large allowance must he 
made for the difference of individual character« However, 
there is express authority in Ertel V Erte]?- that "It is a 
matter of common knowledge that many married men or women 
continue in a satisfactory marital status although they may 
not possess high grade mentality or he successful in the
conduct of business ventures and that many of them are
2
acting with the aid of conservators."”
(3) Test of mental incapacity:
The difficulty of laying down any general, compre­
hensive test to he applied for determining mental capacity 
or intellectual alienation which may he relied upon to annul 
a marriage has frequently been recognised, and, it is sub­
mitted, each case must he considered on its own facts*
The leading case on the question appears to he 
Browning V ReatPe^ where Sir John Nicholl put as a test, 
"[Whether the respondent was],*, incapable, from 
mental imbecility, to take care of his or her own person 
and property." However, the question was minutely investi- 
gated in Dunham V Durham, where Sir James Hannen, P, laid
1. [1942] 40 HE 2d 85 at 89.
2. i.e. trustees.
5. C1812] 2 Phillim. ECC. 69 at
4. [1885] 10 PD 80.
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1
the test as,
" ,. * a capacity to understand the nature of the 
contract, and the duties and responsibilities which it 
creates•"
2
In a similar case, Hunter V Edney, Sir James
3
Hannen, P, observed that,
1 The question which I have to determine is not 
whether she was aware that she was going through the cere­
mony of marriage, but whether she was capable of understand­
ing the nature of the contract she was entering into, free 
from morbid delusions upon the subjectThis statement was
lL
adopted by Bargrave Deane, J, in Jackson V Jackson, Simi- 
larly, Sir Henry Duke, P, observed/T'as to the test to be 
applied, where he stressed the difficulty of formulating 
the right test,^
n The mind of one of the parties may be capable of 
understanding the language used, but may yet be affected by 
such delusions, or other symptoms of insanity, as may 
satisfy the tribunal that there was not a real appreciation 
of the engagement apparently entered into® Noitf that the 
respondent knew that he Cor she] had proposed marriage and
1. [1885] Pat p. 82.
2. [1885] 10 PD 93.
5 # ibid at p. 95.
4. [1908] p.308.
5. [1923] 39 TLR 658.
6. ibid, 661.
the effect of the ceremony and its primary consequences I 
cannot doubt, but whether his [or her] mind at the time was 
in such a condition that he [or she] appreciated and tinder- 
stood the effect of the ceremony is more doubtful.1
The test of mental incapacity which may be accepted
as satisfactory is provided by Singleton, J, in Park V Park ~^
2
and by Heen, J, in Johnson V Johnson, respectively* as 
"was [the party alleged to be idiot, or lunatic or a person 
of unsound mind on the date of the ceremony] capable of 
understanding the nature of the contract into which he [or 
she] was entering, or was his [or her] mental condition 
such that he [or she] was incapable of understanding it", 
and ”... whether there is a capacity to understand the 
nature of the contract and the duties and responsibilities 
created thereby...11.
It is submitted that the above tests must be 
accepted under the HMA. It is obvious that in order to 
ascertain the nature of marriage a person must be mentally 
capable of appreciating that it involves the responsibilities 
normally attaching to marriage.
1. (C.A.) [1953] 2 AlloE.P. 1434-
2. [I960] 82 ALR 2d. 1029.
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IV. Presumption of sanity and burden of proof:
There is a presumption of sanity in favour of the 
validity of a marriage, solemnized in due form, and the 
"burden is on the party alleging mental incapacity, which 
is to be determined on the facts of a particular case.
The leading case on the question is Munishwar Putt
V Indrakumari,^  where Tek Chand, J, summarized the position
2as follows:
,!In cases where marriage is sought to be annulled 
on the ground of idiocy or lunacy of a spouse, the onus in 
support of the plea of insanity existing at the time of the 
marriage lies on the petitioner. Of course, where permanent 
insanity is shown, then it is for the respondent to show 
that marriage was performed during a lucid interval. The 
presumption is in favour of validity of marriage and in 
favour of mental capacity of the spouses entering into 
matrimony. As marital union is closely associated with 
peace and happiness of society in general and individuals 
and families in particular, the marriage should not be 
annulled on grounds of mental incapacity unless the evidence 
in support of the alleged idiocy or lunacy at the time of 
marriage is cogent and compelling. The petitioner in order
1, A.I.R. 1963 HJ 449.
2, ibid, 455.
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to succeed must make out M s  allegations clearly and beyond 
doubt. Courts must ... concentrate upon tbe real question 
in issue, namely, the degree of mental infirmity at the time 
of marriage invalidating its solemnization .... The standard 
of proof in such cases must approximate to satisfaction of 
the Court beyond reasonable doubt....1 (as to what is 
’’beyond reasonable doubt see^ below).
The question arose: What is the effect of adjudica­
tion, prior to or after the marriage, that the person was 
of unsound mind? In the first case can the guardian form 
on behalf of the idiot, or lunatic, or person of unsound 
mind the intention to marry? So odd a notion must be contem­
plated at Hindu law in view of the history of marriage of 
mental defectives prior to 1955} to which we have already 
referred.
(a) Adjudication:
It is submitted that an adjudication, that a person 
was of •unsound mind at the time of adjudication, prior to 
or after the marriage may not be conclusive as to the 
mental capacity of the person entering into a marriage. It 
is also submitted that such adjudication merely implies 
that the person so adjudicated is unable to take care of 
his or her own affairs and it would not amount to mental 
incapacity for our purposes if the person concerned fulfils
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the test laid down (above, p. 2^ 2}* i.e., the person is 
capable of understanding not only the nature of marriage 
but also capable of appreciating the responsibilities 
involving with marriage. In Batrensnoyaa i^ V Bhagwati Saran, 
Mukerjee, J, explained that adjudication of a person as a 
lunatic may no doubt imply that he is not competent to 
manage his own affairs; but it need not mean that he is 
suffering from complete mental alienation. He may have 
sufficient reason still as to enable him to understand the 
ceremonies and take an intelligent part in them.
(b) Can a guardian form an intention to marry:
We will see that non-age is not a ground for annul­
ling a marriage (see below, p.3.^) for the lack of consent 
by the minor is remedied by the consent of his or her 
guardian, i.e., a guardian can form an intention to marry 
on behalf of his ward. However, in case of an idiot, or a 
lunatic, or person of unsound mind a guardian, it is sub­
mitted, can not form an intention to marry on such persons 
behalf. The reason is not difficult to find. The "guardians" 
it has been said, "can not evince on the ward's behalf an 
intention which the ward himself is incapable of forming^"
1. A.I.E. 1950, P.O. 142.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.156.
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V. Mental incapacity in Kenya and Uganda:
In deciding a question, under Kenya and Uganda 
law, whether a person is of unsound mind or subject to 
recurrent fits of insanity or epilepsy or is a lunatic or 
idiot the position may he summarized, in the light of the 
above discussion, in the following terms, namely,
(1) Mere weakness of intellect or inability to enter 
into a financial transaction will not amount to sufficient 
mental incapacity to annul a marriage*
(2) The question of mental incapacity is one of degree 
and the following test must be applied: was the respondent 
capable of understanding and appreciating the nature, and 
responsibilities attached, of the marriage.
(3) the onus of proof is on the petitioner which must 
be proved strictly and the standard of proof is the satis­
faction of a prudent man.
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CHAPTER VI 
FORCE AND FRAUD
I Introduction;
A marriage is voidable, under HMA, where the con­
sent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian 
in marriage of the petitioner is required under section 53
the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or fraud.^
oSimilarly, under the parallel provisions of Kerya and 
Uganda-' law a marriage may be annulled, on the ground of # *
force or fraud T^TIowever", it is to be noted that there is^no^i 
mention of the application of English law, in Uganda, where 
the consent of the guardian was so obtained.
The object of this ground is to enable a marriage 
to be avoided if it was entered into (whether or not it was 
consummated) without the petitioner^ free and full consent 
for it has been observed that, "It is no marriage in law 
where one of the parties was induced to enter into a matri­
monial alliance under coercion, duress or fraud, evidenc­
ing want of free consent. A marriage procured by abduction,
1. S. 12(1)(c)«
2. Cap. 157° S. 11(1)(b)(iii) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, I960.
3« Cap. 112. S.13(1)(e)(Law of the Uganda Protectorate). 
4-. S.9(3)(c) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, 1961•
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terror or coercion has no sanctity...1 (On the total 
absence of consent irrespective of force or fraud see 
helowl^"^).
(1) Necessity of Consent:
The personal consent of the bride, under the HMAjCf** i
is not a prerequisite. And since marriages of lalfors-are in
2
practice not void despite the terms of section 11 it 
follows as a matter of course that a child bride or groom
3
cannot have her or his marriage annulled for non-age*^ or
1. per ^  in Kunta Devi V Siri Ram Kaluram
A.I.R. 1963 HJ 235 at 238, As to force and fraud in 
"nullity" generally, see, S.V. Gupte, Hindu Marriage Act 
pp.186-188; P.V. Dedalkar, Hindu Marriage Act, l955>
pp.97-101; D.H. Chaudbry, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955t 207- 
12. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law 
pp. 191-94-. N.R. Raghava chari ar, Hindu~Law pp.925-50;
D.F. Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law 846-47^ T.P.
Gopalakrishna, Codified Hindu Law pp. T.P. Gopal-
krishnaff' Hindu Marriage Law pp.137-38; Shiv Gopal, The 
Hindu Code pp. 95-96. Dr. Gyan Prakash, the Hindu Coffe 
p.313* Ajit Gopal, Commentary on Hindu Law (Past & 
Present) pp.110-2. J. Jackson, The Pormation and Annul­
ment of Marriage pp.190-205.
2. HMA.
3. See life. Kalawati V ^ tevi Ram A.I.R. 1961 H*P 1 (held,the
minority of the wife or her guardian in marriage in
itself, not a ground for getting it declared null and
void under S.11 or for its annulment under section 12(c).)
Gmt. Naumi V Narotam A.I.R. 1963 H.P.15 (held, a
marriage of a girl below fifteen years is neither void
nor voidable). Mr. Premi V Daya Ram A.I.R. 1965 H.P.
(held, ... the marriage of a minor wife is neither void
or voidable...11) .
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want of consent if the lack of personal consent has been 
properly made good by the consent of the guardian in 
marriage, who, in the case of the bride, is a functionary 
recognised by Hindu Law while, in the case of the groom, he 
remains a relative recognised only by Hindu custom* If the 
consent of the guardian in marriage was not obtained by 
fraud the minor has no relief open to him upon the ground of 
misrepresentation. However, the case of an adult is other­
wise, An adult may go through a ceremony of marriage without
1
giving full or free consent to be married.
The question is, what is the effect of total want of 
consent irrespective of force or fraud under HMA?
It is submitted that total want of consent, which 
may be either due to mistake in the identity of the person 
or due to mistake as to the(purpose of the ceremony, or where 
the marriage is solemnized during intoxication, renders the 
marriage void and not merely voidable just as in the case 
of want of ceremonies amounting to the mock marriage,
1. See J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, 
pp, 185-186, See also J, jacks on: The Formation and 
Annulment of Marriage, pp,200-4. kversley on Domestic 
delations (6tti edn.) By Stranger-Jones, pp.27-29•
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(a) Mistake as the Identity of the person:
For example, take a case where A was given to under­
stand that he was being married to B and, in fact, he was
married to C, i.e. where one person is substituted for 
1
another. If a person is so tricked at the marriage ceremony,
2
the marriage would be declared void. However, a mere mis­
take of name would not suffice i.e., where a man courts a 
woman who he thinks to be someone else, and in a totally 
different position to that in which she really is, and 
marries her, believing her to be that other woman, the 
marriage is valid, for he intends to marry the woman with 
whom he goes through the ceremony.
(b) Mistake as to the nature and purpose of the ceremony:
This may consist in the belief that the register 
office ceremony is a betrothal ceremony or a formality
lL
stating intention to marry at a future date, or a conversion
1. HartsLha.jan Singh V <Jnt. Briibalab Kaur. A.I.R. 1964 
fU 359 at 562.
2. R V Millis [1843-44] X cl. and F 534 = 8 E.R. p.844.
3» Beau Fieldings case
Kelly V Kelly [1932] 49 T.L.R 99; Szapira V Szapira 
Cited in L1902] 24 T.L.R. 756 at 757 twhere marriage 
ceremony was regarded by the petitioner as a formality 
stating intention to marry at a future date)
V Hall [1908] 24 T.L.R. 756; see also Ford V Stier [1896] 
p.l (The court found that the petitioner had gone through 
the ceremony as one of betrothal and granted a decree of 
nullity for want of consent).
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ceremony to another faith.’1'
2
In Kelly V Kelly, for example^ a jewess, went 
through a form of marriage with a jew at an English registry 
•office under the mistaken belief that it was a betrothal 
•ceremony and that she would not be validly married until a 
Jewish ceremony had taken place*
Lord Merrivale, annulling the marriage observed
"that, ^
"it would be intolerable if the marriage law could 
Tbe played with by people who thought fit to go to a Register 
Office , and subsequently, after some change of mind, to 
affirm that it was not a marriage because they did not so 
regard it ... after the ceremony had been performed there 
was never a question of conjugal relations and they never 
took place* That fact in the case, coupled with the facts 
of their jewish origin and racial community, justify me in 
saying that the petitioner when she went through the form 
or ceremony was not aware that it was a ceremony which 
would make her and the respondent man and wife."
Similarly in Valier V Valier^ the marriage was 
annulled, where an Italian man, who was not very quick on
!* Mehta V Mehta [194-5] 2 All. E.R. 690.
2 b Cited above.
3. Kelly V Kelly [1932] 4-9 T.L.R. 99 at 101.
4. 830.
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the uptake and not over familiar with the English language, 
was trioked by an English woman into going through a 
ceremony of marriage with her at a London registry office. 
The man had not the smallest idea that he was contracting 
a marriage. Lord Merrivale, P, observed that, "Matrimony is 
the acceptance by mutual consent of the parties of the 
married state with knowledge of the nature, the undertaking 
and generally of the consequences of the tie which is 
created. I believe, on evidence, that the petitioner did not 
know that he was going to be married, and I am satisfied 
that when he came away from the ceremony he was bewildered 
and did not know until the evening the effect of what had 
happened.n
(c) Marriage during intoxication:
A marriage solemnised during intoxication, or 
induced by the use of drugs is void. Similarly, a marriage
shall be void when it was contracted while one of the
2parties is hypnotised. The reason for this is to be found 
in Sullivan V. Sullivan.^  In this case Sir William Scott 
considered a marriage solemnized during intoxication as
1. Valier V. Ya-:Ller [1925] 133. L.T. 830 at 830.
2. JL. Jackson, lh~Formation and Annulment of Marriage, 
pp.189-190.
3. L1818] 2 Hagg. Con. 238=161 E.R. 728.
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1
solemnized under a, n... disability natural or artificial 
which created a want of reason or volition amounting to 
incapacity to consent.”
It appears that the HMA does not, as does the 
MCA, leave open other grounds of nullity which are not 
specifically listed. It is, however, submitted that a 
marriage may be annulled where a person goes through 
a ceremony of marriage without giving full or free 
consent, Cj., where the misrepresentation is as to the 
nature of the ceremony. It is further submitted that 
want of consent, if not cohabitation, avoids a 
marriage even at Hindu law.
This submission is based upon the analogy of the
1. Sullivan V. Sullivan [1818] 2, Hag. Con. 238 at 246.
mock marriage* The HMA does not in so many words provide 
for a marriage to "be declared null and void, whether per­
formed before or after the passing of the Act, for want of 
due performance of the ceremonies customarily prevailing in 
the community or communities* Yet, as shown clearly in
which lacks the usual forms may be treated as a nullity even 
though both parties thought they were marrying each other* 
This was a bigamy case. There need be no manner of doubt 
but that the law of India provides for a spouse to obtain 
relief on tho ground that there was no marriage, though 
there might have been a mock marriage and even his or her 
consent to the latter will not deprive him or her of the
plea, since it is fin the interests of society that mock 
ceremonies should be as effective as ones solemnized with 
due attention to form*
(3) The Concept of Consent:
where obtained by force or fraud, has two completely differ­
ent aspects and the question of consent of the parties arises 
at two stages* The first aspect is the consent required of
1Lokhanda V State of Maharashtra, a ceremony
The concept of consent in Hindu law of marriage,
1. (1965) 67 Bom. L.R. 4-23 S O . ^
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parents or guardians in marriage. The second is the consent
of the would-be spouses themselvesThe consent of the
would-be spouses themselves can itself be understood in two
main senses. The one consists of such rationality of the
spouses whereby the spouses shall be deemed capable of
understanding the nature of marriage ceremony and physically
apt to take part in it (i.e., this is basically a question
of physical and mental maturity). The other takes for
1
granted the existence of rationality in this sense.
(4) "Two stage theory”:
The question of consent of the parties to the
marriage firstly arises at the time when the parties consent
to solemnize the marriage, i.e., betrothal, and secondly
at the time when the marriage itself is solemnized. The
2view has been taken in Ananthnath V LanMabati and Harbhatjan 
N. Singh V gmt. Brij Balab Kauir that fraud aecording-te be
1. lhanker V Jeimison Cl^2lj ^i DLH161-162
J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment of Marriage,p. 178.
2. A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 778 at 779” (where it was alleged that 
the petitioner relying on the representation that the 
respondent was of sound health and was not suffering 
from any disease gave his consent to the proposal for 
marriage..."
2. A.I.R. 1964 HJ p.359 at p.360 (where it was alleged that 
The consent of the petitioner to marry the respondent 
was obtained by making "wilful misrepresentation and 
fraudulent statement as to the fact of virginity and
?ood character of the respondent. Pandit, J, observed 
at p.362) that, "... 'fraud* as a ground for the annul­
ment of the marriage under the Hindu Law is limited only 
to those cases where the consent of the petitioner at 
the solemnization of the marriage was obtained by some 
sort of deception."
26 b’
a ground for the annulment of marriage is limited only to 
those cases where the consent of the petitioner was obtained 
by fraud at the solemnization of marriage and the consent 
at the first stage though obtained by fraud can not affect 
the validity of the marriage.
The question is: whether there is any justification 
in making a distinction between consent obtained, by, as 
required under this clause, at the time of betrothal and at 
the time when the marriage itself is solemnized?
It is submitted that it is not desirable to make
any such distinction because
(i) to do so would be to give unfair advantage to one of 
the parties which should not be allowed in the interests of 
public policy; and
(ii) the real test for annulling a marriage under this 
clause should be: whether an allegation (i.e. of force or 
fraud) comes within the definition (see pp. x"\\> -^^elow)
/■v
and test (see p£. xA below) laid down in this chapter.
If it fulfils the test, then there is no justification for
making a distinction relative to the time when the consent 
was obtained.
(5) Scope of the Chapter:
We will identify in this chapter some of the
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distinguishing characteristics of force and fraud in rela­
tion to marriage so that we can answer the questions: what 
constitutes force or fraud? when will force or fraud suffice 
to entitle the petitioner to petition for a decree of 
nullity? The answers are not easy to state. In attempting 
them we often become trapped in other definitions of force 
or fraud or think narrowly in terms of other statutes. We 
know, however, that these other definitions do not represent 
an accurate image of the kind of "force” or "fraud” needed.
II Force:
(1) Different meanings and their application:
The term 1 force* has not been defined by the 
statute. The dictionary ^  meaning of force is, "physical 
strength or power exerted upon an object; the use of physical 
strength to constrain the action of persons; violence or
2physical coercion.” In the parallel provisions of English 
and American law*^  the terms used are fear, threats and
1. Hurray; A Hew English Dictionary, vol.4:, p.4-19*
2. See Rayden on Divorce, p.318 and p.77; see also Latey on 
Divorce 18-19 * ? Webb and Beavan, Sourcebook of
English Law, pp.82-3; Eversley on Domestic Relations, 
pp. 30-33; J. Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of 
Marriage7 pp. 190-94-•
3* See American Jurisprudence vol.35j SS96-102, pp.242-45; 
S.7 American Jurisprudence 2nd vol.4, pp.254-58. of 
[New York] Domestic Relations Law Cited in Crossman,
New York, Law of Domestic Relations, p.S.85, P#85;
Fowler V* Harper, Problems of the Family, pp. 189-95 sit
p.192.
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1 2duress. The dictionary defines fear and threat, respective­
ly, as "to regard with fear; he afraid of (a person or 
thing as a source of danger, an anticipated event or state 
of things as painful or evil" and "to press, urge, try to 
force or induce esp* by means of menaces", whereas duress 
means, constraint illegally exercised to force a person
to perform an act". The term used in parallel provisions of
zl c c
the Special Marriage Act, 195^? is furiously, Coercion^
as defined in the Indian Contract Act. "Coercion", accord- 
ing to the Indian Contract Act, "is the committing, or 
threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian 
Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to 
detain, any property, to the prejudice of ary person what­
ever with the intention of causing any person to enter into 
am agreement".
The question is: whether Coercion as has been de­
fined in the Indian Contract Act is the correct meaning of
7
the expression force. Mr. Raghavachariar, is of the opinion
1. Murray: A New English Dictionary, vol04-, p®114.
2. ibid, vol.** V
3. ibid, vol. V, p«724.
4. S. 25(iii)•
5. Coercion is defined by the dictionary in the following 
terms: "Constraint, Restraint, Compulsion; the applicating 
force to control the action of a voluntary agent".
Murray: A New English Dictionary, vol.2, p.587#
6. S.15.
7* Raghavachariar: Hindu Law and Precedent, p.926. See also 
D.H. Chaudhry: The Hindu Marriage Act 1955? p*208.
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that ,Tthe correct meaning of the expression is what Coercion
means under section 15 of the Contract Act”# However, it is
submitted this is not so because (i) this is a definition
which is very narrow in its scope since it covers only
those acts forbidden by the Indian Penal Code; and
(ii) Force may be exercised by threats but those threats
need not be such as may be held to be an act forbidden by
the Indian Penal Code#'*' It is for this reason that the
SMA, which could be expected to enlighten us, turns out to
2be unhelpful# The discrepancy is odd, and unexplained#
(ii) Force in "Penal Code”:
The expression "force” has been defined by section 
15 of Indian Penal Code in the following terms:
"A person is said to use force to another, if he 
causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to 
that other, if he causes to any substance such motion, or 
change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that 
substance into contact with any part of that other1 s body, 
or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying or 
with anything so situated that such contact affects that
1# See S.V#„J-rupte: Hindu manriage Act, p.186# Also,
P.V. Dedikar: Hindu Harriage Act7 1955, P*98#
2c One may note the Christian Marriage and Matrimonial 
Causes Bill, 1962 which is still before Parliament, in 
cl#25(l)(c) follows the HMA and not SMA.
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others sense of feeling: Provided that the person causing 
the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, 
causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of 
motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described;
Pirst:- By his own bodily power#
Secondly:- By disposing any substance in such a manner 
that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes 
place without any further act on his part, or on the part 
of any other person#
Thirdly:- By inducing any animal to move, to change its 
motion, or cease to move"#
The question arose: whether force as has been 
defined by the Indian Penal Code may be sufficient to 
entitle a petitioner to petition for a nullity decree? It 
is submitted, although the Indian Penal Code defines force 
elaborately, the expression "force", as defined by the 
Indian Penal Code, does not cover the technical meaning 
required for our purposes# In defining ’force1 the Penal 
Code takes into consideration only physical force applied 
to person or property. However, we know that in marriage 
the ’force* may take the form of mental coercion as distinct 
from physical force.
271
(j%)F°rce in Nullity Proceedings 
"Force", in relation to marriage, has been defined
by various writers in a variety of ways. Force according to 
1 2Gupte and Mulla, respectively, "... would have a wider 
meaning than Coercion •.. may be either physical or moral 
..." and "... when used excludes any real consent altogether 
Derrett^ defines it as, "where the petitioner has 
reduced to a state in which he or she was incapable of 
offering resistance to coercion and threats.
Force may be defined as power exerted upon an 
individual, in any way, with an intention to overcome his 
or her will and/or overpower his or her judgment, in order 
to induce him or her to enter into a marriage to which con­
sent would not otherwise have been given, and actually so 
overcoming and overpowering,.
The force which may negative consent may consist of 
threats of death or grievous physical harm, or threats of 
imprisonment or arrest. It may also consist of a threat of 
a less serious harm, but involving mental suffering, i.e., 
fear of some untoward circumstance happening (not necessarily 
to the party concerned, but to some third person whose 
interests are a concern to the party coerced).^
1. HinduCPt^riage jAct, 186.
2. Ih^lnciples of Hindu Law, p.846.
3* Introduction"to Modern Hindu Law,
4. Eversley on Domestic delations, 31.
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(3) Essentials of force:
It will be necessary to consider the particular 
factors which are regarded as constituting force. The degree 
of force required to satisfy the Court will also need to be 
discussed, as will the necessity that force be the inducing 
cause of marriage.
What constitutes force:
A decree of nullity will usually be granted on the 
ground of force consisting of threats of death or grievous 
physical harm for, it is submitted, such marriages axe 
ordinarily doomed to failure at the outset, and only rarely 
do they work out advantageously to the people involved or 
the community as a whole.
The cases under this head may be divided into two 
groups. Firstly, cases in which the force was exercised by 
a man1 on the petitioner wife or vice versa. Secondly, 
cases where force was exercised by third parties.
1. The first case on the question appears to be Lady Full- 
wood1ggase [1638] Cro. Car 483 at 493 = 79 E.R. 1617 ' 
at p.1056, where a man, with the aid of a female relative, 
"Violently, and with force and against the will of the 
said Sarah, took and carried the said Sarah ... and 
married her. The Court held that "although this was not 
a marriage de jure, because she was in such fear (as 
she affirmed upon her oath) that she knew not what she 
answered or did, yet it is a maxriage de facto, and is 
felony within the statute", ,
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Q*0 Porce exercised by the parties themselves:
1 ___
In Hussein V Hussein, for example, the res­
pondent induced the petitioner to marry him by threatening
p
to murder her if she did not. Henns-Collins, J, did not 
have any hesitation in annulling the marriage on the ground 
that the respondent,
"dominated [the petitioner] by fear, and exercised 
the power which he had over her to coerce her into marriage.
Similarly in Scott V Sebright ^  and Bartlett V Rice,^ -
1. C1938] p.159.
2. Hussein V Hussein [1938] p.159*
3. LlSS7l l2 PD^  2i CThe petitioner (a young woman of twenty- 
two years entitled to a considerable wealth) had become 
engaged to the respondent, and shortly after coming of 
age was induced by him to accept bills of considerable 
sums of money. The persons who had discounted these bills 
subsequently issued writs against her, and threatened to 
make her a bankrupt. The distress caused by these threats 
seriously affected her health, and reduced her to a state 
of bodily and mental prostration, in which she was in­
capable of resisting coercion and threats, and being 
assured by the respondent that the only method of evading 
bankruptcy proceedings and exposure was to marry him. It 
was also alleged that the respondent frequently threat­
ened her that unless she would marry him he would accuse 
her to her mother and in every drawing-room in London of 
having been seduced by him. In addition to this, the res­
pondent immediately before the ceremony threatened to 
shoot her, if she shewed that she was not acting of her 
own free will.)
4. [1895] 972 LT 122. [A mein threatened to blow her brains 
out if the girl, who rejected him, if she would not con­
sent to marry him, and produced from his pocket a pistol, 
which he held at her head. She then promised to marry him 
on condition that he put away the pistol, which he did. A 
few days later she went home, and shortly afterwards he 
intercepted her while on a railway journey and took her 
to the office of a registrar of marriages. During the 
marriage ceremony, she fainted; as soon as it was over, 
she got right away. The marriage was never consummated.
274
the Court had no hesitation in declaring the marriage to 
he a nullity where the facts were identical for all practical 
purposes with those in Hussein V Hussein 1 Butt, J, and Sir
2
F.H. Jevne, P, observed, respectively, in Soott V Sebright
3
and Bartlett V Rice < gave- the- reasons,
3
"... she had been seduced by mental and bodily 
suffering to a state in which she was incapable of offering 
resistance to coercion and threats which in her normal
condition she would have treated with the contempt she must 
have felt for the man who made use of them; and that, there­
fore, there never was any such consent on her part as the 
law requires for the making of the contract of marriage . *.". 
and "I can not doubt the respondent exercised terrorism 
over her..." .
il 3
In Miss Field1s case and Cooper V Crane^ the
g
marriage was held valid although in Miss Fieldfs case the 
consent was procured by a threat not only to shoot the 
threatener himself but also the young lady*s lover. In
1. [1938] B. 159.
2. [1887] 12 PD 21 at 3'
3. [1895] 72 Iffl 122 at 124.
4. [1848] 2 H.L.C.48 = § E.R. 1010. A Bill to Dissolve the 
marriage of Miss Field known as "Fields Marriage Annull­
ing Bill" Lord Devon, with the concurrence of Lord 
Cottenham, Lord Lyndhurst, and Lord Denman, refused to 
move the second reading of the Bill to dissolve the 
marriage.
5* C1891] PD 369.
6o [1848] 2 HLC 48 = 9 E*R. 1010.
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1 v"*'^Cooper V Crane the facts these: - The petitioner had 
rejected the proposal of marriage of her twenty-one year old 
cousin; "but he obtained a marriage licence, lured her to a 
church and told her she must marry him or he would blow his 
brains out. She knew he carried a gun, and she went through 
the marriage ceremony but did not cohabit with him there­
after.
2The decision in Miss Field's case and Cooper V
r^*>yr
Crane, it is submitted, a?o nft goo cl law in view of Scott 
V Sebright,^  Bartlet V Rice ^  and Hussein V Hussein ^  
because in these cases also the petitioner was reduced to 
a state in which she was incapable of offering resistance to 
force.
(^) Force exercised by third parties:
A marriage may be annulled where a marriage is 
induced by force exercised by third parties and will also 
include cases where a manTs consent for marriage is procured 
by threats of grievous bodily harm or death by the brother 
or father etc. where a man has j^sduced a girl and/or caused
1. [1891] PD 369.
2 . [184-8] 2 HLC 4-8 = 9 E.R. 1 0 1 0 .
3. [1891] PD 369.
4-. [1887] 12 PD 21.
5. [1895] 22 LT 122.
6. [1938] @.159.
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tier to become pregnant.
(a) Force of a less serious nature;
Ankamma V Bamanappa ^  is an illustration in support
of tbe proposition,
where the plaintiff sued for a declaration that the 
defendant was not his legally wedded wife and the allegations 
in the plaint imply either that there was no marriage in 
fact or in any event, it did not amount to a void marriage*
It is common ground that the marriage, if any, took place 
under abnormal circumstances. The plaintiff alleged that he 
was never a willing party to this alliance, that the pro­
posal was never mentioned to him till he actually found 
himself in the house in the neighbouring village that 
evening, that he was decoyed to that village, on a represen­
tation that he was merely going in search of a lost cow, 
that when he found himself in that house in the evening he 
was surrounded by people who had been got ready there 
beforehand, that it was only then that he was asked to go 
through a marriage form to which he objected, that he was 
compelled by some of the people assembled there to sit on 
the plank, that his hand was seized and made to tie the 
thali round the defendants neck. The learned District
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Judge accepted the plaintiff!s story and found that the 
plaintiff could not have with his free will and consent 
entered into relationship of marriage with the defendant 
and that, if at all, there was only a farce of a marriage 
brought about by fraud or force, Vardachariar,J, dismissing 
the appeal by the wife, observed that,
I am not able to say that the learned judge 
was wrong in holding that there was no legal relationship 
of husband and wife created between the parties by whatever 
ceremonial gone through at the time .. „ the mere fact that 
somebody else caught hold of his hand and made him to tie 
a thali round the lady!s neck ought not, it seems to me, to 
be held to constitute a marriage•,•M.
(b) Threats of death or grievous bodily harm;
In America the view has been taken that where a man 
has seduced a girl and/or caused her to become pregnant and 
where the family and friends of the girl bring pressure 
upon the man to marry the girl, it may safely be said that 
the Courts do not readily grant relief in such a case even
though the seducer consents to the marriage with the great-
2est reluctance; for it has been held that in such a case
1. A.I.R. 1937. Mad, 332 at 333.
2, American Jurisprudence vol.35» pp.24*1-4-5 at 244,
See also American Jurisprudence 2d. Vol.4, pp*254-58 at
257.
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he has a moral duty to marry her,^
It is submitted that this view may not be followed
to a case under the HMA as either there is force or there
is not* If there is force the consent is vitiated, and the 
question whether there is moral obligation or no moral 
obligation is irrelevant.
Threats of imprisonment or arrest;
A marriage will be annulled where a man is threat­
ened with a prosecution for seduction etc.* or an arrest is
made without probable cause and the man marries to avoid 
prosecution.^
In Griffiths V Griffiths,^  for example, HauqhtJ, 
found as a fact that the husband married under duress where 
he was induced to go through a ceremony of marriage under 
the threat that he would otherwise be prosecuted for carnal 
knowledge of the wife, then under seventeen years of age. 
The threat was in fact false to the knowledge of the wife, 
but the husband was put in fear by it. Similarly in Hinds
'-N. *
Y Macdonald,
where a sailor's desire to claim his release from
1. Shepherd Y Shepherd [19171 192 SW 658; Owings Y Owings 
H92SJ 118 A 858* and Cases cited therein,
2. See .American Jurisprudence, volo35> pp.241-45 at 244-45,
3. [1944] I.E. 35.
27 9
prison by marrying a woman who had had him arrested on a 
false bastardy charge, it was held that he gave no real 
consent to the marriagee Here were the double elements of 
the woman*s threat to keep him from joining his ship and 
his fear of prison.
It is, however, necessary that the petitioner must 
prove, to establish a right to an annulment on such a ground*
(a) that the charge was a false one? and
(b) the defendant knew it to be false and made the 
charge maliciously.
(40) Threats involving mental suffering or 
reverential fear:
A marriage may be annulled to which consent of one 
of the parties was obtained by force consisting, not threats 
of death or grievous physical harm but, of mental suffering 
or reverential fear.
2This proposition is supported by H V H and 
*
Parojcic V Parojcic. In Parojcic V Parojcic, where the 
petitioners father, after fighting with anti-communist 
forces in Yugoslavia left the country and came to England.
The petitioner and her mother, after suffering many hardships,
1. [1932] 1 D.L.R. 96.
2. [1953] 2 All.E.R. 1229.
3. [1959] 1 All. EoRo 1.
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left Yugoslavia after a few years, and came to England. In 
London they were met by the petitioner1 s father and the 
respondent, a Yugoslav refugee, whom the father introduced 
to the petitioner as the man whom she was to marry. The 
petitioner refused the proposal. There were quarrels between 
the father and the petitioner concerning the proposed mar­
riage. The father threatened to send the petitioner back to 
Yugoslavia if she did not marry the respondent (whether he 
could have done so or not, both of them believed it was 
possible, and the threat, not unnaturally, after the past 
experience terrified the petitioner). Later the petitioner 
went through a ceremony of marriage at a registrars office. 
The court on petition for nullity on the ground of mistake 
and duress held that a decree of nullity would be granted 
because the petitioner had established that she never con­
sented to the marriage, but was driven to go through the 
ceremony by terror installed in her by the father*s threats.
Davies, J, approving Scott V Sebright,^  observed that,
2
"there is no doubt that this young woman was terrified 
into obedience by her father who was almost a stranger to 
her after years of separation and who may well have imbued 
with ideas of patria potestas which were fundamentally 
foreign to his daughter".
1. C1887] 12 PD 21.
2. Paro.jcic V Parojcic [19593 1 All. E.R. 1 at 6*
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Parojcic V Parojcic, it is submitted, may be applied 
and followed by the Courts to a case under the HKA. because 
of the following reasons. In India a great number of parents 
believe in the idea of patria potestas and try to coerce 
their children into marriage to which they would not have 
otherwise consented*
Similarly in H V H,’*' an extraordinary decision 
which extends the doctrine of duress in England from fear
p
of a particular person to fear of unknown persons and the
danger which it sought to avoid might be described as an
*
extraneous one, the court annulled the marriage where a 
Hungarian girl of eighteen years in order to leave the 
country by obtaining a foreign passport she went through a 
form of marriage with a cousin, a French national, and both 
were living in Hungary (the parties never lived together 
and the marriage was never consummated*) The girl, having 
obtained the French passport, left Hungary and came to 
England where she had resided since* She petitioned for a 
decree of nullity on the ground that she was induced to be 
a party to the marriage ceremony by fear or duress* She
1. [195^3 a  All. E.R.
2. William Latey: "Recent Problems in Nullity of Marriage". 
[1954] 3 I.C.LQ, pp.341-348 at pp.345-346. See also A 
note on H V H in [19543 70 L.Q.R. pp.309-10.
3. See E T H  LI9533 2 All. E.R. 1229.
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stated in evidence that she was most anxious to leave
Hungary "because} "the t i m e so terrible I was afraid of
what was going to happen there"* At the time of the marriage 
a communist government ruled Hungary and the wife came of a 
family which, owing to its financial and social position, 
might not be sympathetically regarded by such a government* 
The Attorney-General urged that on the facts of the marriage 
could not be said to have been performed under fear or 
duress, and that a mental reservation as to a vital condition 
of marriage did not invalidate it* Karminski,J, held that 
the fear entertained by the petitioner was of such a kind 
as to negative her consent to the marriage and, therefore, 
there was no consent*
The question is: whether the decision in H V H is 
correct because the marriage, it appears, was in fact a 
fraud practised on the Hungarian law and apparently there
1
was no force such as would oblige her to marry and the cases
1* Brodie V Brodie [1917]^P*271* where Horridge, J, held 
that an agreement entered into by the parties before 
marriage to live apart thereafter was illegal and void* 
But it was not argued, or suggested, that because of 
such a reservation by the parties the marriage was itself 
void or voidable* On the contrary, the learned Judge, 
affirmed the validity of the marriage by a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights*
Martens V Martens [1952] 3 S.A.L.R* 771* cited in H V H  
^119^1 2 All*E*k. 1229 at X'2- 3^ , where it was held that 
ufreHnarriage between a Greek woman and a man resident in 
South Africa was a valid one, even though the ceremony 
of marriage was performed so as to enable her to live 
with a married man in South Africa, and she deserted her 
husband immediately after the ceremony.
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cited in H V H go against the decision arrived at.
H V H , it is submitted, is rightly decided for the 
following reasons:-*
(i) The fear in H Y H , may consist, as we have seen 
(p.^^ahove) of a threat of less serious harm or fear of 
some untoward circumstance happening and it would he in the 
interest of society not to allow such marriages to he rec­
ognised as lawful.
(a) It has heen suggested that,^T,under English law 
the only purpose which will he taken into consideration in 
determining whether the apparent consent can he negatived 
must he a purpose to avoid a danger which would he regarded 
as duress if threatened hy the other party to the marriage. 
Such an interpretation avoids any risk that marriages of 
convenience will he unduly encouraged11.
(^ -0 Degree of Force
The question is: what is the test to he applied in 
cases of f orce!? Must it he sufficient to overcome the will 
of a reasonable man or the individual concerned?
The test should he, it is submitted, the reaction 
of the particular individual concerned, for some persons
1. William Latey: "Recent Problems in Nullity of Marriage"
[1954] 31. C.L.Q, pp.341-348 at 346.
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may have a lower resistance to fear and threats than others
as Hu<jh,J, explained in Griffiths V Griffith^ ^
"Duress must be a question of degree , and may begin
from a gentle form of pressure , to physical violence,
accompanied by threats of death". Karminski, J, in H V H ,
2
agreeing with Huqh, J,*s view added that, "... the question
of degree is a question of fact for the Court* In Ai/kamma V
Bamanappa, for example, although there were no threats of
grievous bodily harm, the Court held "the mere fact that
somebody else caught hold of his hand and made him tie a
thali round the lady!s neck" preceded by the fact that the
petitioner was compelled by some of the people present to
sit on the plank, ought not to constitute a marriage. The
learned judge observed that,
"... if the husband never intended to go through
the form which he is compelled to go through as a kind of
automaton, he cannot be held to have gone through the
marriage at all i.e. it constituted force. Butt, J, summed
'A
up the position, in Scott V Sebright, in the following 
words,
"It has sometimes been said that in order to avoid
1. [19440 I.E. 35 at p.42.
2. [19533 2 All. E.E. 1229.
3. A.I.E. 1937 Mad. 332 at pp.334-335-
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a contract entered into through fear, the fear must be such 
as would impel a person of ordinary courage and resolution 
to yield to it* I do not think that this is an accurate 
statement of the lawf whenever from natural weakness of 
intellect or from fear - reasonably entertained or not - 
either party is actually in a state of mental incompetence 
to resist pressure improperly brought to bear there is no 
more consent than in case of a person of stronger intellect 
and courage yielding to a more serious danger* The difficulty 
consists not in any uncertainty of the law on the subject, 
but in the application to the facts of each individual case"*
^$9 ,T *»« The inducing Cause..*1
The general rule is that a decree of nullity will 
not be granted where the petitioner had sufficient oppor­
tunity, between the time of the threats and the time of the 
marriage, to overcome or escape the threats, i0e* by consult­
ing the police, friends etc*, and he did not do so.^
2In Capossa V Callora, for example, a decree of 
nullity was refused where the defendant husband had told 
the plaintiff that if she did not marry him he would kill
1* American Jurisprudence vol*35» pp* 24-1-4-5 at 24-2-4-3* 
See also American Jurisprudence 2d vol*4-, pp*254— 58 at 
254—55 *
2. [1923]*122 A 378.
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tier brother. She was permitted to go home and remain over­
night. The next morning she went to New York to be married. 
The Court held that she had time overnight to warn her 
brother so that he might have a chance to leave town or 
have the defendant arrested.
Similarly, in 0!Reilly V 01 Reilly, where the plain­
tiff left the defendants home the evening before the 
marriage and when he was called on the telephone the next 
morning and informed that the ceremony could take place 
that day he readily agreed, the Court reversed a decree of 
nullity because, as observed by the Court, after plaintiff 
left defendants home the evening before the marriage he 
had an opportunity to consult with friends or an attorney 
if he so desired.
III. Fraud:
(1) Definitions of Fraud and their applicability;
What sort of fraud is required to annul a marriage? 
We do not find any definition of fraud which might be 
satisfactory for our purposes and we must explore the 
different possibilities.
1* [19513 254 N.W. at 216.
28 7
(i) Dictionary Meaning:
The word fraud has been defined as a "criminal 
deception; using false representations to obtain an unjust 
advantage or to injure the rights or interests of another". 
"An act or instance of deception; a dishonest trick."1
(ii) Fraud in Criminal Law:
2
"Fraudulently" has been defined ^  as "A person is 
said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with 
intent to defraud but not otherwise."
(iii) Fraud in Contract:
According to Section 17 of Indian Contract Act 
fraud means and includes any of the following acts committed 
by a party to a contract, or by his agent, with intent to 
deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce 
him to enter into the contract
(1) the suggestion as a fact of that which is not tome, 
by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having 
knowledge or belief of the fact;
1 61. Murray: A New English Dictionary, vol.Kte^
2„ S.25 Indian P'enal Code, I860,
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(5) A promise made without any intention of performing; 
or
(4) any other act fitted to deceive;
(5) a*iy such act or omission as the law specifically 
declares to he fraudulent.
Explanations:- Mere silence as to facts likely to 
affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract 
is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are 
such that, regard "being had to them, it is the duty of the 
person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, 
in itself, equivalent to speech.”
(2) 1 Fraud” in "nullity" :
The question is: whether fraud as has heen defined 
in the Indian Contract Act will suffice to entitle the 
petitioner to petition for a decree of "nullity”. Mr.
Gupte has expressed the view "that the word fraud used 
in this clause will have more or less the same meaning 
as given in S.17 of the [Indian] Contract Act. This view, 
it is submitted, is not correct because the marriage is
1. S*V. Gupte, Hindu Law of Marriage, p.187.
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not a mere contract^ but an institution of society which 
has some peculiarities in its nature, character and opera­
tion different from those belonging to ordinary contracts 
and cannot be annulled by the parties but only by the
p
sovereign,, It was observed by Sulaiman, J, in Ht. Titli V 
Alfred Robert Jones, that a marriage is not like a mere 
civil contract which may be voidable at the option of one 
party on grounds mentioned in the Contract Act, This view
Z l
finds support from Wells Y Talham where the Court was 
of the opinion that the word "fraud" in statutes permitting 
annulment of marriage for that cause has not the meaning 
usually understood in its application to contracts generally. 
In this case a Protestant married a Catholic by falsely 
representing that she had never been divorced. The Court 
refusing a decree of nullity held that this representation 
was not fraud going to the essence of the marriage.
A distinction has been made, to establish the
1, Harbhatjan Singh Y Britjbalab Kaur» A.I.E. 1954- FU 
359 at p.^62 (discussed ‘below p, J K Shitesh V Emperor 
A.I.E. 1937 Calcutta 214 at p.2175 B. Aukamma V B. 
Bamanappa A.I.E. 1937 Mad. 332 at 339; feam Harakh Y 
Jagarnath; J. Jackson: The Formation and Annulment""of 
MarriageT p.185;
2, fTunishwar Dutt Y Indra Kumari, A.I.E. 1963 HJ 449.
3* A.I.E. 1934 All.273 at p,287.
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meaning of "fraud", "between unconsiimmated and consummated 
marriages* Admittedly it has been held that if the marriage 
is unconsummated any fraud which would be sufficient to 
annul a contract might be sufficient to annul a marriage, 
but in a case where the marriage has been consummated, not 
every kind of fraud that suffices for annulling an ordinary
i
contract will be sufficient to annul such a marriage* Such 
an opinion deserves consideration*
This view appears to be based on the ground that 
an unconsummated marriage is so inchoate and incomplete 
that the status of the parties is similar to that of 
parties to an executory contract and may be annulled with­
out violating any considerations of public policy* Since
it is little more than an engagement to marry and public
2concern is diminished*
It is submitted that this view is not correct for 
the following reasons, namely,
(i) The general rule that an unconsummated marriage 
will be annulled more readily for fraud than a consummated 
marriage has been under consideration in cases involving
1* B. Sivaramayyar "Annulment for Fraud", p*ll* Paper read 
in All India Seminar on Hindu Law, University of 
Rajasthan.
2* Nocenti V Ruberti [1933] 3 A2d 129® See also Watkins V 
Watkins 189 NtB 860; Pi Lorenzo V Pi Lorenzo 73"""KTSS "878, 
£>yenson V Svenson 178 ffif 5^1 Ysern V Horter 110 A31 
all cited in Nocenti1s case *
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a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the respondents 
intention to procure a subsequent religious ceremony with­
out which the wife would not have consented to the civil
ceremony, as was the case in Nocenti V. Ruberti’*' and
2
Akrep V« Akrep, In both the cases the marriage was 
annulled because the Court considered as material a mis­
representation of the husband as to his intention with 
reference to (the fact that the marfi"5'ge was not confiUTnmRtfiii,
(ii) It is not desirable to compare an unconsummated 
and a consummated marriage with the position of persons 
who have made an executory contract and the same persons 
after the contract is executed because a properly solemnized 
marriage is something more than a contract. A Hindu
1. [1933] 3 A 2d 129. A man, as inducement for woman to 
enter into civil ceremony, promised to go through 
ceremony according to rites of the Church of which both 
were communicants. He subsequently refused to do so*
The Court annulling the marriage found that the petitioner 
wife would not have consented to marry the defendant 
had she known that the representation as to the religious 
ceremony to follow is untrue,
2. [ 63 A2d 253. A wife was induced to consent to
civil marriage ceremony on husband1 s promise, which 
the husband did not intend to keep, to have religious 
ceremony in two months according to rites of the Church 
to which the wife belonged. It was proved that the 
defendant was, "determined before marriage not to go 
through with ceremonial marriage•" The Court held that 
the wife was entitled to a decree of nullity on the 
ground of fraud,
3. See above p.
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marriage is generally "binding whether or not Mconsummated 
and is a change of status which affects the spouses them­
selves and the whole community* and
(iii) In deciding a case the fact of consummation or 
non-consummation of marriage is irrelevant because what is 
sufficient fraud is determined in each case merely upon 
whether it fulfils the test laid down for fraud*
(3) Definition of Fraud:
The "fraud" for our purposes may be defined as a 
deliberate act of deception and/or dishonesty including a 
concealment or misrepresentation of an existing material 
fact or facts in any way relating to the essence of the 
marriage, and actually inducing that marriage,
0 0  Test of Eraud:
The question is whether any dishonest concealment 
or representation relating to the marriage, inducing an 
intending spouse or a guardian in marriage, will be a 
sufficient ground for annulling a marriage?
We have seen that "fraud" in relation to a Hindu
1. JcDpH, Derrett: Hindu Law Past and Present, p«87*
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marriage is not used in a general way* Public policy 
requires tbat on mere allegation of any dishonest conceal­
ment or representation a marriage cannot be allowed to be 
annulled. If it is so allowed then all sorts of conceal­
ments and misrepresentations will be alleged by the petit­
ioners and it would be impossible to maintain the sanctity
of marriage* It appears that, unfortunately, no test has
1 2  3been laid down by Jackson, Gupte, Deolalkar^ etc. How-
Zl
ever, the test laid down by Prof* J.D.M. Derrett seems 
to be appropriate: "Did the [concealment or the] misrepre­
sentation go to the root of the marriage?"
(5) Cases where Acts were held to be or not to be 
Fraudulent:
We shall now consider, in order to substantiate 
the above definition, cases where acts were held to be, or 
not to be fraudulent, and attempt to derive a generalisation 
from them.
1* Jackson^JEhe Formation and Annulment of Marriage, p*
2» Gupte ^^ihdu^Flarriage £dr, p 3e^ T3 
3 * Deolalkar, The Hindu Marriage Act 1933»^ P * -
See also NuTla, Principle's of Hindu Law, bp*
Shiv Gopal, The Hindu Code» p * -j, ^  . p * Gopalkrishna,
The Hindu Code, p. -Gopaltoi-elma, Iliii&ur-Marriage
Paw,y>p u \ y y rpL> Jfef?havachariar^-Hindu- Law,- 
4-. J.D.ft. Derrett: Introduction to Ivlodern"Tirndu Law, p.193.
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<^ Sr)(v Concealment of an Intention not to Cohabit and not 
to have Children:
Not to Cohabit:
A fraudulent intention "by one of the spouses, 
prior to or at the time of the marriage, not to cohabit 
after marriage, if adhered to, will constitute such fraud 
as would justify the annulment of marriage because cohabita­
tion after marriage is one of the essentials of marriage, 
and absence of such an intention goes to the "root" of the 
marriage.
This proposition finds support from Shireen V .
Taylor, ^ where the petitioner and the respondent went 
through a ceremony of marriage without any intention on 
the part of the respondent to regard it as a real marriage.
o
Jo observed that, "In my opinion the respon­
dent went through ceremony of marriage without any inten­
tion of getting married. He at that time was practising 
fraud on the petitioner* She would never have given her 
free consent if she had known that he was going to utilize 
her for a temporary makeshift sexual relationship*" The
1. A.IoR. 1952 FU 277*
2* ibid at p*279§ for comments on the case see J.D.M.
Derrett: Aspects of Matrimonial Causes in Modern Hindu 
Law [1964J Kevwe 3u sucL-est asiatque,"' pp.233-241' at pp. 
537-238.
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Court held that the consent of the petitioner was obtained
by fraud and that this mari'iage was a mere pretence and
was null and void,
The American cases on the question are conflicting*
There are cases on the one hand, holding that a person is
not guilty of fraud (i*e, the marriage is not to be avoided)
where he or she conceals an intention never to live with
the other after marriage, goes through the marriage ceremony
with an ulterior motive and with design, afterwards executed,
of deserting the other spouse as soon as the marriage was
performed, e,g, a man proposed marriage professedly for
love but really to get release from confinement on bastardy
process which has been sued out by the woman,'1' or the man
entered into the marriage to prevent the woman from appear-
2
ing against him in a prosecution for seduction. On the 
other hand, it has been held that such a person is guilty 
of fraud and the defrauded party is entitled to a decree 
of nullity, e,g, where a woman married to obtain the man’s
1. Johnson V Johnson, 176 Ala,44^ cited in American 
Jurisprudence 2d, vol,49 at p,462,
2. SoSST'Gbiil'd, 61A 604, ibid,
3. Fiorio V Florio [1955] 143 NYS 2d 105;
ZerFV Zerk [1950] 28 ALR 2d 4-95; Wiley V Wiley [1943] 
139 P2& 950 where the husband was sterilized at the 
wife’s request prior to the marriage).
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name for her illegitimate child^ " or where the woman married
2the plaintiff solely to gain financial advantage*
It is submitted that the former view (based upon 
a local and perhaps fugitive view of public policy) is 
incorrect and should not be followed and the latter view is 
correct because
(a) in such a case the party defrauded had no notice 
of such an intention and contemplated a normal 
marriage relationship, and
(b) there is an analogy with the rule that a promise 
made without any intention of performing it 
constitutes "actual fraud".
Not to have Children:
The unilateral desire to practise birth control is 
apt to give rise to problems concerning the rights of 
spouses inter se. In England and the United States of 
America serious legal questions have arisen where the 
desire to avoid the procreation of children is unilateral, 
and contraception is practised or insisted upon by one 
spouse against the wishes of the other*
1* Anders V Anders [1916] 113 NE 203 Oited in Zerk V Zerk
LT950T "25T33T2d, 495. -----------
2. Zerk V Zerk [1950] 28 ALR 2d. 495.
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The purpose of the present discussion is to 
investigate the question whether a secret intent "by one of 
the spouses, prior to or at the time of the marriage, not 
to have children, if adhered to after marriage, constitutes 
such fraud as will entitle the defrauded party to a decree 
of nullity*
In England the question does not appear to have
arisen directly but it may be noted that in Baxter V.
Baxter, while it was held that a decree of nullity would
not be granted on the ground of non-consummation although
contraceptives were used, in spite of the objection of the
p
husband, Lord Jowitt L.C. observed that, "I desire also
to reserve the question what bearing the employment of
force of fraud may have on the issue of consummation."
In America, although there is authority to the 
*
contrary, it has been held in most cases that a fraudulent 
concealment, prior to or at the time of marriage, by one 
of the spouses not to have children although promising to
ZL
do so expressly or by implication and afterwards refusing
1. (HL) [19473 2 A11.E.R. 886.
2, ibid at p.889*
3* See American Jurisprudence 2d Vol*4 at p.452;
Hminibal V IIainiiljaSr4: J A 2d. Q?Q.
4* Schulman'ir Schulman [19433 46 NYS 2d 158; G-erwitz V 
Serwitz L1945J 66 NYS 2d 327; Hafner V Hafner H9463 
2d 442.
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to engage in sexual intercourse unless contraceptives is
practised, constitutes sued fraud as, if not waived,^
either "by continual cohabitation (despite the knowledge
that measures were being used to prevent conception or by
acquiescence in the use of contraception) will entitle the
2
defrauded party to a decree of nullity*
It is submitted that the American view may be 
followed in cases under the HMA in which a decree of 
nullity is sought upon the same grounds for the following 
reasons, namely,
(a) the concealment of an intention not to have children 
goes in Indian eyes to the "root of the marriage 
and is a promise fraudulent in purpose warranting
1. Gerwitz V Gerwitz [194-53 NYS 2d 327; Hafner V Hafner 
L1946J 66 Ml'S 2d.442; Fish V Fish [ 194-7J 67 tfik 2d, 768; 
Bentz V Bentz [194*73 73 N*YS 2d.44-2; Antoni V Antoni 
T O W  (Mis c•) 128 NYS 2d *510; Gardner V Gardner L 1954*3 
130 NYS 2d*859; Ackerman V Ackerman 2^1 NYS 2d cited in 
A,L.R.2d«, Supplement Service L196T-633 (1964- issue) at 
p. 56; Erimner V Primner £34- ifYS 2d.795? ibid.
2. Schulman V Schulman L194-33 4-6 NYS 2d. 158; Gerwitz V
'Gerwitz [T9^ 5T'6'6' TflS 2d.44-2; Hafner V Hafne¥TI94-63
66 NYS 2d.4-4-2; Bhok V Bhok [ 194*6J 6$ NET 2d74-6l; Berger 
V Berger [194*73 *73 ffiTS 2d.384-; Richardson V Richardson 
IT95TI' 103 NYS 2d.219; Pisciotta T"Kscio¥ta"'I T ^ J
91.A.2d.629. Florio V Flor"i'o'T1955TT¥J"3M5~2d 105; 
Zogolio V Zogolio 157 A 2d. cited in [19653 A.L.R. 2d 
later case service at p.332; Pisciotta V Buccivo 91 A 
2d 629 itid (in which, however, evidence was held 
insufficient to establish fraud).
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a decree of nullity because tbe primary aim of 
marriage is tbe procreation of children* Where the 
spouses enter into the marriage, it is presumed 
that they intend to do so with all the usual 
implications including a willingness to have 
children, and
(b) there are, however, considerations of health, or 
race, or even the public consideration of over­
population, which will justify an agreement or 
understanding between the parties that they shall 
practise contraception* What is under consideration 
here is a concealment of an intention on the part
of one spouse not to cohabit without contraceptives*
(iifc) Concealment of Sterility and Physical Incapacity:
A concealment of known sterility by either spouse, 
prior to marriage, unless waived, may be such fraud as to 
justify a decree of nullity.
The proposition is supported by Turney V . Avery
2and Aufort V, Aufort* In both the cases a decree of nullity 
was given to the husband on the ground of fraud where the
1. [19213 113A 710*
2. [19353 ^  P 2d 620.
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woman did not divulge that she had been surgically sterilized
for "... the procreation of children is one of the ends of 
1
marriage", It is submitted that if one of the spouses 
enters into the marriage knowing that he or she is incapable 
of sexual intercourse and conceals the fact from the other 
spouse, it will be a ground for nullity on the ground of 
fraud irrespective of any relief under Section 12(1) of 
HM.
(itA) Concealment of disease:
A concealment of an incurable disease, including 
hereditary insanity, affecting the health and well-being 
of the spouses and their offspring, is fraud sufficient to 
warrant a decree of nullity.
The proposition finds support from Indian as well 
as American cases.
In Birendra Kumar V ifemlata Biswas^ the petitioner,
B, asked that his marriage with the respondent, H, may be 
declared null and void, on ground that the respondent had
1. Turney V Avery at p.711*
Bee also American Jurisprudence 2d. Vol.4 at p.451* 
Bowler V Harper, Problems of the Family, p.175*
2. JUl.R. l92l Cal. 459^  Tbe fore remand).
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been suffering from a loathsome disease of syphilitic 
origin alleged to incurable and the petitioner alleged 
that the marriage was brought about fraudulently and that 
all the information with regard to the disease was con­
cealed from him* Mookerjee, A.C.J., remanding the case for 
further investigation of the alleged fraud, observed that**" 
rTConcealment of a loathsome and incurable form of syphilis
is recognised as fraud sufficient to warrant divorce or
2
annulment.f? On remand the case was heard by Greaves, J, 
who found upon evidence that the father of the respondent 
knew prior to the marriage that the respondent was suffer­
ing from syphilis, and that this fact was not known to the 
petitioner but was concealed from him* The learned judge,
assuming that the father knew that the disease was incurable,
*
did not thirikr nthat this would be a good ground for 
annulling the marriage”. It is submitted that the observa­
tions of Hookerjee, A.Cj*, were a correct exposition of law 
because a person afflicted with a grievous incurable and 
contagious disease is a source of hidden danger and when a 
marriage is performed concealing such a disease the diseased 
spouse threatens the other spouse with infection and their
1. A.I.E. 1921 Cal. 459 (before remand).
2. A.I.E. 1921 Cal. 464 (after remand). 
3* ibid at p.v^t4?
3 02
children with hereditary disease* In such circumstances, on 
the considerations of public policy, a case exists for 
state interference by way of judicial annulment*
A recent case on the question is Ananth Nath V . 
ha j jabati,^  where it was alleged that the consent of the 
eptitioner was obtained by fraudulent representation as 
to the respondent’s health* It was represented that the 
respondent was of sound health whereas in fact she was 
suffering from tuberculosis* The Court held that conceal­
ment of a disease does not avoid a marriage* In this case 
the decision is right because the disease was curable but
it is submitted that the Court took a narrow view on the
?
subject when it observed that, 11«. .concealment of a disease 
other than those mentioned in the said section [S.13(iii) 
(iv) HMA] can not be the foundation for avoiding the 
marriage", because it failed to consider the effect of a 
distinction between a curable and incurable disease, a 
disease going to the "root" of the marriage, such as 
syphilis, and a disease which does not directly relate to 
the purposes of marriage*
1* A*I.R. 1939 Cal. 778. See as to the comments on the
case, J.D.M* Derrett: [1964] Revue du sud-est asiatique 
at p.239°
2. ibid at p.780.
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In American cas.es a fraudulent concealment of 
tuberculosis, hereditary insanity and venereal disease has 
been generally held to be a ground for nullity on the 
ground of fraud. In Bernice Leventhal V Fennie Liberman,1 
the marriage was annulled because of husband's and his 
parent's fraud in procuring the consent of the wife to 
the marriage. The father and the sister of the respondent 
were both specifically asked, before the marriage, regard­
ing the health of the young man. They both assured the 
plaintiff and her family that the respondent had never been
sick, whereas, in fact, they both knew that he was tubercu-
2lar and had been treated for the disease. In Davis V Davis 
and Sobol V Sobol, the Court gave a decree of nullity 
to the wife, x^ here the husband was suffering from tubercu­
losis, emphasizing dangers to the health of the wife and 
her offspring, We find, as to the concealment of venereal 
disease, that generally if either spouse conceals from 
the other that he or she is afflicted with an incurable 
chronic venereal disease, it is deemed to be such a fraud
ZL
as will warrant a decree of nullity,
1. [V<*>^ ] 88A.L.R. 782.
2. [1919] 106 A 644.
3. [1914] 150 NYS. 248.
4-* C V C [1914-] 5.A.L.R. 1013 and cases referred to therein.
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,Vi Misrepresentation as to -premarital unchastity:
There is no warranty (even at Hindu law)H>y either 
party to the marriage, of premarital chastity, and ordin­
arily, the misrepresentation by the wife as to the fact 
that she was unchaste before marriage is not fraud for 
which a decree of nullity may be granted* This seems to be 
on the ground that chastity is considered to be a personal 
quality and does not prevent the woman from becoming a 
faithful wife or from performing her part in the marriage* 
This view finds support from Indian, East African, English 
and American cases.
2
Iu Harbha.jan Singh Y Smt* Brit1balabkaur where, 
according to the petitioner’s allegation, his consent to 
the marriage with the respondent was obtained by the making 
of uwilful misrepresentation and fraudulent statement as
1. The ancient sastric conception that a bride must be a 
virgin was ignored from early in the British period 
and has no footing today even among the less modernised 
classes. Repudiation for want of virginity is virtually 
unheard-of, though it must have prevailed prior to the 
British period*
2. A.IpR. 1964 PU. 559*
3. ibid at p*3^
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to the fact of virginity and good character of the respon­
dent” « The Court came to the conclusion that such represen­
tation is not sufficient to he a fraudulent misrepresenta­
tion* However, it appears that if the marriage was induced 
by the misrepresentation (i*e* where premarital chastity 
was expressly required see Gatto V Gat to ^  below 3°^ ) it 
goes to the root if the misrepresentation was fraudulent*
Similarly the Kenya Supreme Court considered the question
2
in Jayasukhlal V Lalita where Rudd, J, observed that, 
”Once the nuptial ceremony was completed . ** a marriage 
is complete which can not be avoided even if it had been 
the case that the bride had induced the bridegroom to 
marry her by representing herself to be a widow when, in 
fact, she had been a dancing girl, who had previously led 
an immoral life with several other men*..".
The question is: whether sexual cohabitation before 
marriage can be pleaded as premarital unchastity? This was 
the case in Madan Setti V Thimmi A w a , where M raised the 
contention that his marriage with T was invalid because 
she was pregnant at the time of marriage* The lower
1. C W A ]  106 A 4-93.
2. A.I.E. 1955 N.U.C. 194-5.
3. A.I.R. 194-0 Mad. 155.
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appellate Court had found, as a fact, that T was pregnant 
at the time of her marriage by M himself. It was held that 
a marriage with a girl who is not a virgin is not void. 
Wandsworth, J,'*' observed that, ”... it is going still 
further to say that, when a man has married a girl with 
due formalities, he himself having had an irregular connex­
ion with that girl before marriage, he is entitled to 
repudiate the marriage on the ground of lack of virginity 
of the bride”. It is submitted that this is an extreme 
case and sexual cohabitation before marriage is not a 
ground for annulling a marriage* In fact Hindu law has
p
long held the view that premarital unchastity does; not 
avoid a marriage* However, the question remained open 
whether concealment of unchastity was fraud* The answer 
to this question, it is submitted, must depend on the facts 
of a particular case.
The question has never come squarely before the 
English Courts but it has been held that premarital 
unchastity can not be pleaded to set aside a marriage.^
1. A.I.E. la 40 Mad. 135.
2 . *
3. Perrin V Perrin [1822] 1 Add* 1 = 162 E.R.l*
Graves V Sraves [1842] 3 Curt 236 = 163 E.R.714.
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In America*1' the rule is that premarital unchastity, 
although concealed by one of the parties (with or without 
conscious reference to such subjects hy the parties pre­
vious to their marriage) will not constitute a ground for 
2annulment except under exceptional circumstances involving 
extraordinary fraud, or where an express warranty of pre­
marital chastity was exacted as a condition for consent to
marry (as was the case in Gatto V Gatto) and was not
3 4honoured* In Gatto V Gatto the Court held, that the
complainant was entitled to a decree of nullity on the
ground of extraordinary fraud where the wife frae
^(SShj NVoV /oVe. O - c V q ^
^  v T^C 'A c'ao ° •■■■V' tv ^   ^ \ W  (V-*- o.\
£.<^ <2- VvTTt^S^ \\o V> L*
^ Ic A v o V ^ V v iV e ^  o xk . vc fc> C a^ yN av A K jju ic  V o  iPL‘V a '>f W
Misrepresentation as to pregnancy:
The question is: whether the misrepresentation as
1* See American Jurisprudence, Vol*35> 261-62;
American Jurisprudence 2dV Vol»4, pp.465*-66;
See also Powler ~ Y Harper, Problems of the Family» p*176; 
Vanneman, '*Annulment of Marriage for 3?raud~"Y Selected 
Essays on Family law, Published by the Association of 
American taw Schools, pp.335-53 at Pc34-6.
2. Security first National Bank Case [194-53 162 P2d 966; 
Pox V Pox [194-33 134- P2d 29; Vileta V Vileta [194-23 
128" P2d 261; Sutton V Sutton 1X93^135^53^61.
3. Gambacorta V Gambacorta L1954-3 136 NYS 2d 258;
‘Yucabezky V Yucabezky L19523 111 NYS 2d 441;
Gatto V Gatto H9i9J 106A 493*
4. Ln^ J  106.A*493.
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to premarital pregnancy where the husband has had pre­
marital relations with the wife or where he marries her 
upon the false representation that she is pregnant by him 
although she is not pregnant at all, is such fraud as to 
annul a marriage.
(a) Where the husband has had premarital relations:
Where a woman has falsely alleged that she is 
pregnant as a result of her premarital relations with the 
husband thereby inducing him to marry her the American 
Courts are divided in granting relief. The Courts take the 
view, on the one hand, that the husband by having pre­
marital relations with the wife assumes responsibility 
for the results of his intercourse with her as well as 
results of her intercourse with anyone else and hence a 
decree of nullity will not be granted.^* On the other hand 
the view has been taken that such misrepresentation con­
stitutes fraud enabling the husband to get a decree of
1. Marckley V Marckley [1945] 189 SW 2d 8; Boisclair V 
BbTscTair 11’9^ 3'J ‘47 HE 2d 291; Westfall 7 VesTfalT" 
L192lj 15 ALR 1428; Foss V Foss~Ll855j reported in 
Fowler V Harper, Problems of Trtie Family, p«>195*
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I
nullity* It is submitted that the latter view is correct 
because although a man might have been willing to marry a 
woman who* he supposed, was pregnant by him, few right 
thinking men would be willing to take as a wife a woman 
pregnant by another and care for, as their own, the 
illegitimate children of others.
(b) ... where she is not pregnant at all:
Where a woman falsely pretends that she is pregnant 
by the respondent thereby inducing him to marry her but 
she was not pregnant at all there is a fraud, it is sub­
mitted, such as will negative consent.
It is submitted that where a woman is pregnant by 
another man at the time of marriage (or not pregnant at 
all), and she misrepresents that fact to the man she 
marries, he is entitled to a decree of nullity under 
section 12(l)(c) (i.e. for fraud) irrespective of any
1. Cuneo V Cuneo [1950] - Misc- UTS 2d 899;
Stafford V statford [194-93 217 SW 2d 917;
Arudt V Arudt [194B] 82 HE 2d 908;
Vaguer V Vaguer [194-6] 21 HW 2d 138;
Morris V Morris [1940] 13 A2d 603; Jackson V Rubey [1921] 
19 A.L.R. 7*7; Winner V Winner [1920] 11 A.t.R. 919;
G-ard V Gard [1918] 11 A.t.R/ 923. Se also American 
Jurisprudence, Vol.35? pp.263-64. American Jurisprudence 
2d, vol.4, pp.467-68. Fowler V Harper, faoblemsof the 
Family, at p.175; Vanneman, “Annulment of Marriage for 
Fraud, Selected Essays on Family Law, published by 
the Association of American Law Schools, pp.335-53 at 
pp.338-41.
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relief -under section 12(1)(d) on the ground of concealed 
pregnancy (whether or not the husband had had premarital 
sexual relations).
marital status inducing a spouse (or a guardian in marriage 
to give consent to the marriage is not such fraud as might 
avoid a marriage because, (a) misrepresentation, to be 
ground for annulling a marriage, must be with respect to 
a matter which is an essential of the marriage relation 
and (b) the past marital hi&tory of a person who is 
presently competent, both legally and physically, to marry 
and perform all of his or her marital duties is not such 
a matter.
We will now consider Indian and a few American 
cases on the point in order to substantiate the proposition.
In India, while the premarital status of the bride 
is of the greatest importance in all castes, it is only in 
some castes that the status of the bridegroom is closely 
regarded. However few families of equal wealth and caste 
status care to give their daughters to be second wives or 
to a husband who is cohabiting with a concubine.
Misrepresentation as to premarital status:
A fraudulent misrepresentation as to the prior
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Rukmani V TPS 0R 0 Chari^ is an example in support 
of this proposition. This was a suit for restitution of 
conjugal rights by the husband, H. The wife, W, alleged 
that H married her after making a false representation 
that he was a bachelor. It was admitted by H afterwards 
that he had married a distant relation of his several 
years ago, and that later on, he went through a Sambandham 
with a Nair girl (i.e., he would not have been legally 
competent under HMA to marry). There was evidence to the 
effect that the marriage would not have been gone through 
if H had been known to be not a bachelor. In the High 
Court, on appeal, the fact that H, by means of false state­
ment that he is a bachelor, was able to induce the guardian 
of W to marry her to him, was considered very serious* It 
was held that equitable relief sought in this case is not 
to be granted to a person who has himself been guilty of 
fraud and acquired his right to apply for it by means of 
such fraud. It is submitted that had nullity been asked for 
by a wife, under HMA, in such a case the position might 
have been otherwise, i.e. the grounds for nullity were 
present, since the husband was not legally competent to 
marry under HMA.
1. A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 616
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In America there is a conflict of authority as to 
this question. Most cases are in accord in holding that 
the fact that one who marries merely ,f conceals from" his 
or her spouse the fact that a previous marriage has been 
dissolved by divorce , is not a ground for the annulment
of marriage,^* i.e. these cases support our proposition. In
2
Cassin V Gassin the Court was of the opinion that false 
representations by a woman, about to be converted to the 
Roman Gatholic faith and be married under its laws, that 
she had not been divorced, when a former husband is living, 
while making the marriage void under the laws of the Church, 
is not of the essentials of the marriage so as to entitle 
the husband to have the marriage annulled. Similarly, in
* 4
Wells V Talham^ and Irena Y Thomas, a marriage between 
members of a religious denomination which forbids the 
marriage of divorced persons it was held will not be 
annulled, where one of the parties fraudulently represented 
that he or she had not been divorced because such represen­
tations do not touch the essence of the marriage.
1. American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol*4, pp,451-2. See also 
Vanneman "Annulment of Marriage for Fraud", Selected 
Essays on Family Law, published by the Association of 
American law Schools, pp.335-53 &t PP* 34-3-44.
2. [1928] 58 A.L.R. 319*
3. [19233 33 A.L.R. 827*
4. [1922] 23 A.L.R. 178.
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Misrepresentations as to caste and religion:
Whereas, even in India, the concealment of portions 
of the respondent’s premarital history might not be, and 
it is submitted, is not such fraud as will go to the root 
of the marriage, the concealment of legitimacy and/or caste 
status may be an altogether different matter» Matrimonial 
alliance with a person of inferior caste may result in 
excommunication (where this is still legal) or in other 
social penalties* The offspring of marriages of mixed 
castes, though legally not subject to disabilities are 
still, in many communities, considered inferior and even 
tainted* Marriage is for a home and there can be no home 
where caste or religion have been fundamentally misrepre­
sented*
It is submitted that a misrepresentation by one of 
the spouses, which would mislead a reasonable person as to 
caste or religion, thereby inducing the other to marry may 
constitute sufficient fraud to annul a marriage. We find 
support for our proposition from Indian as well as 
American cases.
(a.) Gaste;
Bimlabai V Sharikerlal, ^  a case of doubtful authority 
since the HMA had already been passed, where the father of 
the bridegroom concealed from the family of the bride, the 
fact that the latter was not a legitimate son of the same 
caste* The misrepresentation was aggravated by the repre­
sentations continued at the very ceremony of marriage itself* 
The Court held that the consent of the bride and her 
guardian was vitiated by this misrepresentation* The actual 
decision was vitiated by certain considerations not 
material to this discussion* But the grounds for nullity 
were, it is submitted, present in the case* Similarly, in 
Kshitesh V Emperor ^  a marriage was sought to be invalidated 
where the marriage was solemnized because of a misrepresen­
tation as to subcaste* It was held that there is no rule of 
Hindu law which prevents a man and woman belonging to two
1* A.I.R* 1959 M.P* 8* As to the criticism of the case see 
J.D.M. Derrett:
61 Bom* L.R. (J) 82-7; sec also J.D.M* Derrett: "Aspects 
of Matrimonial Causes in Modern Hindu Law" [1964] Revue 
du sud-est asiatique, p0239*
J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, pp.193- 
194.
2* (a) The grievance developed after a long time and the 
petition was presented perhaps because of family 
intri gue s; and
(b) The petition was presented, it appears, after a delay 
longer than allowed under HMA*
3* A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 214.
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subcastes from entering into a lawful marriage♦ However, 
Mukherji, J,^ did not express any opinion as to the 
question: Wh.eth.er the fact that the mother's consent was 
processed by misrepresentation would be sufficient to render 
the marriage null and void" • It is submitted that in princi­
ple it would have been sufficient*
(b) As to religion:
2In Claudia Jude V Lancelot Jude the plaintiff, a 
Roman Catholic, asked for a decree of nullity alleging 
that the defendant falsely represented to her that he was 
a Roman Catholic and persuaded her to marry him in a civil 
ceremony, without the knowledge of her parents, promising 
that they should again be married later in the Roman 
Catholic Church# The defendant did not keep his promise and 
persuaded the plaintiff to live with him* The marriage 
was not consummated# Later she came to know that the 
defendant was a Jew and not a Roman Catholic# The Court 
granting a nullity decree held that the misrepresentation 
as to his religion, in view of the fact that marriage with 
him was in fact forbidden by her own personal law, was such 
fraud as to render her consent to the marriage invalid, i*e#,
1# A#I#R. 1937 Cal, 214 at 218# 
2# A#I.R# 1949 Cal. 503.
the misrepresentation went to the essentials of marriage. 
Similarly, in Aykut V Aykut the marriage was annulled on 
the ground of fraud, where the petitioner, a Roman Catholic 
married a Turk who falsely represented to her that he was 
a Roman Catholic*
In America misrepresentation concerning religion 
involving a false representation or a false promise as to 
the performance of a religious marriage ceremony preceded
o
by a civil marriage ceremony (as was the case in Jude V 
Jude) which would mislead an ordinarily prudent person, 
has been held to constitute fraud.
A serious question arises in India at Hindu law if 
a Sikh induces a Hindu to marry him by pretending to be a 
Hindu, or a jain or Buddhist pretends likewise with a
1. A.I.R. 194*0 Cal.75 (The petitioner stated that she would 
never have married him had she known that he was a Mahom 
edan and that she did not have sexual intercourse with 
the respondent after she discovered that he was in fact 
a Mahomedan. The Court granting a decree of nullity 
observed that the policy of the Act [Indian Divorce Act 
18693 does not contemplate a valid marriage between a 
Christian and a person professing a religion which is 
not monogamous.
2. See American Jurisprudence, Vol.35 at p.240. See also 
American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol.4 at p.452.
Vanneman ^Annulment of Marriage for Fraud", Selected 
Essays on Family Law, published by The Association of 
American taw Schools", pp.335-353 at p.347#
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similar effect„ These religions are not identical and 
difference of religion can lead to great inconvenience or 
unhappiness, But public policy seeks to treat all Indians 
not Christians or Muslims as belonging to one community. It 
is submitted nevertheless that in the cases enumerated 
here the misrepresentations would go to the root of the 
marriage *
Misrepresentation as to personal qualities:
A misrepresentation as to character , rank, family, 
fortune, morality, temper and habits is no ground for 
nullity because there are personal qualities whose absence 
does not go to the essentials of the marriage.
The matter arose for decision in Wakefield V Mackay  ^
"where it was held that fraud as to the spousefs character, 
fortune, family is no ground for setting a marriage aside, 
for such are accidentals and not the essentials of the
marriage. The position was made clear by Sir William Scott
2
when he said,
1. [1807] 1 Fhill. ECCb 134 (note) = 161 E,R. 937*
2. ibid at 137 (note) = at p.939. See also American Juris­
prudence , Vol.35? p*238; American Jurisprudence 2A,
Vo 1.43 p.450; Fowler V Harper, jProblems of the family, 
p. 176; vanneman, "Annulment of Marriage for tPrauxlM, 
Selected Essays on Family Law, published by the Associa­
tion of American Law Schools, pp.335-53 at pp.34-2-43*
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"A man who means to act upon such representations 
should verify them hy his own inquiries. The law presumes 
that he uses due caution in a matter in which his happiness 
for life is so materially involved, and it makes no provi­
sion for the relief of a blind credulity however it may 
have been produced"* This applies a fortiori to India where 
marriages are so often negotiated by relations and are the 
result of prolonged investigations and even bargaining.
(6) Conclusion:
We find that fraudulent concealment and/or misrep­
resentation in the following regards, relied upon by the 
petitioner and actually inducing him to consent to the 
marriage, may usually be held to be fraud going to the 
"essence" of the marriage and hence will be sufficient 
ground for annulling a marriage: concealment of:- an 
intention not to cohabit and not to have children, sterility 
and physical incapacity, incurable disease affecting health 
and well-being of the spouses and their children; misrepre­
sentation as to:- premarital pregnancy, caste and religion.
A decree of nullity, however, will usually be denied for 
misrepresentations as to premarital unchastity, premarital 
status, as to personal qualities, including character, rank, 
family reputation, fortune, temper, habits and property.
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(7) Factors Limiting .jurisdiction:
The Court shall refuse to entertain a petition for 
annulling a marriage on the ground of force or fraud where 
either
(i) the petition was presented after the expiration of 
time prescribed for its presentation, i*e., if the petition 
is presented more than one year after the force had ceased 
to operate or as the case may be, the fraud had been dis­
covered;^ or
(ii) the marriage has been approbated by the petitioner 
by living with the other party to the marriage, with his
or her full consent, as husband or wife after the force had 
ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had 
been discoveredj (as to approbation generally see under 
impotence)*
The question that- when the force had ceased to 
operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been dis­
covered is a question of fact to be determined in each case*
IV. Force and fraud in Kenya and Uganda:
In Kenya and Uganda, in attempting to answer as to 
what constitutes force or fraud and when it will suffice to
1. S.
2. S.
Hi) HMA. 
)(ii) mil
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entitle the petitioner for a decree of nullity, the English
law on the subject is to be applied, where the consent of
1
either party is obtained by force or fraud. Similarly, the 
English law is to be applied, in Kenya only, when the con­
sent of the guardian in marriage is so obtained* However,
we do not find any indication as to what law should be
2applied in a similar* case under Uganda Ordinance.
It appears that,
(1) The definition of force laid down and general prin­
ciples discussed above on the basis of English law, it is 
submitted, are equally applicable to a case under Kenya and 
Uganda Ordinance 4
(2) In English law a decree of nullity will only be
granted where the fraud negatives consent to marry the human
being to whom the petitioner was married. The error must be
as to the 1 identity1 of the person and not, ’fortune1, or
*
'condition1, or 'quality'. However, as we have seen, there 
may be other instances of fraud. What then is a judge to do? 
It is submitted that in such a case, the definition, test and 
general principles of fraud applicable to a case -under HMA. 
may be applied to a case under Kenya and Uganda Ordinance,
1. Gap 157 ll(l)(b)(iii) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Ordinance, I960; Cap.112 S13(l)(e),
2. S9(3)(c) [The Uganda] Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
Ordinance, 1961•
3. Bee J.Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of Marriage, 
pp.203-5* J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Itindu 
Law, pp* 193-4-.
CHAPTER VII
CONCEALEP-PREGNANCY AT THE TIME OP THE MARRIAGE
I Introduction:
A marriage may be annulled by a decree of nullity 
on tbe ground that the respondent was at the time of the 
marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner 
These provisions appear to have been based upon 
the [English] Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950,^ section 8(1)(d) 
reenacting section 7(1)(&) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1937.
II Preliminary requirements:
The petitioner has to "satisfy” the Court, in order 
to obtain the relief, on the following matters:
1. S.12(l)d H.MA; Cap 157, S.ll(b)(v) The [Kenya] Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance I960.
2. "that the respondent was at the time of the marriage 
pregnant by some person other than the petitioner".
As to concealed pregnancy generally see: S.V.Gupte,
Hindu Law of Marriage,pp. 188-90; P.V.Deolalkar, Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955» pp. 101-3; Shiv Gopal, The Hindu Code 
pp.34-6-7; H.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, Principles ana 
Precedents, pp.930-31? J.D.M.Derrett, introduction"tcT 
Modern Hindu Law, pp. 194— 95* T.P. Gopalkrishna,' etc,; 
Codified Hindu Law, pp. 168-70; T.P. Gopalkri shna/p Hindu 
Marriage Law, pTI3~8; D.P. Mulla, Principles of Hindu 
Law, p.847; A.G.Roy, Hindu Law (Past ana Present), p. 102; 
D.H. Chaudhury, Hindu Marriage Act, 19531 PP.212-13;
Dr. Gyan Prakash, The Hindu Code, pp.313-314-. See also:
J.Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of Marriage,
pp.205-6.
(1) that at the time of the marriage he was "ignorant” 
of the facts alleged;
(2) that proceedings have been instituted in the case 
of a marriage solemnized before the commencement 
of the Act Lor the Ordinance] within one year of 
such commencement and in the case of marriages 
solemnized after such commencement within one 
year from the date of the marriage;2 and
(3) that marital intercourse with his consent has not 
taken place since the discovery, by him, of the 
existence of the grounds3for a decree. 4-
(1) ... "ignorant" of the facts alleged:
This clause proceeds on an assumption of the facts 
alleged being capable of proof, namely and principally 
pregnancy which must itself involve the assumption of the 
wife having had connection with some male person. The 
petitioner has to prove, to obtain relief under this 
clause, two things, namely,
(i) that he was ignorant at the time of the marriage
1. S.12(2)(b)(1)(i) HMA; Cap.157, S.11(b)(v)(i) The [Kenya] 
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, I960; S.8(l)(i)
of the MCA, 1950.
2. S.12(2)(b)(i)(ii) HMA; Cap.157, S.11(b)(iiXLi). The 
[Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, I960;
S.8(1)(ii) of the MCA, 1950.
3. The use of "grounds" instead of ground is an example of 
bad draftsmanship for here the ground mentioned is only 
one i.e., concealed-pregnancy. This mistake arose it 
appears, due to indiscriminate copying of S»8(l)(iii) 
of MCA, 1950.
4. S(12)(2)(b)(i)(ii) HMA; Cap.157, S.ll(b)(v)(ii) The 
[Kenya] Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, I960;
S .(8;(1)(iii) of the MCA, 1950.
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of the fact that the respondent was pregnant; and
(ii) that he was ignorant of the fact that he was not 
the person responsible for her pregnancy because in such a 
case there is a negative obligation,^ on the petitioner, 
of proving that that person, with whom the respondent had 
had connection was not himself (as to standard of proof 
see below p* )♦
The policy of this preliminary requirement is not 
self evident. Presumably the intention was to reject, as 
"insincere11, petitions grounded on facts, the knowledge of 
which could have existed in the petitioner’s mind when he 
married the respondent, so that marriage seemed to condone 
the facts*
The question is: what does "ignorant" mean? Does 
it meam that the petitioner should have had certain know­
ledge of the facts alleged? or does it mean that the 
situation should be such as to make him suspicious and put 
him on enquiry?
The expression "ignorant" is not defined either in 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* Kenya Ordinance or in 
Matrimonial Causes Acts 1937 or 1950, and the comparative
1# Jackson V Jackson [1939] 1 All E.R* 471* See also 
^ivagufu V Saro.ja A*±0R* I960 Mad* 216 (where it was 
merely said thau he [the petitioner] must show that he 
was ignorant of the facts upon that occasion*
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dearth, of express authority on the topic is not surprising* 
The Oxford English dictionary ^"defines it as, "destitute of 
knowledge, either in general or with respect to a particular 
fact or subject; unknowing; uninformed; unlearned*" But 
this definition takes us no further*
Indeed, the difficulties in the way of providing 
a precise legal meaning of "ignorant" are stupendous* It 
might be thought that an obvious illustration of "ignorant" 
would be in a case where the respondent’s behaviour, before 
the marriage was such as to cause the petitioner to suspect 
her conduct but the respondent assured him as to her con­
duct* But in such a case the petitioner can hardly be said 
to be "ignorant"^ cjfi the circumstances might have been
1* Murray: A New English Dictionary vol*5? P*33*
2* See Raghavachar'Iar: Hindu Law, Principles and Precedents, 
p.931? where he says: "If it is doubtful whether the 
pregnancy was by the petitioner or somebody else by 
reason of the petitioner and others having had inter­
course with the respondent prior to the marriage, the 
benefit of doubt must he in favour of the validity of 
the marriage for in such circumstances it is not 
possible to say that the respondent was pregnant by some 
person other than the petitioner* Again if the circum­
stances proved do not clearly show that the petitioner 
was ignorant of the fact of the pregnancy at the time 
of the marriage, and it is doubtful if he knew about it 
or not, the burden of proof that he did not know about 
the pregnancy must be thrwon on him, the presumption 
being that he did know about the pregnancy at that time•"
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such that the petitioner should not, as a reasonable man, 
have believed the respondent when she assured him as to 
her conducto Similarly, if it is possible to say that the 
petitioner had reasonable grounds to suspect the respon­
dents character, but,nevertheless, decided to give her the 
benefit of the doubt and made no further inquiries.
It appears that an objective test must be applied. 
Was it plain on the facts that the circumstances would have 
made abundantly clear, to a reasonable man, that the 
respondent, before the marriage, was not beyond suspicion? 
Since a case under this clause involves the status of the 
parties public policy requires that a marriage shall not 
be avoided lightly. But, at the same time, it will be 
unfair to expect the petitioner to be able to show absence 
of a certain knowledge of the pregnancy. Of his own dealings 
with the respondent he can of course, be expected to have 
certain knowledge (leaving for the present the problem of 
the mentally defective petitioner).
A precise definition of "ignorant1 would be highly 
technical. But9 basically, it means that in the circumstances 
of the case the petitioner, as a reasonable man, was not 
aware at the time of the marriage of the fact that the 
respondent was pregnant.
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It must be remembered that the proviso has, other 
implications in India from those it has in England* In 
India betrothed couples seldom personally approve each 
other, or maintain daily or frequent contact prior to the 
marriage * The intended bridegroom has few or no opportunities 
to observe his intended spouse !s waistline* Moreover, even 
if he had such opportunities, the folds of the sari will 
conceal the early stages of pregnancy very efficiently* The 
bridegroom^ means of knowledge are in the majority of 
cases confined to inquisitive and persistent female relations 
and it is left in practice to them to awaken in him suspic­
ions of fraud* But since the marriage is in any case the 
work and contrivance of relatives this inquisitiveness may 
be stifled or it may fail for a variety of other reasons.
(2) that proceedings have been instituted within
one year .*„ of such commencement * * * from the date 
of the marriage* * *
It appears, on one reading of the clause, that the 
petitioner is barred from petitioning for nullity, where the 
petition was presented after the expiration of time pre­
scribed for its presentation* Gan. this period be exrtended? 
Suppose the petitioner's right to petition for nullity has
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been concealed by the fraud of the respondent (e.g., (i) 
by the bride1 s withdrawal during the remainder of the 
pregnancy, and bringing the child to birth secretly, and 
secretly conveying the child away to persons in collusion 
with her or her parents, or (ii) where the husband may have 
to go abroad and he may not become aware of the facts in 
question in time to enable him to take proceedings)* Is the 
petitioner debarred from petitioning for nullity?
The case on the question is Savalram V Yeshodabai^
where, the petition was filed on the day on which the
Court opened after long vacation during which the prescribed 
period expired) it was held that,
"A^ fair reading of the section [12(2)(b)(i)(ii)] 
clearly shows that it does not prescribe a period for filing 
a petition by the plaintiff; it is in terms mandatory and 
prohibitory and provides that the Court shall not entertain, 
the petition if the Conditions laid down therein are not 
satisfied. These conditions are in absolute terms and they 
can not be relaxed.”
1. A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 190,
2. ibid at p.191* Bee also Sivguru V Saroja A.I.R. I960 
Mad. 216 (where it merely says that lie Lthe petitioner] 
must institute proceedings within the period of limita­
tion fixed by the statute.)
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The only reported English case on the question is 
Chaplin V Chaplin,^  where the petition was presented after 
the time prescribed for its presentation. The petitioner, 
in appeal, argued that,
in effect, provisio in S.7 (1) Cof MCA 19373 
is in the nature of a statute of Limitation and that 
equitable principles should be applied to its interpretation, 
and, accordingly, if it be established that the husband1 s 
right in this respect has been concealed by the fraud of
the wife, the period provided for in the sub-section should
2
be extended until the discovery of fraud."
*
Rejecting this argument Tucker, L.J., observed
that,
"... Parliament has thought fit to prescribe 
in the clearest possible language that the 
Court shall not grant a decree unless it is 
satisfied that proceedings were instituted 
within a year of the date of the marriage.
It would be wrong for this Court to extend 
that period
There is a strong probability that the decision in
Zl
Chaplin V Chaplin may be followed in future by the Indian 
Courts.
1. [19^8] 2 All. E.R. 408 (C.A.).
2. ibid at p.411.
3. ibid.
4. Cited above.
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flie period is, it is submitted, (i) quite arbitrary 
and rigid, and (ii) until the section is amended, (as to 
the proposed amendment see below p* ) absolute^ and can 
not be extended, for the following reasons: -
(i) Parliament has expressly delimited the period after 
the expiry of which an action under this clause can not be 
brought# It would be wrong to extend the period in case of 
an allegation of fraud because,
(a) had Parliament been interested in making an excep­
tion in case of fraud it would have made S*12(2) (b)(ii) 
(i#e* providing for the proceedings to be instituted ... 
within one year) subject to S*12(2)(a)(i)2 (providing for 
a petition to be presented, in case of force or fraud, 
within one year after the force had ceased to operate or, 
as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered)» Parlia­
ment instead clearly provided in the same section (i*e. 
S*12(2)) a period of limitation for cases involving fraud 
and concealed pregnancy*
(b) There is a danger of giving effect to fanciful
1* See S.Y. Guptei Hindu Law of Marriage, p*189#
* See below.
See also B.B. Pal: Law of Limitation at p,2?0. “The law 
of limitation having'been codified, here no equitable 
doctrine should be adopted". See also J. Jackson: 
Formation and Annulment of Marriage, p.187,
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doubts, if one asserts what the Parliament clearly did not 
intend, i0e., that the period may not be absolute,
(ii) Section 9 of the [Indian] Limitation Act, 1965* 
excludes any possibility of application of section 17^
1* S„17 reads as follows:
Effect of fraud or mistake,
(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for 
which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,-
(a) the suit or application is based upon fraud 
of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which 
a suit or application is founded is concealed by the 
fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the 
consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the 
right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently 
concealed from him;
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until 
the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or 
the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, 
until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the 
means of producing the concealed document or compelling 
its production:
fk*ovided that nothing in this section shall enable 
any suit to be instituted or application to be made to 
recover or enforce any charge against, or set aside any 
transaction affecting, any property which-
(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for 
valuable consideration by a person who was not a party 
to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase 
know, or have reason to believe, that any fraud had been 
committed, or
(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for 
valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction 
in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not 
know, or have reason to believe, that the mistake had 
been made, or
continued:
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of the Limitation Act when it provides that where once 
time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability 
to institute a suit or make an application will stop it.
In case of S.12(2)(b)(ii) time begins to run, in the case 
of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of HMA, 
at one year before commencement, or, in the case of 
marriages solemnized after such commencement, at the date 
of the marriage, and, accordingly, no disability or inability 
to sue can stop the period of limitation running.
(5) that marital intercourse with his consent has
not taken place
Various questions arise to be considered. What do 
the terms "discovered1 and "intercourse with the consent of
(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been 
purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was 
not a party to the concealment and, did not at the time 
of purchase know, or have reason to believe, that the 
document had been concealed.
(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, pre­
vented the execution of a decree or order within the 
period of limitation, the Court may, on the application 
of the judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the 
said period extend the period for execution of the 
decree or order:
Provided that such application is made within one 
year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or 
the cessation of force, as the case may be.
the petitioner mean?"
(i) Meaning of "discovered"
Does it mean that a petitioner is debarred from 
petitioning for nullity because he, before the marriage, 
had grounds for suspecting that the respondent was pregnant 
by someone else - subsequent events turning that suspicion 
into a certainty? Let us suppose that on inquiry the res­
pondent on the one hand denies this and on the other 
refuses to submit to a medical examination. The marriage 
takes place and the petitioner has sexual intercourse with 
the respondent. He has shown that he was "ignorant", but 
his proceeding to petition is based on his "discovery" • At 
what point does "discovery" arise? At some point, we may 
assume, he has imputed to him the knowledge of his wife's 
pregnancy at such a period that it can not be attributed 
to his own acts of conjugal intercourse. A problem arises 
if he continues to have intercourse while his female 
relatives discuss the probabilities, for he is not likely 
to do the calculations unaided.
A state of knowledge, as so often in law, is imputed 
to him, even though objective proofs of his knowledge are
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unattainable ♦ ^
Although the term "discovered" is not defined either 
in the HMA, the Kenya ordinance or in the MCA 1937* 1950, 
it appears that, to arrive at one, an objective test must 
be applied, i.e., whether the facts before the petitioner 
would have made clear to a reasonable man that the respon­
dent was so pregnant* The petitioner would be barred from 
petitioning for nullity, under this clause, if he chose to 
have sexual intercourse with the respondent, having in 
mind the facts laid before him, without determining whether
his suspicions were correct* This is in substance the
2meaning of "discovered" which has been or might be, taken 
by the Courts.
In Siva guru V Saroja,^  for example, (where it was 
alleged that it would be for the respondent to show, upon
1. See N.R. Raqhavacharar: Hindu Law, p.931* "...if marital 
intercourse was shown to have taken place between the 
petitioner and the respondent after the discovery by the 
petitioner of the pregnancy of the pregnancy - a circum­
stance which would be fatal to the maintainability of 
the petition - the only way in which the petitioner 
could overcome this hurdle of objection is by proving 
that the marital intercourse which was had was not with 
the petitioner^ consent, but that he had been forced to 
it by threat or duress overpowering his will."
2* Sivaguru V Saroja A.I.R. I960 Mad. 216 (discussed 
below)’' and 'Smith" Y Smith (C A) [194-7] 2 All. E.R* 74-1 
(discussed below). See also Lawrence V Lawrence [2 June, 
1954] uiireported cited in Rayden on Livorce (9th EcLa)
pp.121-22.
3. Cited above
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proof try  the petitioner of pregnancy per alium at the time 
of marriage, that subsequently there was marital inter­
course between the parties even after the petitioner had 
discovered, or had grounds to infer, the existence of the 
case for decree) the Court, following Smith V Smith, 
appears to have taken the meaning of "discovered” as "...
when he [the petitioner] had grounds for reasonably infer-
2ring the case for annulment"» Smith V Smith provides
an even clearer instance of the meaning of "discovered" 
where the position has been admirably summed up by Bucknill, 
L.J. The argument put forward on the petitioner^ behalf 
was that,
there^ was a finding by the learned judge that the
husband was not positively convinced that his wife was 
pregnant by another man when he had intercourse with her .• • 
and, as I [Bucknill, L.J.] “understand the argument, counsel 
for the husband said that in this particular case it was 
essential that the husband should believe that his wife was 
pregnant in that way before the proviso [S.7(1)(i)(iii) of 
the MCB, 19371 came into operation*"
1. (CA) [ 194-7] 2 All* E.R. 74-1.
2. ibid.
3. ibid at p.74-3*
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Bucknill,^ L.J*, rejecting this argument observed
that,
"while thinking that such belief must play its 
part in considering whether the husband had 
discovered the existence of the grounds for a 
decree, I do not myself think it is a condition 
precedent for the operation of the proviso. It 
might very well be that the husband refused to 
believe in the teeth of overwhelming evidence.
It is an old saying. "None so blind as those 
who won!t see" and, if the belief in those 
circumstances is essential for the proviso to 
come into operation, I think a grave injustice 
would be done to the wife because one must 
take into account her position also. It may be 
that she was to blame in the first instance, 
but she must be allowed to say that, if the 
husband knew or ought to have known that she 
was pregnant at the time of the marriage, and, 
notwithstanding, chose to have connection with 
her, she is entitled to relief under the proviso 
and to say that the husband is debarred from 
obtaining a decree of nullity."
It is self-evident that this view of the law will 
be applicable to a case under HMA because the husband who 
has discovered that his wife is pregnant by another and 
still has marital relations with her is presumed to have 
condoned the fact.
(ii) Intercourse with the Consent...
The question is: whether there can be intercourse
1. Smith V Smith (C.A.) [194-7] 2 All. E.R. 74-1 at 74-3
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without consent? Is there possibility of non-consensual 
intercourse, e.g. where the petitioner is a lunatic or a 
minor or drugged?
It is submitted a husband who has intercourse,
which is not induced, by the fraud of the wife, after the
knowledge of the facts, should thereby be regarded as
condoning his wife!s misconduct* However, it has been
rightly suggested that "marital intercourse with consent
of the petitioner" are superfluous'1’ words in view of the
o
dicta in Henderson V Henderson (discussed below).
*
In Roberts V Roberts, for example, where the 
husband petitioned for a dissolution of his marriage on the 
ground of the wife1 s adultery and it appeared that she had 
confessed the adultery but had denied, in answer to his 
question, that she was pregnant in consequence of it, 
whereupon the husband forgave her and had marital relations 
with her; it was held by Hill, J, that, since the wife knew 
she was pregnant and had induced the acts of her husband by 
false and fraudulent statements, he had not condoned her 
adultery and was entitled to his decree.
1. J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p.195*
2. [19^4] 1 All. E.RT 44;
3. [1917] 117 L.T * 157.
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Similarly, the House of Lords considered the 
question in Henderson V Henderson *" where Viscount Simon ,
L#C*, observed that,
2
" I know nothing in the earlier decisions, either 
in the ecclesiastical Courts or in the Divorce Court in 
England, which supports the view that a husband who has 
intercoursey which is not induced by the fraud of the wife, 
after knowledge of the facts of his wife*s adultery, should 
not thereby be regarded as condoning his wife‘s misconduct#n 
Thus, if the husband has intercourse with the wife after 
knowing the facts which would have made clear to a reason­
able man that she was pregnant, as required under the 
clause, the Court will refuse to grant a nullity decree 
notwithstanding that the petitioner was a lunatic, or a 
minor etc*
III The Standard of Proof:
A petitioner who proves to the "satisfaction” of 
the Court, that the respondent has been pregnant as required 
■under this clause is entitled to a decree of nullity# There 
are, however, various questions to be considered: what
1. [194-4] 1 All# E*R. 44 
2# [1944] 1 All# E.R* 44 at 45#
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precisely is the standard of proof required to "satisfy" 
the Court before it can pass a decree? Is the evidence of 
non-access by the husband admissible in evidence? Is 
evidence of a blood test admissible? Can the Court order 
the wife or the child born since the marriage to undergo 
a blood test?
(1) Nature of standard of proof;
The question is sometimes put in this form: whether 
the standard of proof required in a suit under this clause, 
which is a kind of civil action is "criminal standard of 
proof, i*e., beyond reasonable doubt, or the "civil stand­
ard of proof", i.e., balance of probabilities.**" There has
been a conflict of opinion on the queation. There are cases
2
on one hand, such as Churchman V Churchman and Senat V
3 4Senat holding, respectively, that, "the same strict
1. In Miller V Minister of Pensions [194-73 2 A11.E.R.372; 
Lori Penning discusses the degrees of standard of proof* 
In Wright V Wright [194-8] 77 C.L.R* 191 the Australian 
High Court recogn£ses a real distinction between a civil 
and criminal standard of proof*
2. [194-73 2 All. E.R. 190.
3. [1965] 2 All. E.R. 505.
4. Churchman V Churchman op.cit. per Lord Merriman* P, at 
p. 195 • This dictum has been applied in Ginesi V Ginesi
[1948] 1 All. E.R. 373* Ginesi V Ginesi was referred to
by Mudholkar, J, in Mahendra V Sushi la (S*C) [1964]
Bom. L.R. 681 at 693”  A.I.R. 1965 SVC, 369. See also 
Pairman V Eairman [1949] 1 All. E.R. 938; Gallar V Gallar 
UTXTTI^lTrrTTIT. E.R. 536.
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proof is required in the case of a Matrimonial offence as 
is required in connection with criminal offences properly 
so called1 and "...^ it [adultery] must he proved with the 
same strictness as is required for proof of a criminal 
charge; in other words it must he proved heyond reasonable 
doubt". On the other hand, it has been held that "the
divorce Court is a civil Court, and it should not adopt the
2
rules and standards of a criminal Court"•
What is the statutory requirement as to the standard 
of proof? Shall a criminal or civil standard of proof be 
followed by the Courts?
(2) Statutory requirements:
The statutory requirement as to the standard of 
proof is that the Court must be "satisfied". The question 
is: what is meant by "satisfied" and how can satisfaction 
be arrived at? What is the value of admissions against the 
respondent?
1. Senat V Senat [19653 2 All. E.R. 505. per Sir Jocelyn 
Simon, P, at ~p0507•
2. Bater V Bater [1950] 2 All. E.R. 458.
3. S. 23 HMA.
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(i) Meaning of "satisfied”:
In a case under this clause the issues involved 
are of great public importance and public policy requires 
that the evidence must be clear and conclusive, i.e.,
(a) beyond a mere balance of probabilities^" and (b) it will
satisfy T,the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just
2 3man” . In Pres ton-Jones V Pres ton-Jones the standard of
proof laid down was proof beyond reasonable doubt because,
4as Lord Macdermott, observed, "it would be quite out of 
keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold 
that the Court might be satisfied, in respect of a ground 
for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond 
reasonable doubt".
In White V White,^  a case under the Indian Divorce 
Act 1869 > the Indian Supreme Court noticing favourably 
Preston-Jones V Preston-Jones,^* held that it is the duty of 
the Court to pronounce a decree only when it is satisfied 
that the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as
1* Preston-Jones V Preston-Jones (C.A.) [1951] 1 All.E.R.
T 2 C ----------------------------------
2. Loveden V Loveden [1810] 2 Hagg. con 1 at 3 = 161 E.R.
6 W a t  p. 6*1-9 •----
3. [1951] 1 All. E.R. 124.
4. ibid at p.138.
5* [1958] l.S.C.R. 1410. See also Mahendra V Sushila A.I.R.\^ fr° 
Bgpw-116. (judgment in the same case in the High Court) 
where the case was remanded for further investigation.
6. C.A. [1951] 1 All. E.R. 124.
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to the commission of a Matrimonial offence. Similarly* in
Mahendra V Sushila  ^ referring to Preston-Jones V Preston-
Jones and White V White that Court observed that, "It
follows that what the court has to see in these proceedings
is whether the petitioner has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondent was pregnant by some one else at
the time of the marriage. It is interesting to note that
o
Mudholkar, J, (dissenting) said that, "what the Court has 
said in White1s case about the applicability of the rule 
in Preston-Jones V Preston-Jones must also apply to a case 
under the Hindu Marriage Act" •
(ii) How can satisfaction be "arrived at?
The statutory satisfaction contemplated under this 
clause can be arrived at in a variety of ways. It can be 
arrived at on one hand on the basis of evidence oral or 
documentary or direct or circumstantial led in the case.
On the other it may be arrived at, subject to the discretion 
of the Court, on the basis of admissions of the parties, 
Raghubar^Dayal, J, delivering the judgment of the Court in
1. [1964] Bm. L.R* 681
2, ibid at pc695*
Mahendra V Sushila [1964] L.R. 681 at 686,
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Mahendra1 s case, observed that, ftwe are of the opinion 
that in proceedings under the Act the Court can arrive at 
the satisfaction contemplated by S.23 [of HMA] on the basis 
of legal evidence in accordance with the provisions of the 
Evidence Act and that it is quite competent for the Court 
to arrive at the necessary satisfaction even on the basis 
of the admission of the parties alone."
(iii) Value of admissions.
If admissions are freely to be utilized in India 
Matrimonial cases certain dangers follow, due to the 
inexperience of pleaders and the lack of skill and indepen­
dence in the parties themselves. A respondent may plead 
that her pregnancy was due to the petitioner whereupon it 
will be held that she had admitted that she was pregnant 
at the material date.
An admission may be defined as a concession or 
voluntary acknowledgement made by a party or some one 
identified with him in legal interest of the existence of 
certain facts which are in issue or relevant to an issue
in the case.^ The general rule is that, subject to statutory
2provisions and the discretion of the Court, a fact admitted
1. Ajodhya Prasad V Bhawani Shankar, A.I.R. 1957 All.l.
2. I Indian] Evidence Act; R 6 0 12 CPC; R 5 0 8 CPC,
3 43
1if clear and unequivocal, need not be proved, i.e., 
admission itself serves as proof.
The position, as to the value of admissions, is
2
admirably stated by the Supreme Court in Mahendra V Sushila 
where it was said, "Admissions are to be ignored on the 
grounds of prudence only when the Court, in the circum­
stances of a case, is of opinion that the admissions of 
the parties may be collusive. If there be no ground for 
such a view, it would be proper for the court to act on 
these admissions without forcing the parties to lead other 
evidence to establish the facts admitted, unless of course 
the admissions are contradicted by the facts proved or a 
doubt is created by the proved facts as regards the 
correctness of the facts admitted"•
(3) Standard of proof to be followed:
There is a strong possibility that the criminal 
standard will not be followed by the Courts in considering 
concealed-pregnancy cases, as we shall consider, for two 
reasons, namely,
1. Rameshwar Dayal V State A.I.R. 1954- HP 21,
2. L19S4-J Som'.L.R. 661 at 687; see also Arnold V Arnold
[1911] 1 L.R. 38 Cal. 907a
I.L.R. 38 Cal; Over V Over [1924-] 27 Bom. L.R. 251
both cited in Mahendra Y Sushila [1964-] Bom.L.R. 681.
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(i) This view relies for its validity, on an 
entirely -unconvincing authority; and
(ii) The expression "beyond reasonable doubt" 
is not entirely harmonious with the fact 
that the ground we refer to as "concealed - 
pregnancy" is not to be regarded as a 
criminal or quasi-criminal offence *
(i) View relies on an unconvincing authority:
(a) In Ginesi V Ginesi, the Court of Appeal unreservedly
o
approved the obiter dicta in Churchman V Churchman, (see
above p.S^) a case regarding standard of proof as to the
allegation that a husband had connived in his wife*s
adultery* The Court of Appeal recognised in both cases that
the same principles apply to an allegation of connivance
of adultery as to adultery itself* The obiter dicta in
Churchman V Churchman appears to have been arrived at,
with due respect, by a misunderstanding on the part of their
*
Lordships* Lord Merriman, P, relied on an observation of
(n ^ ii
Lord Wensleydale in Cgipps V £ripps, * which said, "That 
the Court is to be satisfied as far as it reasonably can, 
that the adultery has been proved, and the petitioner has 
not been in any manner accessory to, or connived at, 
adultery, and that he has not condoned the same"* It is
1. C1948] 1 All* E.R. 373.
2* [1947] 2 All* E.R. 190*
3. [1864] XI H.L.C. 1 = 11 E.R. 1.230.
4, ibid at p, 1236.
345
submitted that Lord Merriman, P, in Churchman V Churchman 
used rather broader words, which do not follow from the 
case relied upon by His Lordship and its acceptance in 
other cases, as applying to all matrimonial cases cannot 
be justified* Similarly in Senat V Senat ^  the observation 
that, "it must be proved with the same strictness as is 
required for proof of a criminal charge, ... In my view 
that is clearly established by Ginesi V Ginesi; Preston- 
Jones V Preston-Jones and Galler V Galler." also appears 
to have been arrived at, with due respect, by a misunder­
standing on the part of His Lordship. There is no justifi-
2
cation, it is submitted, for Sir Jocelyn Simon. P,fs
observation relating to Ginesi V Ginesi, Preston-Jones V
h. c;
Preston-Jones and Gallar V Gallar.^  The obiter dicta in
Churchman V Churchman, ^  as we have seen itself has been
arrived at on misunderstanding of judicial authority. In
Preston-Jones V Preston-Jones, Lord MacDermott made it clear
7
that, "... I do not base my conclusions as to the approp­
riate standard of proof on any analogy drawn from the 
criminal law...1
1. C1965] 2 All. E.R. 505 at 507.
2. Senat v Senat [19651 2 All. E.R. 505 at p.507.
5. IT9TOT 1 'All. E.R. 373.
Zj. ^ ib id.
5. C1954-3 1 All. E.R. 536.
6. [194-73 2 All. E.R. 190.
7. ibid at p.138.
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(b) In Ginesi V Ginesi ^  the question of standard of
proof was not properly argued and investigated* The Court
2observed that, "Counsel for husband does not dispute that 
it [the obiter dicta in Churchman V Churchman] is an 
accurate statement of the requirements of proof of adultery 
in divorce proceedings.*." This concession by Counsel made 
matters worse* Further the authorities referred to by the 
Court nowhere suggest that the dicta in Churchman V Church­
man might be correct. On the contrary the decision of 
House of Lords in Mordaunt V Mancreiffe, where it was 
decided that a suit for divorce for adultery, is a civil 
and not a criminal matter, and that the analogies and pre­
cedents of criminal law have no authority in divorce cases 
"strikes at the root" (to use Lord Dennings p h r a s e o f  
Churchman V Churchman and Ginesi V Ginesi.
(c) Similarly in Ginesi V Ginesi and Churchman V Church- 
man the Court did not foresee the following consequence of 
applying the so-called criminal standard of proof* If the 
principles of the criminal standard of proof are to be 
applied the spouse is to be acquitted of adultery if there
1. [1948] 1 All. E.R. 573*
2. ibid
3 T1874-1 T. T 84-9
4-! Gower V Gower*[19303 1 All. E.R. 804.
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is some reasonable hypothesis compatible with innocence 
that is not convincingly excluded by the proofs advanced, 
notwithstanding that the Court has no belief in the 
hypothesis
(d) In recent cases it has been held that the criminal
standard of proof is not necessarily called for in divorce
2 3suits« In Davis V Davis and Gower V Gower ^  the Court
observed, respectively, that, "... the word "strict" is 
sufficiently apt to describe the measure and standard of 
proof required of a charge of cruelty and that it is un­
necessary to introduce any question of the standard of 
proof required of a criminal charge" and, "I do not think 
that this Court is irrevocably committed to the view that 
a charge of adultery must be regarded as a criminal charge, 
to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt." In Wright V
lL
Wright it was held by Latham C.J., Rich and Dixon JJ. 
that the standard required for the proof of a criminal 
offence is not applicable to the proof of adultery in a 
Matrimonial Cause. The Madras High Court in V. Varadarajtila
1. Wright V Wright [1948] 77 C.L.R. 191.
2. TOoko) L1950j I All. E.R. p.40 per Bucknill, L.J., at
p.4-2*
3. (C.A.) ibid at p.804 per Denning, L.J: at p.805.
4. [1948] 77 C.L. R 191.
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1 PBaby Ammal relying on Davis V Davis, Miller V Minister
Z  lL
of Pensions ^  and Lovedon V Lovedon lie Id that tliougli there 
was no direct evidence, the evidence was strong and suffic­
ient to come to the conclusion that the respondent was 
living in adultery*
(ii) "Concealed-pregnancy" is not to be regarded as a 
criminal or quasi-criminal offence*
We know that a suit under this clause is a civil 
and not a criminal proceeding. In such a case, therefore, 
"... in the ordinary way the rules of civil procedure and 
not the rules of criminal procedure would apply...The 
requirements of a higher standard of proof Ci*e. beyond 
reasonable doubt as applied to a criminal proceeding] was 
a measure of mercy thrown1 to those who were potentially 
liable to punishment^ [by the Crown] • The absence of such 
consideration, in a civil action, requires the exclusion 
of "higher standard" in nullity proceedings. The reason 
being that the Courts are concerned with giving relief to 
the parties, not punishment or retribution.
1* A.I.R. 1965 Madras 29 •
2. C.P. [1950] 1 All. E.R. 40.
3. [1947] 2 All. E.R. 372.
4. [1810] 2 Hogg. CM. 1 = 161 E.R* 648.
5* per Lord Denning in Davis V Davis (C.A.) [1950]
1 All. E.R. 40 at 42. relied on in Varadaratjulu V Baby 
Ammal. A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 29.
6. 3T.A*r~"Courts "The standard of proof of adultery"
[1949] 65 LQR 220.
See also "The standard of Proof of Adultery" [1950] 66 
LQR pp.35-38
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The que&tion is: what is the test, if we follow
the "Civil standard of proof"(i.e.,balance of probabilities)
of such a degree of probability? Does it imply a strict
standard of proof? or Does it mean to the satisfaction of
a prudent man, i.e., an objective test may be applied? The
case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but
there may be degrees of probabilities within that standard*
The degree depends on the subject matter* Sir William
2
Scott put the matter succinctly in Loveden V Loveden as, 
"... the circumstances must be such as would 
lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man 
to the conclusion.**"
Lord Denning, (as he then was) commenting
on the case said that "the degree of probability which a 
reasonable and just man would require to come to a conclu­
sion - and likewise the degree of doubt which would prevent 
him from coming to it - depends on the conclusion to which 
he is required to come . *, if he was left in real and 
substantial doubt on the particular matter, he would hold 
the charge not to be established. He would not be satisfied 
about it."
1. Bater Y Bater [1950] 2 All. E.R. 458.
2. riBlOT "2 "Hogg Con.3 = 161 E.R. p.648 at p.649.
3. Bater V Bater [1950] 2 All. E.R. 458 at 459*
350
The question is: what is a real and substantial 
doubt? A real and substantial doubt is, according to Lord 
Dennings L.J., another way of saying a reasonable
doubt9 and a Tlreasonable doubt” is simply that degree of 
doubt which would prevent a reasonable and just man from 
coming to a conclusion* So the phrase Reasonable doubt” 
gets one no further* It does not say that the degree of 
probability must be as high as ninety-nine per cent* or as 
low as fifty-one per cent. The degree required must depend 
on the mind of the reasonable and just man who is consider­
ing the particular subject matter ... when this is realised, 
the phrase "reasonable doubt” can be used just as aptly 
in a civil or a divorce case as in a criminal case...”
It is submitted that in cases under HMA or the 
ordinance the expression "beyond reasonable doubt" must 
be understood as providing for proof beyond reasonable 
doubt in the sense that on the facts and circumstances 
established by the petitioner a prudent man, i*e., the 
judge, would be completely satisfied as to the facts 
alleged.
1. Bater V Bater [1950] 2 All. E.R. 458 at 459.
IV Proof of non-paternity of petitioner*
Proof of a negative is extremely difficult and in 
practice proof that the child, whose existence forms the 
ground for the petition, is not the child of the petitioner 
proceeds either on the footing that the petitioner had no 
access to the respondent at the relevant period or, less 
frequently, that the petitioner was impotent*
1* Evidence of non-access
There is nothing to prevent a hushand or a wife, 
under the Hindu Marriage Act, giving evidence of non-access 
at the material time* This will be so even though the 
result of receiving such evidence may be to declare 
illegitimate one who would otherwise be presumed to be a
i
legitimate child of the marriage.
2. Presumption of certain facts
2A presumption is a rule of law that attaches 
definitive probative value to specific facts and raises 
such a high degree of probability in its favour that it 
must prevail unless clearly met and explained and overturned 
(i*ec rebutted) by explanatory proof to the satisfaction
1. S.112* [Indian] Evidence Act; Sreeni Vasan V Kirubai 
A.I.R, 1957 Mad* 160.
2. Seithammara V Koyommatath Mammod A.I.E. 1957 Ker. 63; 
Kansi Ram V J~ai Rain A.l.R, 1956 H.P.4.
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of the Court.1
The presumption under section 112 of the [Indian] 
Evidence Act applies subject to proof of impossibility of
access* "Presumption of paternity" will be drawn by all 
o
Courts, irrespective of whether the mother was married or
*
not at the time of the conception* Further* section 114 of 
the [Indian] Evidence Act provides that, "The Court may pre­
sume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to 
have happened, regard being had to common course of nature, 
events, human conduct and public and private business, in 
their relation to the facts of the particular case*"
IL
In Mahendra V Sushila the Supreme Court, as to 
section 114, observed that, "The conclusion we have 
arrived at about the child born to the respondent being 
not the child of the appellant, fits in with the presumption 
to be drawn in accordance with the provisions of this 
section[114 of the Indian Evidence Act]*"
The Court considering the question of the proof of 
non-access and legitimacy of the child under section 112 of
1. Fatah Gugan V Sardara A.I.R. 1958 PU.335*
2* Jambapuram Subhama Y J* Venkata Redd* A.I.R. 1950 Mad.
3* Thandi Ram V Jagan Nath A.I.R. 1957 Lah. 784*
4* ngBJTTBom; t z r t  w i t "
5* ibid at p* 689*
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1
the Evidence Act, observed that, "The question of the 
legitimacy of the child born to the respondent does not 
directly arise in this case, though the conclusion we have 
reached is certain to affect the legitimacy of the respon­
dents daughter. However, the fact that she was b o m  during 
the continuance of the valid marriage between the parties 
can not be taken to be conclusive proof of her being a 
legitimate daughter of the appellant ... as it has been 
found by the Courts below, and the finding has not been in 
question here before us, that the appellant had no access 
to the respondent at the relevant time."
5* Blood test:
Blood tests are relevant if the number of days 
between the marriage and the birth is such that the child 
might be the fruit of the marriage. By a blood test the 
petitioner may prove that,the child not being his, and the 
circumstances of the respondents life leaving no room for 
suspicion of adultery on her part, the child must have been 
conceived before the marriage. Such situations are bound to 
arise, in which the child could otherwise claim legitimacy,
1. C1964] Bom. L.R. 681 at 690.
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and yet M s  mother is in a fork between divorce for adultery 
or nullity for concealed-pregnancy, and the blood test 
appears the vital means of settling his status.^
A blood test is admissible in evidence provided it
be offered by the parties voluntarily, The court has, it
appears, no power to order the wife or the child born since
1
the marriage to undergo a blood test.
There are two reported cases in which the results 
of blood tests voluntarily undergone by the parties have 
been put in evidence in order to prove that a husband- 
petitioner, in a divorce suit, was not the father of a 
child born to the wife for the purpose of establishing the 
wife!s adultery. The cases are, Liff V Liff^ and H V 
Hand C.^  In both cases the evidence was similar. The 
husband and wife were both of blood group 0 and the child 
was of group A. There was medical evidence that a child of 
group A could not be produced by two parents both of group
1. See W V V (no.4) (O.A.) [19653 2 All. E.R. 841 affirming 
Cairns, J.,*s decision in V V W (no.4) [19653 2 All.E.R. 
386.
2. 1948 W.N. 128.
3* [19623 "The Times" March 23*
0.^ This was accepted by the Court.
1, Samson Wright ; Applied Physiology. (OoU.P. [1965] 
llth Edn# p*^*
[Human beings can be divided into four main groups 
according to the presence (or absence) in their red 
cells (and in certain tissue cells) of the substances 
called A, B, and 0.
The groups are correspondingly called group A, 
group B, group AB, and group 0. More refined analysis 
shows that substance A can be subdivided into sub-groups 
called A-, & AQ; includes 75% of all group A, A0 forms 
25%.
Group AB is similarly divided into A^B and A^B.]
INHERITANCE OP CLASSICAL BLOOD GROUPS
The four classical blood groups depend on three 
genes named after the corresponding factor A, B, and 0. 
Each person fs blood group is determined by the two genes 
which he receives from each parent. Genes A and B, 
whether present in the red cell separately or together, 
may be demonstrated by the use of Anti-A or Anti-B serum. 
The presence of the 0 gene is not easily demonstrated, 
and to Anti-A serum AA and AO cells react alike, both 
serologically being group A.
Accordingly:
If person receives £ A+A B+B A+B 0+0
( or or
genes ( A+0 B+0
His blood group is A B AB 0
His genotype is AA BB
or or
AO BO AB 00
This information can be used in investigating cases 
of disputed paternity0 A baby must receive one of three 
possible genes (A,B or 0) from each parent. Purther, 
each parent transfers one of two genes to the child: an 
A parent (genotype AA or AO) can give A or B, a B parent 
(genotype BB or BO) B or 0, and AB parent A or B, and 
an 0 parent (00) 0 only* It must be remembered, however, 
that the child's blood may not be set in its true ABO
continued
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type until as late as one year after birth.• 
It follows that:
If the Baby's 
group is
Parents must 
have given it
So if mother 
was
Father could 
not have 
been
0 0+0 Ro matter AB
which
AB A+B tl IT 0
A C A+0 ) B or 0 B or 0
( or )
( A+A )
B ( B+0 ) A or 0 A or 0
( or )
( B+B )
The medico legal value of blood groupings tests is 
greatly enhanced if the MR and the various Rhesus factors 
are also studied*
The M & R factors depend on two minor blood genes.
It is very rare indeed for these two elicit an output 
of Agglutinins when injected into man and they may 
therefore be ignored in carrying out transfusions. They 
are, however, antigenic to rabbits and agglutinating 
sera can be prepared by injecting human M or N cells 
into rabbits.
Each person carries two of the genes of the M & R 
group, i*e#, M+M (=M), R+R (=R), or M+R (=MR). As a 
result:
If a baby's 
supplementary 
group is -
Parents must 
have given it
So if mother's 
supplementary 
group was -
Father could 
not have 
been -
M M+M Ro matter 
which
R
R R+R ii ti M
m M+R R R
m m+r M M
It should always be remembered that blood grouping 
tests can never prove that any suspected person is the 
actual father; they can only show that he could not 
possibly have been the father or that he (like many 
others) might have been.
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It is self-evident that these cases will he 
applicable to a case under H M  if the parties themselves 
tender the evidence.
In W V W ^  the Court refused to order a blood test
because in that case it was not in issue that at the time
of the marriage the wife was pregnant* The difficulty in 
the case was caused by the fact that the husband admitted 
that he himself had sexual intercourse with the wife before 
marriage* He alleged that the wife also had sexual inter­
course with another man or men* The court said that it has 
no power to order such a test [i.e* a blood test]* In
Mehendra V Sushila this case [here the case cited was 
*
Cairns, J 1 s  ^decision which was subsequently affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal^] was referred to but the Supreme Court did 
not consider the question of a blood test.
It is submitted that this should be left to the
discretion of the Court because it may depend on the facts
of a case whether to make such an order or not*
V • a .' e*
X. C1964] Bm, L.R. 681.
3. [1963] 2 All. E.R. 386.
L2. V T V  (no.4) [1963] 2 All. E.R. 841.
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V "Concealed-pregnancy" in Kenya and Uganda
In Uganda, we do not find specific reference to 
concealed-pregnancy", as a ground for nullity* However, it 
is submitted that, in Uganda, this may well he imported 
under "fraud"• The principles applicable to a case under
HMA; (sec ahovo-y-pp-*—  ----- it is submitted, may be
applied by the Courts in Kenya and Uganda.
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CHAPTER VIII 
VENEREAL DISEASE
I* Introduction:
A marriage is voidable, under The [Kenya]^ Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, I960, where the respondent 
was at the time of the marriage suffering from venereal 
disease in a communicable form.
These provisions appear to have been based upon
p
section 8(1)(c) of the [English] Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950, re-enacting section 7(1)(c) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1937♦ We find, however, that in the parallel 
provisions of HMA or Uganda Ordinance there is no specific 
reference to venereal disease as a ground for nullity. It 
is submitted, this (until adopted as a ground) may well be 
imported under "fraud11. To the extent to which non-dis­
closure of certain defects amounts to fraud (above, p. ) 
non-disclosure of an advanced stage of venereal disease may 
amount to "fraud" under the HMA or Uganda ordinance.
1. Cap. 157. section 11(1)(b)(IV).
2. S,8(l)(c) provides "... that the respondent at the 
time of the marriage suffering from venereal disease in 
a communicable form"; As to venereal disease as a ground 
for "nullity" generally see, J. Jackson, The Formation 
and Aimulment of Marriage, pp.76-77; J.D.M. fierrett, 
Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p,5^15 Latey on 
Divorce (lAth Edn. j p. 214; Ray den on D i vo rce^c9 th Edn.) 
pp.l2l-22; Webb and Beavan, Sourcebook of Family Law,
P*95.
360
II . Venereal disease in a communicable form:
The question is: what is meant by "in a communi­
cable form"? Does it mean communicable to the husband or 
to any person? It has been observed in Latey on Divorce 
that, "The question whether the Act would cover a case 
where the disease is only communicable to progeny and not 
to the petitioner may arise for decision."
The expression "in a communicable form" would mean,
it is submitted, a venereal disease, which has been defined
?
in the Venereal Diseases Act, 1917* as "syphilis, gonorr­
hoea, or soft chancere" for the purpose of that Act,
communicable to any person. The only available case on the
*
queation is Lawrence V Lawrence  ^where Judge Lawson Camp­
bell decided that "communicable" meant "communicable to 
any person", so that where the wife1 s syphilis was communi­
cable to a child of the marriage but not to the husband, 
the husband was entitled to a decree.
1. at p.214.
2. S.4.
3. [June 2, 19540 unreported; Cited in Hayden on Divorce 
(9th edn.) at pp.119-20.
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III. Preliminary requirements:
Where relief is sought on the ground of venereal 
disease it is required that the Court shall he satisfied 
on the following matters, namely:
(1) that the petitioner was at the time of the 
marriage ignorant of the facts alleged
(2) that the proceedings were instituted within
2
a year from the date of the marriage, and
(3) that marital intercourse with the consent 
of the petitioner has not taken place 
since the discovery hy the petitioner of 
the existence of the grounds for a decree.
(1) !tignorantfT of the facts alleged:
The term "ignorant”, under the proviso, means that 
in the circumstances of the case the petitioner, as a 
reasonable man, was not aware at the time of the marriage 
of the fact that the respondent was suffering from venereal
1. Cap. 157* S.ll(l)(b)(V)(I) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, I960, See also S.8(l)(d)(i)
M.C.A. 1950.
2. Cap,157« S.ll(l)(b)(U)(ii) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, I960. See also S.8(1)(d)(ii) 
M.C.A. 1950.
3. Cap. 157• S.(H)(1)(b)(v)(iii) The [Kenya] Hindu Marriage 
and Divorce Ordinance, I960. See also S.8(1)(d)(iii) 
M.C.A, 1950.
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disease in a 001011111111 cable form'*'(as to detailed treatment 
of the meaning of "ignorant" see under Concealed-pregnancy).
(2) That the proceedings were instituted within one year:
The petitioner is "barred from petitioning under 
the proviso , if the petition was presented after the 
expiration of time prescribed for its presentation. This 
period, it is submitted, is absolute and cannot be 
extended for the Ordinance has expressly delimited the 
period after the expiry of which an action under this 
proviso can not be brought, (as to a detailed discussion 
see under Concealed-pregnancy).
(3) That marital intercourse with the consent of the 
petitioner has not taken place;
The question is: (as was under Concealed-pregnancy) 
what do the terms "discovered" and "intercourse with the 
consent of the petitioner" mean?
(i) Meaning of "discovered":
It is submitted that, under the proviso, "discovered"
1. Jackson V Jackson [1939] 1 All. E.R. 4-715* See also 
Sivaguru V Saroja, A.I.R. I960 Mad.216.
S avalram V Yeshodabai, A.I.R. 1962, Ban. 190.
2. See Ohaplin V ChaplTn (C.A.) [194-?] 2 All. E.R, 4-08.
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means that in the circumstances of the case the facts
before the petitioner would have made clear to a reasonable
man that the respondent was suffering from a venereal
disease in a communicable form (as to a detailed discussion
see under Concealed pregnancy) and the petitioner would be
barred from petitioning for nullity, under this proviso,
if the petitioner chose to have sexual intercourse with
the respondent, having in mind the facts laid before him.'*"
2 husband prayed for annulment of 
the marriage on the ground that the wife was at the time 
of the marriage, suffering from a venereal disease in a 
communicable form. The wife, by her answer, alleged that 
the husband was disentitled to relief because he had had 
sexual intercourse with her on two occasions after the 
1st June (the date on which the husband first learned of 
the wife’s condition and after which he continued to share 
a bed with her for about a fortnight* Karminski, J, 
accepted the husband’s evidence that his reason for con­
tinuing to share a bed with the wife after he discovered 
her condition was that he did not want her parents, in
1. See Smith V Smith (C.A.) [19473 2 All.E.R* 74*1; see also 
Sivaguru V Sarotja, A*I.R* I960, Mad* 216*
2* [l962jl06 (Vol.ii) The Solicitorfs Journal, p«959*
36 3
whose house the parties were living3 to know the true 
state of affairs, and that marital intercourse did not 
take place after 1st. June. In the result, it was held, 
that the husband was entitled to a decree nisi of nullity.
Similarly in Lawrence V Lawrence,1 a husband was 
informed through a clinic that the wife had syphilis. The 
wife falsely persuaded him that in consequence of a later 
blood test she in fact had not got venereal disease. In 
reliance of that false information the husband had sexual 
intercourse with her twice. It was held by Judge Lawson 
Gampbell, that the husband was not fixed with knowledge 
at the time he had the sexual intercourse, because a reason­
able man would not have thought it necessary to make 
further inquiries after the wifers assurance.
(ii) Intercourse with the consent:
The words "intercourse with the consent of the 
petitioner" tinder this clause means the same thing as under 
"Concealed-pregnancy", i.e., they are necessary in view of 
the dicta in Henderson V Henderson. (As to a detailed
1. [June 2, 1954-3 unreported, cited in Rayden on Divorce, 
(9th Edn.) p.122.
2. [1944] 1 All. E.R. 44; Roberts V Roberts [19173 117 L.T. 
157. See also J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern 
Hindu Law, p. 195*
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discussion see under Concealed-pregnancy).
IV. The standard of proof:
The question is: what precisely is the standard of 
proof requited to satisfy the Court before it can pass a 
decree? Karminski, J, (considering a nullity petition on 
the ground of "venereal disease in a communicable form"), 
observed in C V C  ^that,
"Whether the degree of that onus of proof was 
described as being to satisfy the Court beyond reasonable 
doubt, or by saying that the Court must be satisfied as to 
be sure, was a philological difference merely".
The standard of proof in such a case, it is sub­
mitted, must be that of a prudent man, i.e., that on the 
facts and circumstances established by the petitioner a
prudent man, i.e., the Judge would be completely satisfied
2as to the facts alleged.
1. [1962] 106(ii) The Solicitor's Journals p.959 at p.960.
2. See above "The Standard of Proof" under Concealed- 
pregnancy.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS
(1) We find that in the dharmasastra nullity existed*
A marriage was void if the parties to the marriage were 
within the degrees of prohibited relations. Similarly, a 
marriage was voidable on the ground of incurable impotence, 
force or fraud which included fraudulent concealment of 
impotence, insanity, a chronic or loathsome disease, or any 
other serious defect of the purporting bride or the bride­
groom, and finally nondisclosure of such defects. We also 
find that in pre-1955 law "nullity" was possible on the 
ground of impotence, force or fraud and later bigamy* The 
HMA and parallel laws of Kenya and Uganda enacted various 
grounds on which a marriage might be annulled.
(2) A marriage is void if either party has a spouse 
living or of the former husband or wife of either party was 
living, at the time of the marriage* The terms "spouse 
living" and "former husband or wife of either party was 
living" implies that, at the time of the second marriage, 
there is a priori valid subsisting marriage* A spouse may 
rely on the "presumption of death" of the other spouse and 
may marry again without committing bigamy* Similarly, a 
spouse whose other spouse has disappeared may remarry, after 
making all possible inquiries, relying on the presumption of 
death of the other spouse and the Court, in any future
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proceedings, with, regard to such a marriage as "binding in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary# However, a marriage 
contracted in contravention of section 15 HMA shall he 
voidable, The use of words "marriage” and "solemnized" 
indicate that it is essential for the second marriage to be 
bigamous that it should have been celebrated with proper 
ceremonies and in due form.
(3) A marriage between parties who are within the degrees 
of prohibited relationship, or prohibited degrees of con­
sanguinity or where the parties are sapindas of each other 
is void# The degrees of prohibited relationship, or prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity, or sapinda relationship include 
relationship by half, uterine and full blood. It also 
includes illegitimate blood relationship as well as relation­
ship by adoption# It is punishable to procure1 the solemn!- 
zation of one1 s own marriage in contravention of the law 
relating to degrees of prohibited relationship and sapinda- 
ship# This clause is absolute and should be construed 
strictly#
The reason for the rule prohibiting a marriage on 
the ground of degrees of prohibited relationship, or pro­
hibited degrees of consanguinity, or sapinda relationship 
is to avoid the possibility of incestuous intercourse#
The restriction relating to the prohibited degrees
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of consanguinity and sapin&asliip may "be enacted if a custom 
permitting such a marriage may be adequately proved*
(4) Impotence, to be a ground for nullity under HMA or 
the Kenya and Uganda Ordinance, may be defined as a practical 
disability for sexual intercourse due to some malformation 
and/or invincible repugnance to the act of sexual intercourse 
generally or quoad banc (to a particular woman) or hunc (to 
a particular man) due to nervous and/or psychic disorder 
either proved as a fact or inferred from the conduct of the 
alleged impotent spouse*
It is to be noted, however, that wilful refusal to 
consummate as distinct from inability to consummate, is not 
a ground for nullity under HMA, Kenya or Uganda Ordinance,
It is also to be noted that sexual intercourse with the use 
of contraceptives or contraceptive measures or where the 
husband had invariably adopted the practice of coitus 
interruptus is complete intercourse for sexual intercourse 
is, for the purposes of nullity, erectio and intromissio 
without necessarily ejaculatio, Similarly, we find that 
merely conception and birth of a child, which may be due to 
fecundatio ab extra or by artificial insemination, does not 
itself establish that "intercourse in law" has taken place, 
ice,, the marriage has been consummated. Thus the following 
instances may be held to amount to impotence: incurable, or
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curable with danger to the spouse concerned, structural mal­
formation, a venereal disease making normal intercourse 
impossible, a nervous and/or psychic disorder making the 
respondent incapable of sexual intercourse in general or 
quoad hanc or hunc* An inference of impotence may be inferred 
by the Court due to failure on the part of the respondent 
to consummate the marriage after a reasonable time, or due 
to refusal to undergo medical examination and/or treatment. 
However, the circumstances favouring an inference of impot­
ence are not reasons for disability. However, sterility can 
not be the synonym of impotence.
Impotence may either be proved by medical examination 
of the parties (in which case the medical evidence must be 
strictly proved) or by examination of the parties as wit­
nesses (in which case the admissions of the respondent are 
sufficient to establish the case, unless the litigation is 
collusive and corroboration is not essential, although is 
required). The standard of proof of impotence is a reasonable 
conclusion based on fair inferences which would satisfy a 
prudent man, i.e., the judge, that the respondent is and has 
been impotent.
A decree of nullity of marriage may be refused where 
the petitioner has approbated the marriage or where the 
petitioner is taking advantage of his or her disability or 
where the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion 
with the respondent.
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(5) A marriage may be annulled under HMA and Uganda 
Ordinance on the one band and Kenya Ordinance on tbe otber 
wbere either party to tbe marriage was, respectively, an 
idiot or a lunatic and a person of unsound mind, or subject 
to recurrent fits of insanity or epilepsy, Tbe test required 
in determining wbetber a spouse is an idiot or a lunatic or 
a person of unsound mind, is not a question of mere weakness 
of intellect or tbe capacity to enter into a financial agree 
ment. Tbe test of mental incapacity is: wbetber tbe party 
alleged to be idiot, or lunatic or person of unsound mind, 
on tbe date of tbe marriage, was capable of understanding 
not only tbe nature of tbe marriage be or sbe was entering 
into but tbe duties and responsibilities created thereby. 
There is a presumption of sanity in favour of tbe validity 
of a marriage, solemnized in due form. However, a guardian 
cannot form an intention to marry on behalf of bis or her 
ward,
(6) A marriage may be annulled on tbe ground that tbe 
consent of tbe petitioner or tbe guardian in marriage, wbere 
necessary, was obtained, before or at tbe time of tbe 
marriage, by force or fraud, Tbe personal consent of tbe 
child bride or groom is not pre-requisite and a cbildbride 
or groom can not have her or bis marriage annulled for non­
age or want of consent, Tbe HMA does not leave open otber
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grounds of nullity which are not specifically listed, none­
theless, a marriage may he annulled where there is total 
want of consent, which may he due to mistake in the identity 
of the person, or due to mistake as to the nature and purpose 
of the ceremony or where the marriage was solemnized during 
intoxication or induced hy drugs, renders the marriage void* 
However, want of ceremonies amounting to mock marriage 
renders the marriage merely voidable*
Force for our purposes may he defined as power 
exerted upon an individual in any way, with an intention to 
overcome his or her will and/or overpower his or her judg­
ment, in order to induce him or her to enter into a marriage 
to which consent would not otherwise have heen given, and 
actually so overcoming and overpowering. The force which 
may negative may consist of threats of death or grievous 
physical harm, or threats of imprisonment or arrest. It may 
also consist of threat of a less serious harm, hut involving 
mental suffering. The test applied in cases of force must 
he the reaction of the particular individual concerned.
Fraud for the purposes of nullity of marriage may 
he defined as a deliberate act of deception and/or dishonesty 
including a concealment or misrepresentation of an existing 
material fact or facts in any way relating to the essence 
of the marriage, and actually inducing that marriage. The 
test to he applied in such a case is, "Did the concealment
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or the misrepresentation go to the root of the marriage. 
Thus, we find that fraudulent concealment and/or misrepre­
sentation in the following regards, relied upon by the 
petitioner and actually inducing him to consent to the 
marriage, may usually he held to he fraud going to the 
”essence1 of the marriage and hence will he sufficient 
ground for annulling a marriage: concealment of:- an inten­
tion not to cohabit and not to have children, sterility and 
physical incapacity, incurahle disease affecting health and 
well-heing of the spouses and their children; misrepresenta­
tion as to:- premarital pregnancy, caste and religion. A 
decree of nullity, however, will usually he denied for mis­
representations as to premarital unchastity, premarital 
status, as to personal qualities, including character, rank, 
family reputation, fortune, temper, hahits and property.
(7) A marriage under HMA and the Kenya Ordinance (in 
Uganda, however, it may come under "fraud") may he
annulled on the ground of concealed-pregnancy at the time of 
marriage. The petitioner has to satisfy the Court, in order 
to obtain the relief that he was ignorant of the facts 
alleged, that the proceedings have heen instituted within 
the prescribed time limit, and that marital intercourse with 
his consent has not taken place since the discovery, by him, 
of the existence of the grounds for a decree.
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The term "ignorant" means, applying an objective 
test, that in the circumstances of the case the petitioner, 
as a reasonable man, was not aware at the time of the 
marriage of the fact that the respondent was pregnant-
The petitioner is barred from petitioning for nullity,
where the petition was presented after the expiration of
time prescribed for its presentation. This time is absolute 
and can not be expended. However, it is submitted that this 
clause should be amended, in order that the period may be 
exrbended to cover the period where the petitioners right 
to nullity has been concealed by the fraud of the respondent.
It is submitted that this clause should be amended to read
"with the discretion of the Court
The term "discovered" means, after applying an 
objective test, that whether the facts before the petitioner 
would have made clear to a reasonable man that the respondent 
was pregnant as alleged. However, the words "intercourse 
with the consent of the petitioner" are meaningless and 
superfluous •
The standard of proof to be followed in a nullity 
suit on the ground of concealed-pregnancy is civil standard 
of proof, i0e#, balance of probabilities. The test to be 
applied in such a case is: whether on the facts and circum­
stances established by the petitioner a prudent man, i,e,,
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the judge, would he completely satisfied as to the facts 
alleged*
(8) A marriage on the ground of venereal disease in a 
communicable form is voidable under the Kenya Ordinance* 
However, under HMA and Uganda Ordinance it may be annulled 
on the ground of fraud to the extent to which non-disclosure 
of advanced staged of venereal disease may amount to fraud* 
The expression in a communicable form" means communica­
ble to any person* The preliminary requirements, the 
standard of proof and the test to be applied in such a case 
are the same as to be applied in a case of concealed- 
pregnancy.
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APPENDIX I
THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
Act 25 of 1955 
[18 May 1955]
An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage
among Hindus
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Sixth Year of the 
Republic of India as follows:
PRELIMINARY
1* Short title and extent
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus domi­
ciled in the territories to which this Act extends who 
are outside the said territories*
2. Application of Act
(1) This Act applies—
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any 
of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, 
a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana
or Arya Samaj,
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh 
by religion, and
(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories 
to which this Act extends who is not a Mulsim, 
Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is 
proved that any such person would not have been 
governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage 
as part of that law in respect of any of the matters 
dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed* 
Explanation* The following persons are Hindus, 
feuddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case 
may be:
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(a) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose 
parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by 
religion;
(b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose 
parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion 
and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, 
group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; 
and
(c) any person who is a convert or re-convert to the 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion*
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection 
(l), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the 
members of any Schedules Tribe within the meaning of 
clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the 
Central Government, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, otherwise directs.
(3) The expression fHindu* in any portion of this Act 
shall be construed as if it included a person who, though 
not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to 
whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained 
in this section.
3* Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(a) the expressions * custom* and *usage* signify any 
rule which, having been continuously and uniformly 
observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law 
among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group 
or family.
Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable 
or opposed to public policy; and
Provided further than in the case of a rule applicable 
only to a family it has not been discontinued by the 
family;
(b) ‘district court* means, in any area for which there 
is a city civil court, that court, and in any other area 
the principal civil court of original jurisdiction,and 
includes any other civil court which may be specified 
by the State Government, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, as having jurisdiction in respect of the matters 
dealt with in this Act;
(c) *full blood* and *half blood* —  two persons are 
said to be related to each other by full blood when 
they are descended from a common ancestor by the
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same wife and by half blood when they are descended 
from a common ancestor but by different wives;
(d) 'uterine blood1 —  two persons are said to be re­
lated to each other by uterine blood when they are 
descended from a common ancestress but by different 
husbands;
Explanation* In clauses (c) and (d), ’ancestor1 includes 
the fattier and ’ancestress* the mother;
(e) ’prescribed* means prescribed by rules made under 
this Act:
(f) (i) 1sapinda relationship1 with reference to any 
person extends as far as the third generation (inclusive) 
in the line of ascent through the mother, and the fifth 
(inclusive) in the line of ascent through the father, 
the line being traced upwards in each case from the 
person concerned, who is to be counted as the first
?eneration;
ii) two persons are said to be ’sapindas1 of each 
other if one is a lineal ascendant of the other 
within the limits of sapinda. relationship, or if they 
have a common lineal ascendant who is within the limits 
°£ sapinda relationship with reference to each of them;
(g) ’degrees of prohibited relationship’ ~  two persons 
are said to be within the ’degress of prohibited relat­
ionship ’ —
(i) if one is a lineal ascendant of the other; or
(ii) if one was the wife or husband of a lineal 
ascendant or descendant of the other; or
(iii) if one was the wife of the brother or of the 
father’s or mother’s brother or of the grandfather’s 
or grandmother’s brother of the other; or
(iv; if the two are brother and sister, uncle and 
niece, aunt and nephew, or children of brother and 
sister or of two brothers or of two sisters: 
Explanation. For the purposes of clauses (f) and (g), 
relationship includes—
(i) relationship by half or uterine blood as well as by 
full blood;
(ii) illegitimate blood relationship as well as legiti­
mate:
(iii) relationship by adoption as well as by blood; 
sind all terms of relationship in those clauses shall 
be construed accordingly.
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4-« Overriding effect of Act
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act* —
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or 
any custom or usage as part of that law in force 
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall 
cease to have effect with respect to any matter for 
which provision is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the 
commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect 
in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the pro­
visions contained in this Act*
HINDU MARRIAGES
5* Conditions for a Hindu marriage
A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, 
if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of 
the marriage;
(ii) neither party is an idiot or a lunatic at the 
time of the marriage;
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of eighteen 
years and the bride the age of fifteen years at the 
time of the marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of pro­
hibited relationship, unless the custom or usage 
governing each of them permits of a marriage between 
the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless 
the custom or usage governing each of them permits
of a marriage between the two;
(vi) where the bride has not completed the age of 
eighteen years, the consent of her guardian in 
marriage, if any, has been obtained for the marriage,
6* Guardianship in marriage
(1) Wherever the consent of a guardian in marriage is 
necessary for a bride under this Act, the persons 
entitled to give such consent shall be the following 
in the order specified hereunder, namely: 
fa) the father;
(b) the mother;
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(c) the paternal grandfather;
(d) the paternal grandmother;
(e) the brother by full blood; as between brothers the 
elder being preferred;
(f) the brother by half blood; as between brothers by 
half blood the elder being preferred:
Provided that the bride is living with him and is being 
brought up by him;
(g) the paternal uncle by full blood; as between 
paternal uncles the elder being preferred;
th) the paternal uncle by half blood; as between 
paternal uncles by half blood the elder being preferred: 
Provided that the bride is living with him and is being 
brought up by him;
(i) the maternal grandfather;
(j) the maternal grandmother;
(k; the maternal uncle by full blood; as between 
maternal uncles the elder being preferred:
Provided that the bride is living with him and is being 
brought up by him#
(2) No person shall be entitled to act as a guardian in 
marriage under the provisions of this section unless such 
person has himself completed his or her twenty-first year*
(3) Where any person entitled to be the guardian in 
marriage under the foregoing provisions refuses, or is for 
any cause unable or unfit, to act as such, the person next 
in order shall be entitled to be the guardian.
(4) In the absence of any such person as is referred to 
in subsection (1), the consent of a guardian shall not be 
necessary for a marriage under this Act.
(5) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of a 
court to prohibit by injunction an intended marriage,
if in the interests of the bride for whose marriage consent 
is required, the court thinks it necessary to do so*
7<> Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage
(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance 
with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party 
thereto•
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi 
(that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom 
and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the 
marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh 
step is taken*
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Registration of Hindu marriages
(1) For the purpose of facilitating the proof of Hindu 
marriages, the State Government may make rules pro­
viding that the parties to any such marriage may have 
the particulars relating to their marriage entered in 
such manner and subject to such conditions as may "be 
prescribed in a Hindu Marriage Register kept for the 
purpose*
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), 
the State Government may, if it is of opinion that it is 
necessary or expedient so to do, provide that the enter­
ing of the particulars referred to in subsection (1) 
shall be compulsory in the State or in any part thereof, 
whether in all cases or in such cases as may be specified, 
and where any such direction has been issued, any person 
contravening any rule made in this behalf shall be 
punishable with fine which may extend to twenty-five 
rupees#
(3) All rules made under this section shall be laid 
before the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after 
they are made*
(4) The Hindu Marriage Register shall at all reasonable 
times be open for inspection, and shall be admissible as 
evidence of the statements therein contained and certified 
extracts therefrom shall, on application, be given by
the Registrar on payment to him of the prescribed fee#
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, 
the validity of any Hindu marriage shall in no way be 
affected by the omission to make the entry#
RESTITUTION OR CONJUGAL RIGHTS 
AND JNDIGIAL SEPARATION
9» Restitution of conjugal rights
(1) When either the husband or the wife has, without 
reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the 
other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the 
district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and 
the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the 
statements made in such petition and that there is no 
legal ground why the application should not be granted, 
mav decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly#
(2) Nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for 
restitution of conjugal rights which shall not be a ground
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for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or 
for divorce,
10* Judicial separation
(1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized 
before or after the commencement of this Act, may 
present a petition to the district court praying for a 
decree for judicial separation on the ground that the 
other party —
(a) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous 
period of not less than two years immediately pre­
ceding the presentation of the petition; or
(b) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as 
to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the 
petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for 
the petitioner to live with the other party; or
(c) has, for a period of not less than one year 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, 
been suffering from a virulent form of leprosy; or
(d) has, for a period.,of not less than three years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the peti­
tion, been suffering from venereal disease in a 
communicable form, the disease not having been con­
tracted from the petitioner; or
(e) has been continuously of unsound mind for a period 
of not less than two years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition; or
Tf) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had 
sexual intercourse with any person other than his or 
her spouse.
Explanation, —  In this section, the expression 
'desertion1, with its grammatical variations and 
cognate expressions, means the desertion of the 
petitioner by the other party to the marriage without 
reasonable cause and without the consent or against 
the wish of such party, and includes the wilful 
neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the 
marriage.
(2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been 
passed, it shall no longer be obligatory for the 
petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the 
court may, on the application by petition of either 
party and on being satisfied of the truth of the state­
ments made in such petition, rescind the decree if it 
considers it just and reasonable to do so.
1* Substituted by Act 73 of 1956, s*2.
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NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
11, Void marriages
Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of 
this Act shall "be null and void and may, on a petition 
presented “by either party thereto, he so declared by a 
decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the 
conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of 
section 5*
12, Voidable marriages
(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after 
the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may 
be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the follow­
ing grounds, namely:
(a; that the respondent was impotent at the time of 
the marriage and continued to be so until the institu­
tion of the proceeding; or
(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the con­
dition specified In clause (ii) of section 5; or
(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the 
consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner 
is required under section 5* the consent of such 
guardian was obtained by force or fraud; or
(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage 
pregnant by some person other than the petitioner,
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), 
no petition for annulling a marriage —
(a^  on the ground specified in clause (c) of subsection 
(l) shall be entertained if —
(i) the petition is presented more than one year 
after the force had ceased to operate or, as the 
case may be, the fraud had been discovered; or
(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full 
consent, lived with the other party to the marriage 
as husband or wife after the force had ceased to 
operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been 
discovered;
(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of subsection 
(1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied—
(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the 
marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;
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(ii) that proceedings have “been instituted in the 
case of a marriage solemnized before the commence­
ment of this Act within one year of such commence­
ment and in the case of marriages solemnized after 
such commencement within one year from the date of 
the marriage; and
(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of 
the petitioner has not taken place since the dis­
covery by the petitioner of the existence of the 
grounds for a decree,
13* Divorce
(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after 
the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition 
presented by either the husband or the wife, be 
dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that 
the other party —
(i) is living in adultery; or
(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to 
another religion; or
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind for a 
continuous period of not less than three years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition; or
(iv) has, for a period of not less than three 
years immediately preceding the presentation of 
the petition, been suffering from a virulent and 
incurable form of leprosy; or
(v) has, for a period of not less than three years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition, been suffering from venereal disease in 
a communicable form; or
(vi) has renounced the world by entering any 
religious order; or
(vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a 
period of seven years or more by those persons 
who would naturally have heard of it, had that 
party been alive; or
(viii) has not resumed cohabitation for a space 
of two years or upwards after the passing of a 
decree for judicial separation against that party; 
or
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(ix) has failed to comply with a decree for resti­
tution of conjugal rights for a period of two years 
or upwards after the passing of the decree
(2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolu­
tion of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the 
ground, —
(i) in the case of any marriage solemnized before 
the commencement of this Act, that the husband had 
married again before such commencement or that 
any other wife of the husband married before such 
commencement was alive at the time of the solemni­
zation of the marriage of the petitioner:
Provided that in either case the other wife is 
alive at the time of the presentation of the
Petition; or
ii) that the husband has, since the solemnization 
of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or 
bestiality.
14-* No petition for divorce to be presented within three 
years of marriage
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it 
shall not be competent for any court to entertain any 
petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of 
divorce, unless at the date of the presentation of the 
petition three years have elapsed since the date of the 
marriage:
Provided that the court may, upon application made to 
it in accordance with such rules as may be made by the 
High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be pre­
sented before three years have elapsed since the date 
of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of 
exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional 
depravity on the part of the respondent, but, if it 
appears to the court at the hearing of the petition 
that the petitioner obtained leave to present the peti­
tion by any misrepresentation or concealment of the 
nature of the case, the court may, if it pronounces a 
decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree 
shall not have effect until after the expiry of three 
years from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the 
petition without prejudice to any petition which may 
be brought after the expiration of the said three years 
upon the same or substantially the same facts as those 
alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.
1. For the effect of the insertion here of clause (la) for 
Uttar Pradesh by Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1962 see§ 384 
above.
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(2) In disposing of any application under this section 
for leave to present a petition for divorce "before the 
expiration of three years from the date of the marriage, 
the court shall have regard to the interests of any 
children of the marriage and to the question whether 
there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation 
between the parties before the expiration of the said 
three years,
15. Divorced persons when may marry again
When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of 
divorce and either there is no right of appeal against 
the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the 
time for appealing has expired without an appeal having 
been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has 
been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party 
to the marriage to marry again.
Provided that it shall not be lawful for the respective 
parties to marry again unless at the date of such 
marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date 
of the decree in the court of the first instance,
16, Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages
Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of any 
marriage under section 11 or section 12, any child 
begotten or conceived before the decree is made who 
would have been the legitimate child of the parties to 
the marriage if it had been dissolved instead of having 
been declared null and void or annulled by a decree of 
nullity shall be deemed to be their legitimate child 
notwithstanding the decree of nullity:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall 
be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage 
which is declared null and void or annulled by a decree 
of nullity any rights in or to the property of any 
person other than the parents in any case where, but 
for the passing of this Act, such child would have been 
incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights 
by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his 
parents•
17* Punishment of bigamy
Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the 
commencement of this Act is void if at the date of
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such marriage either party had a husband or wife 
living; and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 
of the Indian Penal Code^ shall apply accordingly.
18• Punishment for contravention of certain other conditions 
for a Hindu marriage
Every person who procures a marriage of himself or 
herself to be solemnized under this Act in contravention 
of the conditions specified in clauses (iii), (iv), (v) 
and (vi) of section 5 shall be punishable —
(a) in the case of a contravention of the condition 
specified in clause (iii) of section 5» with simple 
imprisonment which may extend to fifteen days, or with 
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with 
both;
(b) in the case of a contravention of the condition 
specified in clause (iv) or clause (v) of section 5» 
with simple imprisonment which may extend to one 
month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand 
rupees, or with both; and
(c; in the case of a contravention of the condition 
specified in clause (vi) of section 5> with fine which 
may extend to one thousand rupees.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
19* Court to which petition should be made
Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the 
district court within the local limits of whose ordinary 
original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized 
or the husband and wife reside or last resided together,
20. Contents and verification of petition
(1) Every petition presented under this Act shall state 
as distinctly as the nature of the case permits the 
facts on which the claim to relief is founded and shall
also state that there is no collusion between the
petitioner and the other party to the marriage.
(2) The statements contained in every petition under
this Act shall be verified by the petitioner or some 
other competent person in the manner required by law
1. 45 of I860.
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for the verification of plaints, and may, at the hearing, 
he referred to as evidence.
21. Application of Act V of 1908
Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act 
and to such rules as the High Court may make in this 
behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regu­
lated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908.
22. Proceedings may be in camera and may not be printed or 
published
(1) A proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in 
camera if either party so desires or if the court so 
thinks fit to do, and it shall not be lawful for any 
person to print or publish any matter in relation to 
any such proceeding except with the previous permission 
of the court.
(2) If any person prints or publishes any matter in 
contravention of the provisions contained in subsection
(1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend 
to one thousand rupees.
23• Decree in proceedings
(1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended 
or not, if the court is satisfied that —
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists 
and the petitioner is not in any way taking advan­
tage of his or her own wrong or disability for the 
purpose of such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the ground 
specified in clause (f) of subsection (1) of 
section 10, or in clause (i) of subsection (1) of 
section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner 
been accessory to or connived at or condoned the 
act or acts complained of, or where the ground of 
the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in 
anv manner condoned the cruelty, and
(c; the petition is not presented or prosecuted in 
collusion with the respondent, and
(d) there has not been any unnecessary or improper 
delay in instituting the proceeding, and
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(e) there is no other legal ground why relief 
should not he granted, 
then, and in such a case, hut not otherwise, the court 
shall decree such relief accordingly.
(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this 
Act, it shall he the duty of the court in the first 
instance, in every case where it is possible so to do 
consistently with the nature and circumstances of the 
case, to make every endeavour to hring ahout a reconcil­
iation between the parties.
24. Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings
Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to 
the court that either the wife or the husband, as the 
case may he, has no independent income sufficient for 
her or his support and the necessary expenses of the 
proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or 
the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petition 
er the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during 
the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the
petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent
it may seem to the court to he reasonable.
25* Permanent alimony and maintenance
(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act 
may, art the time of passing any decree or at any time
subsequent thereto on application made to it for the.
purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case 
may be, order that the respondent shall, while the 
applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for 
her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or 
such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding 
the life of the applicant as, having regard to the 
respondent’s own income and other property, if any,
the income and other property of the applicant and the 
conduct of the parties, it may seem to the court to be 
just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, 
by a charge on the immoveable property of the respondent
(2) If the court is satisfied that there is a change in 
the circumstances of either party at any time after it 
has made an order under subsection (1), it may, at the 
instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any 
such order in such manner as the court may deem just.
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(3) If the court is satisfied that the party in whose 
favour an order has heen made under this section has 
remarried or, if such party is the wife, that she has 
not remained chaste, or, if such party is the husband, 
that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman 
outside wedlock, it shall rescind the order*
26. Custody of children
In any proceeding under this Act, the court may, from 
time to time, pass such interim orders and make such 
provisions in the decree as it may deem just and 
proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and 
education of minor children, consistently with their 
wishes, wherever possible, and may, after the decree, 
upon application by petition for the purpose, make 
from time to time, all such orders and provisions with 
respect to the custody, maintenance and education of 
such children as might have been made by such decree 
or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining 
such decree were still pending, and the court may also 
from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such 
orders and provisions previously made.
27* Disposal of property
In any proceeding -under this Act, the court may 
make such provisions in the decree as it deems just 
and proper with respect to any property presented, at 
or about the time of marriage, which may belong jointly 
to both the husband and the wife.
28. Enforcement of, and appeal from, decrees and orders
All decrees and orders made by the court in any 
proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like 
manner as the decrees and orders of the court made in 
the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction are 
enforced and may be appealed from under any law for 
the time being in force.
Provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject 
of costs only.
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SAVINGS A ED REPEALS
29. Savings
(1) A marriage solemnized between Hindus before the 
commencement of this Act, which is otherwise valid, 
shall not be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been 
invalid by reason only of the fact that the parties 
thereto belonged to the same gotra or pravara or 
belonged to different religions, castes or sub-divisions 
of the same caste.
(2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to 
affect any right recognized by custom or conferred by 
any special enactment to obtain the dissolution of a 
Hindu marriage, whether solemnized before or after the 
commencement of this Act.
(3) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any pro­
ceeding under any law for the time being in force for 
declaring any marriage to be null and void or for 
annulling or dissolving any marriage or for judicial 
separation pending at the commencement of this Act, 
and any such proceeding may be continued and deter­
mined as if this Act had not been passed.
(4-) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to 
affect the provisions contained in the Special Marriage 
Act, 1954-1 with respect to marriages between Hindus 
solemnized under that Act, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act.
[s.30, the repealing section, was itself repealed by Act 58
of I960.]
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APPENDIX II
CHAPTER 157
28 of I960
THE [KENYA] HINDU MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ORDINANCE
Commencement: 19th July I960
An Ordinance to regulate the marriage of, and 
provide for matrimonial causes between, Hindus and 
persons of allied religions,
PART I - PRELIMINARY
1* This Ordinance may be cited as the Hindu Short title. 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance*
2* (1) In this Ordinance, except where the Interpreta- 
context otherwise requires —  tion.
"court" means the Supreme Court;
"custom" means a rule which, having been con­
tinuously observed for a long time, has attained 
the force of law among a community, group or 
family, being a rule that is certain and not un­
reasonable or opposed to public policy; and, in 
the case of a rule applicable only to a family, 
has not been discontinued by the family;
"Hindu" means a person who is a Hindu by 
religion in any form (including a Virashaiva, a 
Lingayat and a follower of the Brahmo. Prarthana 
or Arya Samaj) or a person who is a Buddhist of 
Indian origin, a Jain or a Sikh by religion.
"marriage" means a marriage between Hindus and 
either —
(a) solemnized after the commencement of this 
Ordinance, or
(b) a marriage which, immediately before the 
commencement of this Ordinance, was deemed, under 
section 3 (now repealed) of the Hindu Marriage,
Divorce and Succession Ordinance, to be a valid Cap. 149(194-8) 
marriage or which would have been so deemed if 
it had been solemnized in Kenya, or
3 92
(c) a marriage solemnized under the Special ^  « iqrzi.
Marriage Actv 195^» or the Hindu Marriage Act, p2 „ -,q27
1955> of India, as amended from time to time, and ^ 0 
any enactment substituted therefor;
"of the full blood" means descended from a 
common ancestor by the same wife;
"of the half blood" means descended from a 
common ancestor but by different wives;
"of uterine blood" means descended from a 
common ancestress but by different husbands*
(2) For the purposes of this Ordinance, the 
following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or 
Sikhs, as the case may be—
(a) a person, legitimate or illegitimate, both 
of whose parents are or were Hindus, Buddhists,
Jains or Sikhs by religion;
(b) a person, legitimate or illegitimate, one 
of whose parents is or was a Hindu, a Buddhist, 
a Jain or a Sikh by religion and who has been 
brought up as a member of the community, group 
or family to which such parent belongs or 
belonged;
(c) any person who is a convert or reconvert 
to the Hindu, the Buddhist, Jain or Sikh 
religion*
PART II —  HINDU MARRIAGES
Conditions 3» (1) A marriage may be solemnized
for Hindu if the following conditions are ful-
marriages. filled—
(a) neither party has a spouse living at the 
time of the marriage;
(b) both parties are of sound mind at the time 
of the marriage;
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(c) ttie bridegroom has attained the age of 
eighteen years and the bride the age of 
sixteen years at the time of the marriage;
(d) where the bride has not attained the age
of eighteen years, the consent of her guard­
ian in marriage, if any, has been obtained 
for the marriage;
(e) the parties are not within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity, unless the custom 
governing each of them permits of a marriage 
between them#
(2) For the purposes of this section, two persons 
are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
if —
(a) one is a lineal ancestor of the other;
(b) one was the wife or husband of a lineal 
ancestor or descendant of the other;
(c) one was the wife of the fatherfs or mother’s 
brother or of the grandfather’s or grand­
mother’s brother of the other;
(d) one was the husband of the father's or 
mother's sister or of the grandfather's or 
grandmother's sister of the other;
(e) they are brother and sister, uncle and 
niece, aunt and nephew or children of 
brother and sister or of brothers or sisters; 
or
(f) they have a common ancestor not more than 
two generations distant, if ancestry is 
traced through the mother of the descendant, 
or four generations distant, if ancestry
is traced through the father of the descendant.
(3) The relationships referred to in subsection
(2) of this section include those of the half 
blood and of uterine blood as well as those of the 
full blood, and the illegitimate child and adopted
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child of any person shall he deemed to he respec­
tively the legitimate child and the child of the 
marriage of such person.
4. (1) Wherever the consent of a guardian Guardian- 
in marriage is necessary for a hride under this ship in 
Ordinance, the guardian in marriage shall he—  marriage.
(a) the father; whom failing
(h) the mother; whom failing
(c) the paternal grandfather; whom failing
(d) the paternal grandmother; whom failing
(e) the brother of the full blood, as. between 
brothers the elder being preferred; whom 
failing
(f) the brother of the half blood, as between 
brothers of the half blood the elder being 
preferred, if the bride is living with him 
and is being brought up by him; whom failing
(g) the paternal uncle of the full blood, as 
between paternal uncles the elder being 
preferred; whom failing
(h) the paternal uncle of the half blood, as 
between paternal uncles of the half blood 
the elder being preferred, if the bride is 
living with him and is being brought up by 
him; whom failing
(i) the maternal grandfather; whom failing
(j) the maternal grandmother; whom failing
(k) the maternal uncle of the full blood, as 
between maternal uncles the elder being 
preferred, if the bride is living with him 
and is being brought up by him.
(2) No person shall be entitled to act as 
guardian in marriage under the provisions of this 
section unless such person has himself attained 
the age of twenty-one years.
(3) Where the person entitled to be the guardian 
in marriage refuses, or is for any cause unable or 
unfit, to act, the person next in order shall be 
entitled to be the guardian.
(4) If there is no such person as is referred 
to in sub-section (1) of this section, the consent 
of a guardian in marriage shall not be necessary.
Ceremonies 5* (1) A marriage may be solemnized
for Hindu with the customary rites and cere- 
marriages. monies of either party thereto.
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the 
Saptapadi (that is, the taking of seven steps by 
tHe bridegroom and the bride jointly before the 
sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and 
binding when the seventh step has been taken.
(3) Where the marriage is solemnized in the 
form of Anand Karaj (that is, the going round the 
Granth SaHxb by the bride and bridegroom together), 
the marriage becomes complete and binding as soon 
as the fourth round has been completed.
Eegistra- 6. (1) The Minister may make rules
tion of requiring and prescribing the manner
Hindu of registration of all or any marriages
marriages. solemnized in Kenya.
(2) Separate or different rules may be made with 
respect to the marriages of Hindus belonging to 
different castes or communities0
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing provisions, any such rules may —
(a) require marriages to be compulsorily 
registered;
(b) require the priest or other person perform­
ing the marriage ceremony to issue a certi­
ficate of marriage in the prescribed form;
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(c) require any marriage to be registered within 
the period prescribed by the rules;
(d) impose fees for the issue of certificates 
of marriage and for the issue of copies or 
translations of certificates of marriage;
(e) impose penalties of imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding six months or a fine of not 
more than six thousand shillings, or both, 
for the breach thereof;
(f) provide for the receiving in evidence of 
entries in the register and marriage certifi­
cates, and of certified copies thereof.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
section, the validity of a marriage shall in no 
way be affected by the omission to make an entry 
in any marriage register, nor shall registration 
render valid any marriage which would otherwise be 
invalid.
7. (1) A marriage, whether solemnized before Provisions 
or after the commencement of this Ordinance, as to Hindu
shall not be capable of being dissolved during marriages,
the joint lives of the parties otherwise than 
in accordance with the provisions of this 
Ordinance.
(2) A marriage solemnized under this Ordinance 
shall be a marriage within the meaning of the Cap. 152 
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance.
(3) A marriage solemnized after the commence­
ment of this Ordinance shall be void if the 
former husband or wife of either party was living 
at the time of the marriage and the marriage with 
such former husband or wife was then in force;
and the provisions of section 171 of the Penal Cap.63*
Code shall apply in such a case.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
15 of the Subordinate Courts (Separation and 
Maintenance) Ordinance, the provisions of that Cap. 153* 
Ordinance shall apply in respect of any husband
and wife whose marriage at the commencement of
3 97
this Ordinance is deemed under section 3 (now 
repealed) of the Hindu Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession Ordinance to he a valid marriage or Cap*14-9
would he so deemed if it had heen solemnized (194-8)
in Kenya,
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
15 of the Subordinate Courts (Separation and 
Maintenance) Ordinance, the provisions of that 
Ordinance shall apply to the husband and wife of 
every marriage*
Offences, 8, Whoever solemnizes or procures to 
he solemnized a marriage in respect 
of which any of the conditions spec­
ified in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) 
of subsection (1) of section 3 of 
this Ordinance has not at the time of 
the marriage heen fulfilled shall he 
liable—
(a) in the case of the condition speci­
fied in the said paragraph (c), to 
imprisonment for a term not exceed­
ing fourteen days or to a fine not 
exceeding five hundred shillings, or 
to both such imprisonment and such 
fine;
(h) in the case of the condition specified
in the said paragraph (d), to a fine
not exceeding one thousand shillings; 
and
(c) in the case of the condition specified
in the said paragraph (e), to imprison­
ment for a term not exceeding one month 
or to a fine not exceeding one thousand 
shillings, or to both such imprison­
ment and such fine.
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PART III - MATRIMONIAL CAUSES
Matrimonial 9* Except where and to what extent that 
causes. other provision is made in this Ordin-
Cap.152. ance, the provisions of the Matrimonial
Causes Ordinance shall apply to matri­
monial causes relating to marriages, 
and the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance 
shall, in relation to marriages, he 
subject to the provisions of this Part,
Grounds 10, (1) A petition for divorce may he 
for presented to the court hy either party
divorce, to a marriage whether solemnized before
or after the commencement of this 
Ordinance on the ground that —
(a) the respondent has since the celebration 
of the marriage committed adultery; or
(b) the respondent has deserted the petitioner 
without cause for a period of at least 
three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition; or
(c) the respondent has since the celebration
of the marriage treated the petitioner with 
cruelty; or
(d) the respondent is incurably of unsound 
mind and has been continuously under 
care and treatment for a period of at 
least five years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition; or
(e) the respondent has ceased to be a Hindu 
by reason of conversion to another 
religion; or
(f) the respondent has renounced the world 
by entering a religious order and has 
remained in such order apart from the 
world for a period of at least three 
years immediately preceding the presen­
tation of the petition; or
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(g) a decree of judicial separation has 
been in force "between the parties for 
a period of at least two years immediately 
preceding the presentation of the petition* 
and the parties have not cohabited since 
the date of the decree;
and by the wife on the ground that her husband-
(f) has* since the celebration of the marriage* 
been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality; 
or
(g) in the case of a marriage solemnized 
before the commencement of this Ordinance—
(i) at the time of the marriage was 
already married; or
(ii) married again before such commence­
ment*
the other wife being in either case alive at 
the date of presentation of the petition.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person 
of unsound mind shall be deemed to be under care 
and treatment while he is detained* whether in 
Kenya or elsewhere* in an institution duly recog­
nized by the Government as an institution for the 
care and treatment of insane persons* lunatics or 
mental defectives* or is detained as a criminal 
lunatic under any law for the time being in force; 
and a certificate -under the hand of the Minister 
that any place is a duly recognized institution for 
the purpose of this section shall be receivable 
in all courts as conclusive evidence of that fact*
II* (1) The following are the grounds on 
which a decree of nullity of marriage may be 
made—
(a) in the case of a marriage solemnized 
after the commencement of this 
Ordinance --
Grounds
for
decree of 
nullity,
(i) that either party had a spouse living 
at the time of the marriage* and the 
marriage with such spouse was then in 
force; or
(ii) that the parties are within the pro­
hibited degrees of consanguinity* unless 
the custom governing each of them per­
mits of a marriage between them;
(b) in the case of any marriage* whether sol­
emnized before or after the commencement
of this Ordinance—
(i) that either party was permanently 
impotent* or incapable of consummating 
the marriage* at the time of the 
marriage; or
(ii) that either party was at the time of 
the marriage of unsound mind or subject 
to recurrent fits of insanity or 
epilepsy; or
(iii) that the consent of either party to 
the marriage or of the guardian in 
marriage was obtained by force or fraud 
in any case in which the marriage might 
be annulled on this ground by the law 
of England; or
(iv) that the respondent was at the time
of the marriage suffering from venereal 
disease in a communicable form; or
(v) that the respondent was at the time of 
the marriage pregnant by some person 
other than the petitioner:
Provided that, in the cases specified in sub- 
paragraphs (ii)* (iv) and (v) of paragraph (b) of 
this subsection* the court shall not grant a decree 
unless it is satisfied—
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(i) that the petitioner was at the time of 
the marriage ignorant of the facts 
alleged;
(ii) that proceedings were instituted, in 
the case of a marriage solemnized 
"before the commencement of this Ordin­
ance, within one year after such com­
mencement, and, in the case of any other 
marriage, within one year after the date 
of the marriage; and
(iii) that marital intercourse with the con­
sent of the petitioner has not taken 
place since the discovery by the petit­
ioner of the existence of the grounds
of decree#
(2) (a) Where a decree of nullity is granted 
in respect of a voidable marriage, any child who 
would have been the legitimate child of the parties 
to the marriage if it had been dissolved, instead 
of being annulled, on the date of the decree shall 
be deemed to be their legitimate child notwith­
standing the annulment#
(b) Paragraph (a) of this subsection shall 
not operate so as to confer on a child any rights 
in the property of any person other than its parents 
in any case where, but for this section, suah child 
would have been incapable of acquiring or possess­
ing such rights by reason of its illegitimacy#
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed 
as validating any marriage which is by law void, 
but with respect to which a decree of nullity has 
not been granted#
12# A petition for judicial separation may Grounds for 
be presented to the court by either the husband judicial 
or the wife on any of the following grounds—  separation#
(a) on any of the grounds on which a
petition for divorce might be presented 
by that party; or
(b) that the respondent has deserted the 
petitioner without cause for a period 
of at least two years immediately 
preceding the presentation of the 
petition; or
(c) that the respondent has since the 
celebration of the marriage treated the 
petitioner with cruelty; or
(d) that the respondent has failed to comply 
with a decree for restitution of conjugal 
rights.
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APPENDIX III
EXTRACTS FROM Cap. 112: AN ORDINANCE RELATING TO DIVORCE
[1951]
[THE LAWS OF UGANDA/(Law 1) Vol.Ill]
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Petitions 12. A husband or a wife may present a
for nullity petition to the court praying that his 
of marriage, or her marriage may be declared null and
void.
Grounds 13. (1) The following are the grounds
for decree on which a decree of nullity of marriage 
of nullity, may be made—
(a) that the respondent was permanently impotent 
at the time of the marriage;
(b) that the parties are within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or 
legal) or affinity;
(c) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at 
the time of the marriage;
(d) that the former husband or wife or either 
party was living at the time of the marriage, 
and the marriage with such previous husband or 
wife was then in force;
(e) that the consent of either party to the 
marriage was obtained by force or fraud, in any 
case in which the marriage might be annulled on 
this ground by the law of England.
(2) If the court finds that the petitioner’s case has 
been proved it shall pronounce a decree nisi declaring 
the marriage to be null and void.
14. Where a marriage is annulled on the ground Children
that a former husband or wife was living, end of annulled
it is found that the subsequent marriage was marriage,
contracted in good faith and with the full 
belief of the parties that the former husband
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or wife was dead, or where a marriage is annulled on 
the ground of insanity, children begotten before the 
decree nisi is made shall be specified in the decree, 
and shall be entitled to succeed in the same manner 
as legitimate children to the estate of the parent 
who at the time of the marriage was competent to 
contract*
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APPENDIX IV
[THE UGANDA] HINDU MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ORDINANCE, 1961.
No.2 of 1961.
An Ordinance To Regulate The Marriage Of And Provide Por 
Matrimonial Causes Between Hindus And Persons Of Allied 
Religions.
[BY NOTICE]
Enacted by the Legislature of the Uganda Protectorate.
1. This Ordinance may be cited as the Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1961, and shall 
come into force on a date to be appointed by 
the Governor by notice in the Gazette.
2. (1) In this Ordinance, unless the context 
otherwise requires —  "custom" means a rule 
which, having been continuously observed for 
a long time, has attained the force of law 
among a community, group, or family, being a 
rule that is certain and not unreasonable or 
opposed to public policy and, in the case of 
a rule applicable only to a family, has not 
been discontinued by the family;
"Hindu” means a person who is a Hindu by 
religion in any form (including a Virashaiva, a 
Lingayat and a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana 
or Arya Samaj) or a person who is a Buddhist of 
Indian origin, a Jain or a Sikh by religion;
"marriage” means a marriage between Hindus 
which is either —
(a) a marriage solemnized under the provisions 
of this Ordinance; or
Short 
title and 
commence­
ment.
Interpreta­
tion.
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Ob) a marriage (including a polygamous 
marriage) solemnized before the commencement 
of this Ordinance inside or outside the 
Protectorate and recognised as such by both 
parties; or
No*28 (c) a marriage solemnized under the pro­
of I960. visions of the Hindu Marriage and Divorce
Noo4-3 Ordinance, I960, of the Colony and Protectorate
of 1954*• of Kenya, the Special Marriage Act, 1954-, of
No.25 India or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? of
of 1955« India, or any enactment substituted for that
Ordinance or those Acts; or
(d) a marriage declared by the Minister by 
notice in the Gazette to be a marriage for 
the purposes of this Ordinance;
"Minister" means the Minister for the time 
being responsible for the administration of 
this Ordinance;
,Tof the full blood" means descended from a 
common ancestor by the same wife;
"of the half blood" means descended from a 
common ancestor but by different wives;
"of uterine blood" means descended from a 
common female ancestor but different husbands.
(2) Por the purposes of this Ordinance, the 
following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jains 
or Sikhs, as the case may be—
(a) a person, legitimate or illegitimate, both 
of whose parents are or were Hindus, Buddhists, 
Jains or Sikhs by religion;
(b) a person, legitimate or illegitimate, one 
of whose parents is or was a Hindu, a Buddhist, 
a Jain or a Sikh by religion and who has been 
brought up as a member of the community, group 
or family to which such parent belongs or 
belonged;
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(c) any person who is a convert or reconvert 
to the Hindu, the Buddhist, Jain or Sikh 
religion.
Conditions
for
marriage•
(b) both parties are of sound mind at the 
time of the marriage;
(c) the bridegroom has attained the age of 
eighteen years and the bride the age of six­
teen years at the time of the marriage;
(d) where the bride has not attained the age 
of eighteen years, the consent of her guardian 
in marriage, if any, has been obtained for 
the marriage;
(e) the parties are not within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity, unless the cuatom 
governing each of them permits of a marriage 
between them.
(2) For the purposes of this section two 
persons are within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity if— -
(a) one is a lineal ancestor of the other;
(b) one was the wife or husband of a lineal 
ancestor or descendant of the other;
(c) one was the wife of the fatherfs or 
mother1s brother or of the grandfather1s or 
grandmother1s brother of the other;
(d) one was the husband of the fatherfs or 
mother’s sister or of the grandfather’s or 
grandmother’s sister of the other;
(e) they are brother and sister, uncle and 
niece, aunt and nephew or children of brother 
and sister or of brothers or sisters; or
3* (1) A marriage may be solemnized if the 
following conditions are fulfilled—
(a) neither party has a spouse living at the 
time of the marriage;
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(f) they have a common ancestor not more than 
two generations distant (if ancestry is traced 
through the mother of the descendant) or four 
generations distant (if ancestry is traced 
through the father of the descendant),
(3) The relationships referred to in subsection (2) 
of this section shall include those of the half blood 
and of uterine blood as well as those of the full 
blood, and the illegitimate child and adopted child of 
any person shall be deemed to be respectively the 
legitimate child and the child of the marriage of such 
person*
Guardian- 4* (1) Wherever the consent of a guardian in
ship in marriage is necessary for a bride under this
marriage. Ordinance the guardian in marriage shall be—
(a) the father; whom failing
(b) the mother; whom failing
(c) the paternal grandfather; whom failing
(d) the paternal grandmother; whom failing
(e) the brother of the full blood, as between 
brothers the elder being preferred; whom 
failing
(f) the paternal uncle of the full blood, as 
between paternal uncles the elder being pre­
ferred; whom failing
(g) the maternal grandfather; whom failing
(h) the maternal grandmother.
(2) No person shall be entitled to act as guardian 
in marriage under the provisions of this section unless 
such person has himself attained the age of twenty-one 
years,
(3) Where the person entitled to be the guardian in 
marriage refuses, or is for any cause unable or unfit, 
to act, the person next in order shall be entitled to 
be the guardian.
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(4) If there is no such person as is referred to 
in subsection (1) of this section, a guardian in 
marriage may be appointed by a first-class magistrate 
on the application of any interested party*
Ceremonies (1) A marriage may be solemnized in
for accordance with the customary rites and
marriages* ceremonies of either party thereto#
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include 
Saptapadi (that is, the taking of seven
steps by uhe "bridegroom and the bride jointly 
before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes 
complete and binding when the seventh step 
has been taken#
(3) Where the marriage is solemnized in the 
form of Anand Karan (that is, the going round 
the G-ranth Sahib by the bride and bridegroom 
together), the marriage becomes complete and 
binding as soon as the fourth round has been 
completed.
Registra­
tion of 
marriages,
6# (1) The Minister shall make rules-—
(a) requiring marriages to be registered 
within a period to be prescribed in the rules; 
and
(b) requiring the priest or other person per­
forming the marriage ceremony to issue a 
certificate of marriage in a form to be 
prescribed in the rules; and
(c) imposing fees for the issue of certificates 
of marriage and for the issue of copies or 
translations of such certificates; and
(d) providing for the receiving in evidence
of entries in the register and marriage certif­
icates and of certified copies thereof; and
(e) providing for anything incidental to or 
connected with the registration of marriages.
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Bigamy,
etc.
(Tap *22 a
Offences.
(2) Rules made under the provisions of this 
section may provide that any person who contra­
venes or fails to comply with any provision 
thereof shall he guilty of an offence and shall 
he liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand 
shillings.
(3) All fees collected in pursuance of rules 
made under the provisions of this section 
shall he paid into the general revenue of the 
Protectorate,
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
section, the validity of a marriage shall in 
no way he affected hy the omission to make an 
entry in any marriage register nor shall 
registration render valid any marriage which 
would otherwise he invalid.
7. (1) A marriage solemnized after the 
commencement of this Ordinance shall he void 
if the former hushand or wife of either party 
was living at the time of the marriage and the 
marriage with such former hushand or wife was 
then in force, and the provisions of section 
150 of the Penal Code shall apply in such a 
case.
(2) A marriage, whether solemnized before or 
after the commencement of this Ordinance, shall 
not he capable of being dissolved during the 
joint lives of the parties otherwise than in 
accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance.
8. Whoever solemnizes or procures to he 
solemnized a marriage in respect of which anv 
of the conditions specified in paragraphs (c),
(d) and (e) of subsection (1) of section 3 of 
this Ordinance has not at the time of the 
marriage been fulfilled shall he liable—
(a) in the case of the condition specified in 
paragraph (c) of that subsection to a fine 
not exceeding five hundred shillings;
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Matrimonial
causes*
Cap*112.
(b) in the case of the conditions specified in 
paragraph, (d) of that subsection to a fine not 
exceeding one hundred shillings; and
(c) in the case of the condition specified in 
paragraph (e) of that subsection to a fine not 
exceeding one thousand shillings.
9* (1) Subject to the provisions of this 
section, the Divorce Ordinance shall apply to 
marriages and to matrimonial causes relating 
to marriages*
(2) In addition to the grounds for divorce 
mentioned in the Divorce Ordinance, a petition 
for divorce may be presented—
(a) by either party to a marriage on the 
ground that—
(i) the respondent has ceased to be a 
Hindu by reason of conversion to 
another religion; or
(ii) the respondent has renounced the 
world by entering a religious order and 
has remained in such order apart from 
the world for a period of at least three 
years immediately preceding the presenta­
tion of the petition; and
(b) by the wife, in the case of a marriage 
solemnized before the commencement of this 
Ordinance, on the ground that her husband—
(i) at the time of the marriage was 
already married; or
(ii) married again before the commence­
ment of this Ordinance, the other wife 
being in either case alive at the date 
of presentation of the petition.
(3) A decree of nullity of marriage—
(a) shall not be granted on the ground that 
the parties are within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity if the custom 
governing each party permits a marriage 
between them;
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Cb) in the case of a marriage solemnized 
before the commencement of this Ordinance 
shall not be granted on the grounds that 
the former husband or wife of either party 
was living at the time of the marriage and 
the marriage with such previous husband or 
wife was then in force; and
(c) may be granted on the ground that the 
consent of a guardian in marriage was 
necessary under the provisions of this 
Ordinance and was obtained by force or 
fraud.
(4) In this section references to the Divorce 
Ordinance include a reference to any Ordinance 
replacing that Ordinance.
PASSED in the Legislative Council on the 9th 
day of Eebruary* 1961.
Ph. PULLICINO, 
Clerk of Council
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